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INTRODUCTION
People involved in a social interaction can be thought of as being temporarily con-
nected. This connection starts, for example, in the motor system of person A, which
leads to observable behavior that is perceived and interpreted by the primary sensory
and higher cortices of person B. This in turn can lead to activity in the motor system
of person B, which leads to observable behavior that can be perceived and interpreted
by person A, and so on. This connection is dynamic and dependent on events in the
interaction, such as changes in direction of eye gaze, the words being said and the
gestures being made. In this thesis, we investigate such a communicative connection
on a neural level. This research is inspired both by theories explaining how humans
understand each other and by the methodological advancements in connectivity
analyses.
1.1 MIRRORING AND SIMULATION THEORY
Over the past few decades it has become clear that perception and action are closely
linked in the human brain. They do not function as two independent modules,
but instead represent a continuum. This relationship becomes clear when you, for
example, try to execute an action while simultaneously observing someone else
doing an action. The action you observe inﬂuences the action you want to do. If the
observed action is similar to the one you want to execute, it can speed up reaction
time. When the two actions are dissimilar, it can, however, slow down reaction time
(Kilner et al., 2003; Brass et al., 2000; Craighero et al., 2002). Conversely, the way we
perceiveanactioncanbeinterferedbytheconcurrentplanningofanaction(Müsseler
and Hommel, 1997; Hamilton et al., 2004). These bidirectional inﬂuences between
perception and action led to the idea that these two processes are represented in a
similar code (common coding theory, Prinz, 1990). This in turn inspired the core
idea of simulation theory: we understand other people by transforming their actions
into our own motor-representations of that action and thereby we internally simulate
doing that action (Goldman, 1992; Gibson, 1986; Gallese, 2003).
The idea of simulation received neurophysiological support with the discovery
of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons were originally discovered in area F5 (ventral
premotor cortex) of the Macaque monkey and have the special property of ﬁring
both when executing and perceiving (viewing or listening to) a goal-directed hand
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action (Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 1996; Ferrari et al., 2003; Fujii et al., 2007;
Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002; Umiltà et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). This
discovery constitutes an important step in neuroscience, because it conﬁrmed the
idea that perception and action are inextricably linked on a neural level. Shortly after
their discovery, mirror neurons were regarded as the neural basis of the simulation
theory of action understanding (Gallese and Goldman, 1998).
In the human brain, there is strong evidence that ﬁve regions contain mirror neu-
rons: the ventral and dorsal premotor cortex (Kilner et al., 2009; Lingnau et al., 2009),
thesupplementarymotorarea(Mukameletal.,2010),theinferiorparietallobe(Chong
et al., 2008), and the temporal lobe (Mukamel et al., 2010). Currently, the two methods
that provide the strongest evidence for mirror neurons in humans are (cross-modal)
repetition suppression paradigms (Kilner et al., 2009; Lingnau et al., 2009; Chong
et al., 2008) and measurement of extracellular activity (Mukamel et al., 2010). These
ﬁndings were preceded by experiments showing that perception of an action activates
brain regions known in the literature or measured in the same participants to be
involved in generating the same actions (Buccino et al., 2001; Grafton et al., 1996;
Grèzes et al., 1998; Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Grèzes et al., 2003; Nishitani and Hari,
2000, 2002; Perani et al., 2001; Gazzola et al., 2007b,a; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). All
these studies culminated in the idea of a putative Mirror Neuron System in the human
brain(KeysersandGazzola,2009)consistingoftheventralanddorsalpremotorcortex,
the inferior parietal lobe, and the middle temporal lobe (see Figure 1.1). Furthermore,
several other brain areas show an overlap between the experience and observation of
for example emotions (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Wicker et al., 2003; Jabbi et al., 2007),
andsensations(Singeretal.,2004;Keysersetal.,2004,2010;Blakemoreetal.,2005). In
particular, there is accumulating evidence that BA 2, involved in sensing how our own
body moves and in action observation and execution, represents a ‘somatosensory’
branch of the pMNS (Keysers et al., 2010).
Mirror neurons were originally conceptualized as motor neurons in the macaque
monkey’s brain that responded selectively to perceptual input. While it becomes
more and more clear that mirroring is a more general mechanism of the human brain,
it has been suggested to extend the deﬁnition of a mirror neuron to “any neuron
involved in the execution of a motor action that shows signiﬁcant vicarious activity to
the observation of corresponding actions performed by others” (Keysers and Gazzola,
2009).
Simulation theory and the idea of mirroring have received much scientiﬁc attention
and have led to the idea that it is one of the basic principles of human interaction. It
hasbeenimplicatedinmanysocialskills,suchasimitation(Iacobonietal.,1999;Koski
et al., 2003; Hurley, 2008), empathy (Fujii et al., 2007; Fogassi et al., 2005; Gazzola et al.,
2006; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002; Umiltà et al.,
2001), mind-reading (Gallese, 2003; Gallese and Goldman, 1998), facial expressions1.2 MENTALIZING 3
Dorsal premotor cortex
Ventral premotor cortex
Parietal lobule
Middle temporal gyrus left hemisphere right hemisphere
Medial prefrontal cortex Temporal-parietal junction
left hemisphere right hemisphere right hemisphere left hemisphere
putative Mirror Neuron System 
Mentalizing brain areas
Figure 1.1: Areas constituting the putative Mirror Neuron System and the mentalizing
system in the human brain.
(van der Gaag et al., 2007), joint action (Kokal et al., 2009; Newman-Norlund et al.,
2008, 2007) and language (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Arbib, 2008).
1.2 MENTALIZING
Besides simulation as a mechanism to understand others, people have the capacity to
think about and understand others on a more reﬂective level. This can be illustrated
with a typical scene from a soap opera, such as the Bold and the Beautiful: Taylor
and Ridge are about to get married. Without Taylor knowing this, Brooke is about
to confess that she is pregnant with Ridge’s baby. She hopes that by revealing this
she can prevent this marriage from happening. To understand and appreciate such a
situation, we have to be able to track what all characters involved know, what they
do not know and predict what they will think when they will ﬁnd out. This ability to
attribute mental states, beliefs and desires to others is called having a Theory of Mind
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983). The process of reasoning
about other people’s mental states is often referred to as mentalizing (Frith and Frith,
1999).
Neuroimaging studies have identiﬁed several brain areas that are associated with4 INTRODUCTION
mentalizing, such as the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the temporal
poles, the temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), precuneus and the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC). The two most important of these seem to be the mPFC and the TPJ
(seeFigure1.1)andtogetherthesearereferredtoasthementalizingsystem(Overwalle
and Baetens, 2009; Carrington and Bailey, 2009).
The mPFC is involved in a multitude of social cognitive tasks (Amodio and Frith,
2006), such as mentalizing (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al.,
2001; Mitchell et al., 2005; Grèzes et al., 2004), person perception (Mitchell et al., 2002;
Bonda et al., 1996), but also self-reﬂection (Ochsner and Gross, 2004; van der Meer
et al., 2010), emotional processing (Ochsner and Gross, 2004), intention attribution
(Brunet et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008;
Kampe et al., 2003), and autobiographical memory (Spreng et al., 2009). Damage
to this area commonly leads to poor performance on mentalizing tasks (Rowe et al.,
2001; Stuss et al., 2001; Gregory et al., 2002; Adenzato et al., 2010). One study, however,
failed to ﬁnd a deﬁcit in ToM reasoning in a patient with medial frontal damage (Bird
et al., 2004), suggesting that the mPFC is not the only area involved in mentalizing.
The TPJ (in particular in the right hemisphere, rTPJ) has also been associated with
many different functions related to mentalizing (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Apperly
et al., 2004; Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000; Samson et al., 2004; Saxe, 2006;
Sommer et al., 2007), intention attribution (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Noordzij et al.,
2009), perspective-taking (Ruby and Decety, 2003), and sense of agency (Decety and
Lamm, 2007; Blakemore and Frith, 2003). An unresolved question remains whether
activity in the TPJ is unique to mentalizing processes or whether it can be attributed
to lower-level computational processes such as attention re-orienting (Corbetta et al.,
2008; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008; Young et al., 2010).
1.3 MIRRORING, MENTALIZING, AND COMMUNICATION
There has been a lot of debate about which of the two theories (theory of mind or sim-
ulation theory) can explain most of human interpersonal understanding (Gallagher,
2007; Hickok, 2009; Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Many now believe that mentalizing is a
separate mechanism from the more basic, low-level motor simulation (Uddin et al.,
2007; de Lange et al., 2008; Brass et al., 2007; Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). Thus
the debate has shifted to the more fruitful question of how these two systems work
together to achieve a full understanding of other people (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007).
The charades experiment that is central to this thesis was set up in part to investigate
this issue.
Charades is a social communicative game in which one participant has to use ges-
tures, rather than verbal communication, to convey a concept to another participant.1.4 THE CHARADES EXPERIMENT 5
This type of gestural communication essentially boils down to using a sequence of
hand-actions to inﬂuence the mental state of another person. In this way, it provides
a good means to study the involvement of both pMNS and mentalizing areas. Further-
more, gestural communication seems to be a primitive form of more sophisticated
verbal communication and may have played a crucial role in language evolution
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Arbib, 2008; Gentilucci and Corballis, 2006). Interestingly,
in the human brain, the production and perception of language seem to recruit sim-
ilar brain regions, which also overlap partly with the premotor node of the pMNS.
Gestural communication is therefore an interesting link between the mirror system
as studied in non-human animals (such as the Macaque monkey and the swamp
sparrow (Galleseetal.,1996;Rizzolattietal., 1996;Prather etal.,2008))andtheunique
language skills of humans.
1.4 THE CHARADES EXPERIMENT
In the charades experiment couples of participants played the game of charades
by taking turns gesturing and guessing concepts in the MR-scanner. Participants
were presented with a word on the screen (either an action or an object, for example
nutcracker, knitting, shaving) and were instructed to convey the meaning of this word
by gestures. Their gestures were recorded on video and presented to their partners,
who went into the MR-scanner to guess what their partner had gestured. The partners
had to push a button when they thought they knew what word was being portrayed.
After a while, the two partners switched roles, with the former gesturer becoming
the guesser and vice-versa. Both partners guessed and gestured 14 words in total.
On a different day, they returned for the control condition in which they observed
exactly the same movies of their gesturing partner, but now with the instruction
to try not to interpret the gestures. In this way, we recorded the brain activity of
both partners in the social interaction and during a control condition with the same
gesture-recordings, but with a different instruction.
fMRI experiments are intrinsically rendered artiﬁcial by the fact that participants
have to lie down on an MR-bed with their head strapped within a head-coil. This
artiﬁciality is worsened by the fact that stimuli have to be repeated more than ten
times to result in a reliable fMRI-signal. Therefore, we wanted to create an experi-
mental situation that is as close to the real world as possible. We did this by letting
participants play the actual game of charades together. Both partners were present
while scanning and they reported enjoying the game. They indicated to have tried
their best to gesture the concepts as comprehensible as possible. This might not
have been the case if we would have had the participants come on different days, for
example, or if we would have used one set of gestured concepts and shown these to6 INTRODUCTION
different guessers. Furthermore, we did not impose a strict temporal structure on
the timing of the experiment. Gestures could be made freely during a period of at
least 50s dedicated to each concept and hardly any constraints: no restrictions on the
amount of arm movements or eye gaze, no ﬁxed number of repetitions for one word
and no separation in planning and execution phase.
The charades experiment allowed us to investigate several research questions. First,
we wanted to analyze the involvementofmirroringand mentalizing areas in gesturing
and guessing concepts. Given that the pMNS maps goal-directed hand actions onto
the motor programs for the execution of those actions, we hypothesized that parts of
the areas involved in generating communicative actions would also become activated
during the observation of these actions. Furthermore, we reasoned that activity
during gesture production may reﬂect a theory of mind of how the partner might
interpret the gestures, and activity during gesture interpretation may reﬂect a theory
ofmindofwhatthepartnermighthavemeantwhilegeneratingthegestures. Thus, we
hypothesized that pMNS areas would be involved in all three experimental conditions
(gesturing, guessing and passive observation), while mentalizing areas would show
activity during gesturing and guessing, but not during passive observation.
Second, besides studying activity patterns within either the gesturer or guesser’s
brain, we wanted to study the ‘connectivity’ between the brains of gesturer and
guesser. Of course, no direct neural connectivity between two different brains exists.
Here, ‘connectivity’ refers to the fact that the brain activity of the gesturer is linked to
the brain activity of the guesser through an external chain of events: activity in the
brain of the gesturer produces observable gestures which are video recorded and later
observed by the guesser which again leads to brain activity. This research question
was based on the hypothesis put forward by simulation theory that mirror neurons
of an observer would resonate1 with the actions of others. Our hypothesis was that
pMNS areas of the gesturer would have a measurable inﬂuence on pMNS areas of the
guesser.
Third, we wanted to investigate the inﬂuences from and to pMNS areas within the
brain of the guesser. The inclusion of relatively long blocks of gesture observation
in the experiment allowed us to compare hypotheses generated by different models
of the pMNS. A classic account of the pMNS during action observation could be de-
scribed as strictly feed-forward. This account is inherent to many descriptions of the
anatomyofthepMNS,andappliestheconceptofaninvertedforwardmodel to action
observation (Kilner et al., 2007). A forward model, derived from motor control theory
sends a copy of motor commands to sensory areas to predict sensory and propriocep-
tive consequences of that action. This would predict that action observation leads
to a predominantly temporal ! parietal ! premotor ﬂow of information in which
1 The term ‘resonance’ is here used in a rather loose sense as opposed to a strict physical meaning of the
word, see paragraph 4.11.5 GRANGER CAUSALITY 7
a visual/auditory representation of an action is transformed into the corresponding
motor-programs, which contributes to action understanding. An alternative account
sees the pMNS as a dynamic feedback control system. This latter model is inspired
by both forward and inverse models from motor control theory (Wolpert et al., 2003;
Voss et al., 2006; Greenwald, 1970). An inverse model, in contrast to a forward model,
calculates what motor commands should be executed to achieve a certain goal or
end-state2 (Wolpert et al., 2003). A dynamic feedback control system view of the
pMNS incorporates both forward and inverse models and furthermore assumes that
the forward model is inhibitory, while the inverse model is excitatory. Combined,
this predicts that when we see a predictable chain of events, the beginning is fully
represented in the visual cortex and triggers motor programs through the inverse
model. These motor programs are then ‘forwarded’ to predict future visual (and
somatosensory) stimuli. If these stimuli conform to the predictions, they will be
inhibited. The visual ! premotor stream of information is reduced and the premotor
representations triggered will not be substantially updated. If the visual information
violates the predictions, it will not be inhibited, leading to a renewed visual ! pre-
motor stream of information and an update of the motor representations. Thus, a
dynamic feedback control system would predict that action observation leads to a
predominantly premotor ! parietal ! temporal ﬂow of information because of a
combination of inhibitory forward and excitatory inverse models.
1.5 GRANGER CAUSALITY
To investigate directed inﬂuences between brain regions within and between brains,
we used Granger causality mapping. Granger causality is a measure of directed
inﬂuence between two time series. Originally conceptualized in the econometric
ﬁeld by Wiener and formalized by Granger (Wiener, 1956; Granger, 1969), it was
introduced as a connectivity analysis for fMRI data in 2003 by Goebel et al. (2003) and
Roebroeck et al. (2005). Clive Granger formalized causality between two time series
using the intuitively appealing concept of temporal precedence: if a signal change in
A is consistently followed by a signal change in B, A Granger-causes B. Mathematically,
this is calculated by comparing two regression equations: one in which the current
value of a time series yi is explained by its own past (yi¡j) with one in which the same
time series yi is explained both by its own past and the past of another time series
(xi¡j). This results in error variances, whose F-ratio quantiﬁes the inﬂuence x exerts
on y. The converse inﬂuence of y on x is also calculated and the difference between
2 This might sound confusing, as the strictly feed-forward account that is described seems to have the
same characteristics as an inverse model. However, Kilner et al. (2007) write: “[...] there is no separate
inverse model or controller; a forward model is simply inverted by suppressing the prediction error
generated by the forward model”.8 INTRODUCTION
the two reveals the dominant direction of inﬂuence between the two time series.
In this way, Granger causality provides a statistical measure of directed inﬂuences
between brain regions and has the advantage that it does not require an underlying
anatomical model. It maps inﬂuences from a certain seed region to the rest of that
brain and vice versa.
When we apply Granger causality on data of different brains, the inﬂuences from a
certain seed in the gesturer are mapped on the brain of the guesser. Thus, a map of
the guesser will show the brain regions that are inﬂuenced by the seed of the gesturer
morethantheotherwayaround. Thisresultisthusthenetinﬂuencebetweengesturer
and guesser (gesturer ! guesser ¡ guesser ! gesturer). In our experiment the guesser
! gesturer inﬂuence immediately served as a control quantity, because the one-way
nature of the information ﬂow provided by the video-camera and screen ensured that
information could only ﬂow from the gesturer to the guesser.
1.6 GRANGER CAUSALITY AND THE BOLD RESPONSE
Results of Granger causality analyses of fMRI data are interpreted as indications of
information ﬂow on a neuronal level. This is an indirect inference, however, as fMRI
measures BOLD responses rather than neuronal activity directly. The BOLD response
(Blood Oxygen Level Dependent response) is essentially a measure of changes in de-
oxyhemoglobin level triggered by changes in neural activity. It is assumed to originate
from neural activity, predominantly synaptic (Logothetis et al., 2001; Logothetis and
Wandell, 2004), but unfolds later in time (» 4 - 6s). The temporal characteristics of
the hemodynamic response that links neural activity to changes in the BOLD signal
is not equal across brain regions and participants (Rajapakse et al., 1998; Aguirre
et al., 1998; Kruggel and von Cramon, 1999; Handwerker et al., 2004) and this variabil-
ity is assumed to cause problems for Granger causality analyses (David et al., 2008;
de Marco et al., 2009; Roebroeck et al., 2005; Friston, 2009; Chang et al., 2008). One
fear is that a systematic difference in hemodynamic response between two regions
might introduce temporal precedence where there was none, leading to the report
of spurious Granger causality ﬁndings. Another fear is that a difference in hemody-
namic response might invert the reported direction of Granger causality. The intuitive
idea behind this is as follows: If region A causes neural activity changes in region B
and region B has a faster hemodynamic response than region A, a Granger causality
analysis of the BOLD signal might indicate a net inﬂuence going from B to A rather
than the true underlying neural causality that goes from A to B.
In a between-brains analysis, these hemodynamic differences between brain re-
gions and individuals pose less of a problem because the time lags between neural
activity in the two brains, in the order of seconds, larger than differences in hemody-1.7 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 9
namic delay, in the order of tenth of seconds (Handwerker et al., 2004). In a within-
brain analysis, however, this issue is more pressing. In a recent study, Deshpande et al.
(2009) has investigated the effect of the variability of hemodynamic responses be-
tweentwobrainregionsofonesubjectonGrangercausalityanalyses. Theyfoundthat
even when intra-subject differences in hemodynamic response function are present,
Granger causality is still sensitive to inﬂuences in the order of a hundred milliseconds.
However, the effect of inter- and intrasubject differences on a group level had never
been investigated. We examined if Granger causality can indeed deduce the domi-
nant ﬂow of neural information even when differences in hemodynamic response are
present between different brain regions and between participants, before we applied
Granger causality on our data to investigate the connectivity from and to the pMNS.
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
In Chapter 2 we review functional and lesion studies on the neural substrates of the
perception and production of both language and action. In particular, Broca’s area
(here taken to indicate BA 44, BA 45 and the ventral part of BA 6) is important for per-
ception and production of both language and action. Broca’s area overlaps partly with
the premotor node of the pMNS and in this chapter we discuss several theories about
why language and action share common substrates. The remainder of this thesis
focuses on non-verbal communication. Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 describe
results of the charades experiment. Chapter 3 describes both a whole-brain analysis
andaregion-of-interestanalysisofthecharadesdata. Themainquestionistowhatex-
tent the pMNS and mentalizing areas are involved in gesturing and guessing concepts
during the game charades. Furthermore, we analyzed how activity in these regions is
dependent on the intention induced by the task, by comparing activity during guess-
ing and passive observation. The aim of Chapter 4 is to investigate the information
ﬂow between brains during the game charades. We extend Granger causality, which
is usually applied within one brain, to a between-brain Granger causality. Then, we
used brain activity of the gesturer to map regions in the brain of the guesser, whose
brain activity has a Granger causal relation with brain activity of the gesturer. Our
hypothesis is that pMNS areas show a dependency between brains, following from
the resonance property of the pMNS. In Chapter 5 we investigate a possible confound
of Granger causality: inter- and intrasubject variability in hemodynamic responses.
We performed simulations to systematically investigate the effect of hemodynamic
response, neuronal delay and connectivity strength on the result of Granger causality
analyses on group level. We ﬁrst tested whether this variability could lead to false
positive results. Then we investigated whether differences in hemodynamic response
could lead to inverted directions on group level. In Chapter 6 we use Granger causal-10 INTRODUCTION
ity within one brain to investigate how areas of the pMNS inﬂuence each other and
other areas of the brain during guessing and observation of gestures. We compare
two different models of the pMNS, the pMNS as a dynamic feedback control system
versus the pMNS as a strict feedforward system, by testing the conﬂicting hypotheses
that these models generate. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with an overview of the
current work and some ﬁnal remarks.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ABSTRACT
A distinction between action perception and production has always been emphasized by
traditional accounts of brain function. The goal of this review is to show that this simple
distinction seems no longer valid. Broca’s area in particular seems to be important for both
perception and production of language and action. Functional imaging studies suggest
that Broca’s area is active both when people produce and perceive syntactically complex
sentences and while they produce and perceive complex actions. Lesions in this area disrupt
the capacity to produce syntactically correct sentences and to perceive sentences in which
syntax is essential. From an action-perspective, lesions to Broca’s area disrupt the capacity to
produce goal directed actions and to perceive the actions of others. Furthermore, the property
and location of mirror neurons in the monkey might provide the reason why Broca’s area in
humans has a dual function in production and perception.
.........................................................................................
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditional accounts of brain function have often emphasized a distinction between
action perception and production. For instance, the occipital and temporal lobe
were considered to deal with visual and auditory perception while the frontal lobe
was considered to deal with the production of goal directed actions. In the domain
of language as well, the classic distinction between Wernicke and Broca’s aphasia
suggested that one part of the brain deals with perceiving what other people say while
the other deals with producing speech.
1 Authors contributed equally to this bookchapter
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The goal of this review is to show that this simple distinction seems no longer valid.
In particular, we will show how both in the domain of language and action, a brain
area, called Broca’s Area, seems to be important for both perception and production.
Finally, we will show how mirror neurons help us understand why and how a certain
brain area can be important in both perception and production.
We will start by explaining where Broca’s area is located in the brain. We will then
show how lesions in this area disrupt the capacity to produce syntactically correct
sentences and to perceive sentences in which syntax is essential. We will then show
that lesions to Broca’s area disrupt the capacity to produce goal directed actions
and to perceive the actions of others. We will then review data from functional
imaging studies that suggest that Broca’s area is active both when people produce
and perceive syntactically complex sentences and while they produce and perceive
complex actions. Finally, we will review the property and location of mirror neurons
in the monkey and suggest that they may be the reason why Broca’s area in humans
has a dual function in production and perception.
2.2 BROCA’S ANATOMY
The name ‘Broca’s area’ comes from the French neurologist Pierre Paul Broca, who
brought the inferior frontal gyrus into the spotlight as a possible location for the seat
of language in the human brain. When he investigated the brains of his deceased
patients who suffered from a “loss of speech”, he found lesions located in the frontal
lobe. He decided, however, not to dissect the brains and only described the lesions
fromtheoutside. HesentthebrainstoamuseuminParisgivingneuroscientistsnowa-
days the opportunity to use modern imaging techniques to investigate his original
ﬁndings (Cabanis et al., 1994; Dronkers et al., 2007; Castaigne et al., 1980) From these
images we know now that the lesions are not conﬁned to parts of the inferior frontal
gyrus only, but they extend medially into the arcuate/superior longitudinal fasciculus,
which connects anterior and posterior language regions (Geschwind, 1972).
The original ﬁnding of Broca, however, has led to a substantial amount of research
on Broca’s area and these studies have made it further clear that Broca’s area does not
consist of one cytoarchitectonically well-deﬁned area, but comprises several areas,
including Brodmann areas (BA) 44 and 45 and the ventral part of Brodmann area 6. In
the remainder of this chapter, we will use the term Broca’s area to indicate BA 44 and
45 and the ventral part of BA 6.2.3 LESION STUDIES OF LANGUAGE 25
2.3 LESION STUDIES OF LANGUAGE
2.3.1 Language production
As introduced, the term ‘Broca’s aphasia’ has been minted after Paul Broca’s descrip-
tion of patient ‘Tan’ to address production language impairment due to a damage in
the posterior half of the left inferior frontal gyrus. The label ‘Broca’s aphasia’, though,
seemed very soon too broad and unspeciﬁc to describe the complex pattern of lin-
guistic deﬁcits related to a brain damage in the ‘language production areas’. After the
fundamental studies of Arnold Pick (Pick, 1898, 1913) the term ‘agrammatism’ has
been used to denote a type of Broca’s aphasia, which involves a speciﬁc impairment
at the grammatical level. Since then, the production deﬁcits seen in Broca’s aphasia
and agrammatism have been described in a great number of lesion studies across
languages (see Bates et al., 1991, for a review), studies which all converge in showing
that lesions in Broca’s area result in a production deﬁcit with a particular involvement
of grammar. The production deﬁcits observed in Broca’s aphasia are generally charac-
BA 45
BA 44
ventral
BA 6
Figure 2.1: Broca’s area shown on the cortical surface of the brain. Broca’s area com-
prises several areas, including Brodmann areas (BA) 44 and 45 and the ventral part
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terized by a decrease in speech rate, omission and/or substitution of function words
(articles, prepositions, pronouns), a frequent use of uninﬂected verbs (particularly
detectable in morphologically rich languages in which the non-ﬁnite form of verbs is
morphologically marked, like Italian ‘mangiare’ - to eat), and a reduced use in the use
of coordinated and subordinated sentences together with a loss of comprehension of
complex syntactic structures. Miceli et al. (1984) showed that Italian aphasic speakers
with a lesion in Broca’s area omit free morphemes (articles and prepositions) and
substitute bound morphemes (verb inﬂections for Tense and Person agreement).
The same deﬁcits were observed for German by DeBleser et al. (1996) and Luzzatti
and Bleser (1996) who showed that agrammatic aphasic speakers were impaired in
‘syntax-dependent morphology’, i.e. morphological processes which are more directly
linked to syntactic operations (like verbal inﬂection).
As far as language production goes, the data provided by lesion studies seem to
converge in showing that lesions in Broca’s area produce an agrammatic speech
output, which suggests that these brain areas are the locus in which syntax is stored.
But if Broca’s area indeed represents the anatomical locus for syntax, once a damage
is located in that area, a language impairment at the syntactic level should not only
be detectable in production but also in comprehension.
2.3.2 Language comprehension
Thanks to a series of pioneer lesion studies on agrammatism (Caramazza and Zurif,
1976; Grodzinsky, 2000; Luzzatti et al., 2001; Shapiro and Levine, 1990), it became
clear that people with lesions in Broca’s area (which had been addressed for a long
time as the speciﬁc locus for language production) not only show deﬁcits in pro-
duction but they also show similar impairments in the comprehension of complex
grammatical structures. Caramazza and Zurif (1976) were among the ﬁrst to describe
that patients with a lesion in Broca’s area show deﬁcits in comprehension of com-
plex syntactic structures. The authors showed that agrammatic patients performed
at chance when interpreting semantically reversible sentences, i.e. sentences that
require a syntactic analysis to be correctly understood like: “The girl was kicked by
the boy”. In contrast, they performed above chance with sentences that could be
interpreted using semantic rules as a disentangling strategy, such as: “The ball was
kicked by the girl”. Further studies on comprehension deﬁcits in Broca’s aphasia (e.g.
Grodzinsky, 1995; Luzzatti et al., 2001) report that other complex syntactic structures,
like passive and subordinate sentences as well as sentences with pronominal clitic
pronouns, are difﬁcult to interpret for aphasic speakers.
Lesion studies have provided (and still provide) fundamental information on the
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Broca’s area is involved both in language production and in language comprehension,
disconﬁrmingtheinitialthoughtthatBroca’sareawasexclusivelyinvolvedinlanguage
production. Second, the evidence is strong in favor of Broca’s area being involved in
syntactic processing, supporting the view that this area is the locus of grammatical
encoding.
2.4 LESION STUDIES OF ACTIONS
Lesions in and around Broca’s area are relatively well known for their association
with Broca’s aphasia, which we have discussed in the previous paragraphs. In this
section, we will focus on how lesions in this part of the brain can cause disruptions in
executing action and observing the actions of others.
2.4.1 Action execution
Deﬁcits in producing actions are known as apraxia. Patients who suffer from apraxia
have difﬁculties in executing learned movements even though they are physically able
to perform these movements. The disorders aphasia and apraxia very often occur
together (Renzi et al., 1980).
Lesions in Broca’s area play an important role in apraxia (Leiguarda and Marsden,
2000). They can lead to weakness of muscles that control oro-facial, laryngeal and
tongue movements (Förster, 1936). Furthermore, lesions in Broca’s area can lead to
difﬁculties in sequencing of actions (Harrington et al., 1998), to a loss of regularity of
exploratory ﬁnger movements during manipulation of objects (Binkofski et al., 2001),
to deﬁcits in visuomotor associative learning (Binkofski and Buccino, 2004), and to
deﬁcits in grasping (Dettmers et al., 2003).
Natural lesions that are restricted to one cytoarchitectonically well-deﬁned brain
area are rare. Fortunately, with the technique of repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS), it is possible to create temporary ‘lesions’ in a particular brain
area to investigate the necessity of this brain area during a certain task. To investigate
the role of Broca’s area during imitation of ﬁnger movements, Heiser et al. (2003)
delivered rTMS over right and left Broca’s area while participants had to perform this
task. They found that these stimulations caused a disruption in the imitation task,
while the control rTMS over the occipital cortex did not show such a disruption. This
indicates that Broca’s area could be the place in which a matching between observed
and to- be-executed actions takes place. Since rTMS did not cause a disruption
in a motor control task, the deﬁcits in imitation could not have been caused by a
disruption in planning or selection.
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argued that the movement that had to be imitated was too simple. This has as a
consequence that only in the ﬁrst few trials has the observed movement really to be
transformed into one’s own motor representation, but in later trials, the observed
movement merely functions as a visual cue to perform a learned movement. Maku-
uchi (2005) performed a new experiment from which he concludes that it is not
imitation that Broca’s area is essential for, but it is the delayed execution of actions.
Damage to Broca’s area thus does not only have an inﬂuence on the production
and perception of language, but also disrupts action production.
2.4.2 Action perception
Besides disrupting action production, damage in Broca’s area also has a profound
inﬂuence on the perception of actions performed by other people. Damage to Broca’s
area leads to an impairment in conceptual knowledge about actions (Tranel et al.,
2003).
Aphasic patients with lesions in the inferior frontal gyrus and the ventral premotor
cortex have trouble with action understanding (Saygin et al., 2004). This is indepen-
dent of whether the action is presented linguistically (i.e. a written description) or
non-linguistically (i.e. visual presentation). Furthermore, the linguistic and non-
linguistic deﬁcits are correlated with each other in the mild and relatively ﬂuent
aphasics, which implies a common underlying cause of the deﬁcits. Artiﬁcially lesion-
ing this area with TMS disrupts action understanding of other people’s actions (Pobric
and de C Hamilton, 2006). These results are in accordance with results of Aziz-Zadeh
et al. (2006), who (in non brain damaged subjects) found overlapping activations for
action observation and reading sentences about actions in Broca’s area.
Pazzaglia et al. (2008) provide evidence that indicate that the deﬁcits in action
production are related to deﬁcits in action perception. First, they showed that brain-
damaged patients who suffer from limb apraxia also show a greater impairment in
recognition of gestures than brain-damaged patients who do not suffer from this
disorder. Second, premotor and parietal lesions that impair hand action execution
(as compared to mouth action execution) also selectively impair the recognition of
hand gestures and their sounds (Pazzaglia et al., 2008).
All these studies show that deﬁcits in action comprehension and action production
are very much interrelated and associated with Broca’s area.
2.5 FUNCTIONAL STUDIES ON LANGUAGE
If lesion studies inform us on the speciﬁc linguistic deﬁcits that Broca’s patients
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neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging),
ERP (Event-Related Potentials), MEG (Magnetoencephalography) and PET (Positron
Emission Tomography) has made possible the investigation of language processing in
healthy people. fMRI and PET, with their high spatial resolution permit the localiza-
tion of particular brain areas which are involved during speciﬁc language tasks. PET
is used more often for production studies given that it is less sensitive to movement
and muscular artifacts, whereas fMRI has been extensively used in comprehension
paradigms.
2.5.1 Language production
In a PET stud Indefrey et al. (2001) elicited the production of sentences, which were
increasingly grammatically complex. Participants were asked to describe short an-
imated movies, which involved non-animated participants (a circle, an ellipse and
a square). Results showed that the production of syntactically more complex sen-
tences resulted in an activation of the left anterior operculum, caudally adjacent to
BA44. Haller et al. (2005) performed an fMRI study involving open speech production.
Participants were required to generate sentences given bare syntactic constituents
(for example using the constituents: ‘child’, ‘throw’ and ‘ball’, participants should
produce sentences like: ‘The child throws the ball’). The activation resulting from
the sentence generation task was compared with a sentence reading and a word
repetition tasks. Both contrasts revealed that BA44/45 and BA6 were activated. Word
level production studies involving syntactic processing have also been performed.
Jaeger et al. (1996) and Indefrey et al. (1997) investigated which are the neurocorre-
lates of regular and irregular past verb formation. According to linguistic accounts,
regular past verbs are formed using morpho/syntactic rules, for example in English,
afﬁxing the -ed morpheme to the verbal root. Irregular past verbs, however, cannot
be ‘blindly’ formed applying a morpho/syntactic rule but their speciﬁc forms need
to be stored in the lexicon. The two studies report that producing the past tense of
regular verbs activates inferior frontal regions (regions that have been found to be
active in morpho/syntactic processes), whereas producing the past tense of irregular
verbs activates middle temporal regions (more involved with lexical processes).
2.5.2 Language comprehension
Ben-Shachar et al. (2003) performed an fMRI study to check which were the areas
involvedinaspeciﬁcsyntacticoperation, i.e. syntacticmovement. Participantshadto
listen to sentences and after this make a grammatical judgment about them. Results
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Broca’s area (together with Wernicke’s regions in both hemispheres) was activated
in another fMRI study by Ben-Shachar et al. (2004). In this study, the task consisted
of a comprehension test with two other types of grammatical structures involving
syntactic movement, i.e. topicalization and embedded questions. These authors
consider the activation of the left Broca’s area crucial for syntactic processes. Meyer
et al. (2000) found an activation of the left Broca’s area during auditory presentation
of grammatically correct and incorrect sentences. Fiebach et al. (2001) conducted
a study aimed at detecting the areas involved in syntactic transformation or in the
detection of syntactic anomalies. The results revealed that BA 44/45 were active in
sentences with syntactic transformations, and BA 44/6 were active while detecting
syntactic anomalies. Area BA 44 was activated in a study by Dapretto and Bookheimer
(1999), when participants had to focus their attention towards more syntactic aspects
of sentences compared to more semantic ones.
Summarizing the results from these studies, it is possible to speak about a net-
work of regions within Broca’s area, which support syntactic processing both for
production and language comprehension. More speciﬁcally, the left inferior frontal
gyrus with areas BA 44/45 are actively involved in more complex syntactic processing,
while the frontal operculum seems to support the detection of whether a structure is
grammatical or not.
2.6 FUNCTIONAL STUDIES ON ACTIONS
2.6.1 Action execution
Activation in Broca’s area is found during the programming of object directed action
execution, particularly when the action is a complex motor act which requires a high
degree of sensorimotor control (Binkofski and Buccino, 2004). In our laboratory,
activation in Broca’s area is always found when comparing object- directed action
execution against rest (Gazzola et al., 2006; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Gazzola et al.,
2007a,b).
Further evidence for the fact that Broca’s area is involved in the motor programming
of actions comes from a study by Haslinger et al. (2002) in which participants have to
performincreasinglycomplexﬁngermovements. Resultsshowthatthemorecomplex
the sequence of movements is, the more Broca’s area is involved. Other studies by
Schubotz & Cramon (2003; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c) have shown similar results in
that the ventral premotor cortex part of Broca’s area is engaged when a sequential-
based prediction of the action has to be made (for example, to predict the end state of
a sequence of movements).
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(Decety et al., 1994; Ehrsson et al., 2000; Grafton et al., 1996), manipulation of objects
(Binkofski et al., 1999), ﬁnger movements (Krams et al., 1998; Seitz and Roland, 1992),
and gesturing (Fridman et al., 2006).
Summarizing, parts of Broca’s area seems to be involved in action execution, partic-
ularly when the action is complex (both in terms of movement and sequencing) and
is object-directed.
2.6.2 Action perception
Studies using movies of simple hand actions show that Broca’s area is consistently
activated when observing these simple hand or mouth actions (Buccino et al., 2001;
Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Gazzola et al., 2007b,a; Grafton et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al.,
1996b). Broca’s area is particularly involved when the action is goal-directed and
includes an object, for example grasping a little cup, biting and chewing an apple
(Buccino et al., 2001). Not only the visual perception of an action involves Broca’s area,
but the mere sound of actions also elicits a response in this area (Gazzola et al., 2006).
It is argued that, for Broca’s area to respond to observed action, the action needs to
be part of the motor repertoire of the observer. For example, Broca’s area responds to
the observation of mouth actions of humans (speech pronunciation) and monkeys
(lip smacking), but not to mouth actions of a dog (barking) (Buccino et al., 2004).
Gazzola et al. (2007a) extend this ﬁnding by showing that Broca’s area is also involved
in actions the kinematics of which we cannot match onto our own motor repertoire,
but of which we do understand the goal (e.g., ‘human’ actions performed by an
industrial robot).
The fact that Broca’s area was historically linked to language processing, raised
the question whether activation in this region is truly due to the processing of the
action or to a form of inner verbalization of the action (Decety et al., 1997; Grèzes
and Decety, 2001). There is now, however, relatively wide agreement about the fact
that the idea of ‘silent speech’ cannot account for the activation in Broca’s area. If
activation in Broca’s area would be due to inner speech, then one would expect that
imitation with the left or right hand would activate this area similarly; however, Koski
et al. (2003) found a difference in activation due to imitation with one hand or the
other. Second, inner speech would predict that hearing and performing hand and
mouth actions should cause similar patterns of activity in premotor regions. Gazzola
et al. (2006) and Etzel et al. (2008), however, showed that hand and mouth actions
determine different patterns of activity, which are, however, similar during execution
and perception. In another study, rTMS was applied over left and right BA 44, causing
a disruption in the imitation process (Heiser et al., 2003). Could it be a disturbance
in the silent verbalization of the action that disrupted the imitation? The authors32 BROCA’S: LINKING PERCEPTION AND PRODUCTION
note that this is a highly unlikely explanation, since pre-verbal little children cannot
verbalize actions but can imitate them.
Summarizing these functional studies, we can say that Broca’s area is highly impor-
tant for the perception of other people’s actions and for programming the execution
of complex actions of hands and mouth, given that these are not too repetitive.
2.7 MIRROR NEURONS & THE PUTATIVE MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM
In the previous section, we have seen that Broca’s area is involved in both perception
and production of complex actions. Is it truly the same neural substrate that is
responsible for these different tasks? In the monkey’s brain there is evidence for the
idea that production and perception depend on the same neurons, so-called mirror
neurons.
Mirror neurons were ﬁrst discovered in Italy (Gallese et al., 1996; Pellegrino et al.,
1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996a). Activity from single neurons in the macaque monkey’s
brain had been recorded when the monkey was performing an action (i.e. grasping a
peanut, shelling a peanut). The researchers discovered that some neurons in this area
not only showed activity during action execution, but also when the monkey observed
the researcher grasping a peanut or shelling it. Later, the same laboratory would show
that some mirror neurons also respond to the sound of a similar action (Keysers et al.,
2003; Kohler et al., 2002). These neurons thus have the special property of ﬁring not
only when the monkey performs an action but also when a similar action is perceived.
Mirror neurons therefore show a direct connection between perception and action.
The areas in which mirror neurons have been recorded from in the monkey are the
rostral part of inferior area 6 (area F5) (Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996;
Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002) and the rostral part of the inferior parietal
lobule (area 7b) (Fogassi et al., 2005).
Since the moment of discovery of mirror neurons, the question arose whether such
neurons would be present in the human brain. Indeed, evidence for a mirror neuron
system in humans has been derived from neuroimaging and transcranial magnetic
stimulation studies, with the former showing that a network of areas is active both
while people perform actions and while they view or hear other people’s actions
(Gazzola et al., 2006; Keysers and Gazzola, 2006; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). In
humans, this system seems to include the dorsal premotor, somatosensory, cerebellar
and posterior temporal cortex in addition to BA 44 and 6 and the inferior parietal
lobule (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008).
But is it also true for humans that it is the same population of neurons that respond
both to the observation and execution of actions? We cannot say anything about2.8 BROCA’S AREA: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND ACTION 33
individual neurons, but on the level of individual voxels2, we can afﬁrm that this is the
case. Gazzola and Keysers (2008) have shown that within individual subjects, they are
truly the same voxels that respond both to the perception and production of complex
actions. In addition, in a recent study, Etzel et al. (2008), using an analysis technique
known as multivariate classiﬁcation, could show that the perception and execution
of actions not only both recruit Broca’s area, but that they indeed determine similar
patterns of activity in Broca’s area, a ﬁnding most compatible with the presence of
mirror neurons in the human Broca’s area.
Mirror neurons show activation both in response to the execution of an action and
to the observation of an action. In the human brain, we have seen that Broca’s area
is part of the putative mirror neuron system and has similar properties: it is active
during perception and production of complex actions. Could it be that these two
areas have a common evolutionary ancestor? Probably yes: there is a wide agreement
that area F5 ﬁnds its homologue either in BA 44, 45 or 6. There is, however, less
agreement about where exactly in these three areas it is (Amunts et al., 1999; von
Bonin and Bailey, 1947, 1961; Campbell, 1905; Grèzes et al., 2003; Grèzes and Decety,
2001; Morin and Grèzes, 2008; Passingham, 1993, 1981; Petrides, 2006; Petrides and
Pandya, 1994; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).
The discovery of mirror neurons has led to the idea that we understand, at least in
part, the goal-directed actions of others such as grasping and manipulating objects
by activating our own motor and somatosensory representations of similar actions
(Buccino et al., 2001, 2004; Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gazzola et al., 2006, 2007a;
Hamzei et al., 2003; Heiser et al., 2003; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Keysers and Gazzola,
2006; Keysers et al., 2003; Kilner et al., 2007; Nishitani and Hari, 2000).
2.8 BROCA’S AREA: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND ACTION
Inthepreviousparagraphs,wereportedaseriesofstudies(bothlesionandfunctional)
that show that BA 44/45 and BA 6 are critical brain areas underlying language produc-
tion and comprehension as well as action execution and perception. Several studies
addressed the question whether action and language share a common functional
architecture in the brain.
Within the linguistic domain, one well-known phenomenon observed in Broca’s
aphasia is the noun-verb dissociation. Broca’s aphasic speakers are reported to com-
prehend (and produce) nouns better than verbs (Miceli et al., 1984; Zingeser and
Berndt, 1990; Rossi and Bastiaanse, 2008). This observation gave rise to a large num-
ber of studies investigating the causes of this dissociation. The ﬁrst careful anatomical
2 A voxel is a volume element that constitutes the building blocks of a 3D MR image of the brain. A voxel
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study in an agrammatic patient who showed a selective impairment in action naming
was conducted by Damasio and Tranel (1993), who described that the patient pre-
sented a lesion in the left pre-motor frontal cortex. Saygin et al. (2004) reported an
action comprehension study with 29 aphasic patients. Patients were tested with a
comprehension task involving the process of actions presented visually (with a rele-
vant drawing - pantomime) and linguistically (with a sentence). Results showed that
patients were impaired in the comprehension of both modes of presentation. Arévalo
et al. (2007) tested 21 aphasic speakers and a control group. Participants had to name,
read or repeat single words, which were nouns or verbs. Behavioral results showed
that both aphasics and non-brain-damaged speakers were less accurate in naming
verbs, but a cross-item analysis revealed that the crucial factor that inﬂuenced the
performance was ‘manipulability’, and this was true across category (both for verbs
and for nouns).
These studies importantly conﬁrm that people with damage in language areas
(BA 44/45) show difﬁculties in the comprehension of both language and pantomime
actions which indicates that similar brain areas are recruited for both tasks, bringing
evidence for a convergence between the areas that are important for language and
pantomime processing.
Hamzei et al. (2003) explicitly addressed the question of whether action recognition
and language production share a common functional architecture. They performed
an experiment in which they instructed participants to either recognize an action
shown in a picture or to silently verbalize an action verb written on the screen. They
found an overlap between activation of the language and the action task in the Broca’s
area on a group level. On a single subject level, however, no overlap was found and no
consistent spatial pattern could be detected between the two activation peaks. This
indicates that there seems to be no functional subdivision for language and action in
Broca’s area.
The observation that language and action share common neural substrates opens
the question of whether this occurs as a coincidence or whether this is the base for
advocating a closer relation between the two systems.
There exist a number of speculative ideas about this. The ﬁrst one is represented
by the ‘Motor Theory of Speech Perception’ (Liberman and Mattingly, 1985) which
states that we understand speech by perceiving the phonetic information as intended
gestures of the sender, represented in the brain as motor commands. Galantucci
et al. (2006) reviewed this theory and gathered evidence for the claims that perceiving
speech is perceiving gestures and that the motor system is recruited for this. Another
idea for why both action and language perception and production have overlapping
brainsubstratesisthehypothesisof‘embodiedsemantics’,whichclaimsthatlanguage
comprehension stems from the internal referring to the actions that are conveyed by
the language. This theory is supported by studies showing that listening to action-2.8 BROCA’S AREA: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND ACTION 35
related sentences activates the motor-related areas in the brain (Aziz-Zadeh et al.,
2006; Hauk and Pulvermüller, 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005). The third idea argues
that language evolution originated from hand gestures, which is the reason they are
represented in the same region in the brain (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).
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ABSTRACT
Communication is an important aspect of human life, allowing us to powerfully coordinate
our behaviour with that of others. Boiled down to its mere essentials, communication entails
transferring a mental content from one brain to another. Spoken language obviously plays
an important role in communication between human individuals. Manual gestures however
often aid the semantic interpretation of the spoken message, and gestures may have played
a central role in the earlier evolution of communication. Here we used the social game of
charades to investigate the neural basis of gestural communication by having participants
produce and interpret meaningful gestures while their brain activity was measured using
functional magnetic resonance imaging. While participants decoded observed gestures, the
putative mirror neuron system (pMNS: premotor, parietal and posterior mid-temporal cortex),
associated with motor simulation, and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), associated with
mentalizingandagencyattribution,weresigniﬁcantlyrecruited. OftheseareasonlythepMNS
was recruited during the production of gestures. This suggests that gestural communication
relies on a combination of simulation and, during decoding, mentalizing/agency attribution
brainareas. Comparingthedecodingofgestureswithaconditioninwhichparticipantsviewed
the same gestures with an instruction not to interpret the gestures showed that although parts
of the pMNS responded more strongly during active decoding, most of the pMNS and the TPJ
did not show such signiﬁcant task effects. This suggests that the mere observation of gestures
recruits most of the system involved in voluntary interpretation.
.........................................................................................
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Communication is an important aspect of human life, allowing us to powerfully
coordinate our behaviour with that of others. Boiled down to its mere essentials,
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communication entails transferring a mental content from one brain to another. Spo-
ken language obviously plays an important role in communication between human
individuals. Manual gestures however often aid the semantic interpretation of the
spoken message (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 1998; Kendon, 1994; McNeill, 1992;
Melinger and Levelt, 2004; Willems and Hagoort, 2007), and gestures may have played
a central role in the earlier evolution of communication (Arbib, 2008; Gentilucci and
Corballis, 2006; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). Therefore we will examine here the neural
substratesofgesturalcommunicationinhumans. Althoughthisquestionhasreceived
less attention in the ﬁeld of neuroscience than spoken language, two potentially com-
plementary processes have been implicated in the perception and/or production
of gestures: simulation and mentalizing (de Lange et al., 2008; Keysers and Gazzola,
2007; Thioux et al., 2008).
The concept of simulation has received a surge of popularity since the discovery of
mirror neurons in macaque monkeys (Ferrari et al., 2003; Fogassi et al., 2005; Fujii
et al., 2007; Gallese et al., 1996; Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002; Rizzolatti
et al., 1996; Umiltà et al., 2001). These neurons are active not only while the monkey
performs an action (e.g. shelling a peanut), but also while the monkey sees or hears a
similar action. Mirror neurons have been found in the ventral premotor and inferior
parietal cortex of the monkey. However, it remains unclear whether other regions
of the monkey brain contain mirror neurons for actions, because extensive single
cell recording during both action execution and observation have so far not been
performed outside of the premotor and inferior parietal lobule. Evidence for a similar
system in humans has been derived from neuroimaging and transcranial magnetic
stimulation studies (Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Buccino et al., 2001; Decety et al.,
1997; Fadiga et al., 1995; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Grafton et al., 1996; Iacoboni
et al., 1999; Jeannerod, 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), with the former showing
that a network of areas is active both while people perform actions in the scanner
and while they view or hear other people’s actions. In humans, this system seems to
include the dorsal premotor, somatosensory, cerebellar and posterior temporal cortex
in addition to the ventral premotor, inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule
(Chong et al., 2008; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). These are the likely homologues
of the aforementioned regions of the monkey (Nelissen et al., 2005; Petrides et al.,
2005). This extended set of areas can be called the putative Mirror Neuron System
(pMNS) in order to emphasize that if a voxel in an fMRI experiment is involved
in both execution and observation, the neurons within these voxels can, but do
not have to, be mirror neurons (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Gazzola et al., 2007b):
different populations of neurons within the same voxel could play the lead role during
observation and execution. This caveat means that functional neuroimaging ﬁndings
have to be interpreted with care: the fact that a region involved in action observation
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of the fact that processing X involves ‘simulation’ (i.e. the recruitment of motor
programs ‘as if’ the participant were producing these gestures him/herself) but it is
not a guarantee that processing X truly depends on mirror neurons or simulation
(Hickok, 2009). Neuroimaging therefore needs to ask questions in terms of brain
regions (are regions of the pMNS involved?), and not in terms of cognitive processes
involved (is simulation involved?): the former can be empirically measured using
neuroimaging, the latter only tentatively suggested (Poldrack, 2006).
The discovery of mirror neurons has lead to the idea that we understand, at least in
part, the goal-directed actions of others such as grasping and manipulating objects
by activating our own motor and somatosensory representations of similar actions
(Buccino et al., 2001, 2004; Buxbaum et al., 2005; Gallese et al., 1996; Gallese and
Goldman, 1998; Gazzola et al., 2006, 2007a; Hamzei et al., 2003; Heiser et al., 2003;
Iacoboni et al., 2005; Keysers and Gazzola, 2006; Keysers et al., 2003; Kilner et al., 2007;
Nishitani and Hari, 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Umiltà et al., 2001) as if we had per-
formed similar actions. This ‘as if’ component is why this process is called simulation.
It seems that simulation occurs simultaneously at different levels of representations
(Thioux et al., 2008): strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons in the monkey
for instance represent details of an action and the goal of an action, respectively and
simultaneously (Gallese et al., 1996), and experiments in human support the notion
that both the details (TMS) and goals (Gazzola et al., 2007a,b) of actions are simulated.
Whether the same system is involved in perceiving communicative gestures has been
much less investigated.
Several lesion studies have investigated the neural basis of gesture production and
perceptioninthecontextofapraxia. Thisisadisorderinwhichpatientshavedifﬁculty
with the control of action, including impairment in the production of gestures. In
ideationalapraxia,patientshavepreservedbasicmotorskills,butifaskedtomimicthe
use of tools (e.g. show me how you would use a hammer to hammer a nail), they fail
to produce the correct actions (Ochipa et al., 1989). The ability to mimic is therefore
traditionally used as a localizer for areas related to apraxia (Mozaz et al., 2002). These
studies have shown that the normal production of gestures requires an intact left
posterior parietal lobe, including the parietal node of the pMNS (Choi et al., 2001;
Fridman et al., 2006; Hermsdörfer et al., 2001; Higuchi et al., 2007; Lotze et al., 2006;
Molletal.,2000;Nairetal.,2003;Ohgamietal.,2004). Morerecently,Montgomeryetal.
(2007) use a functional neuroimaging study to show that observing and producing
communicativehandgesturesactivatedthesuperiortemporalsulcus,inferiorparietal
lobule and frontal operculum - a set of regions that corresponds to those of the pMNS.
A limitation of this well controlled study is the fact that the participants had no
genuine communicative intent: they produced pre-trained gestures in response
to words (e.g. “thumbs up”) in the production condition, and passively observed
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addition, the authors intermixed imitation trials with passive observation trials. This
may have lead to activations in motor production areas during gesture observation
trials simply as a covert rehearsal of the motor programs that will later be needed for
imitation. Overall, this task may therefore differ in important ways from the real life
processes involved. For example, if one is in a foreign country, does not speak the
language, and has only gestures to ask where to ﬁnd a good restaurant. Would such a
situation also primarily recruit the pMNS? Would other regions become important,
including those involved in asking yourself what the other person is thinking, i.e.
mentalizing areas?
A set of brain regions has been implicated in such reﬂection about the mental state
of others. These areas include the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC, in particular the
paracingulate gyrus) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (Brunet et al., 2000;
Castelli et al., 2000; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith and Frith,
2006; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000, 2002; Hampton et al., 2008;
McCabe et al., 2001; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Sommer et al., 2007; Vogeley et al.,
2001; Walter et al., 2004).Gallagher and Frith (2004) compared the recognition of
hand gestures expressing internal states (e.g. I feel cold) with those expressing a
command (e.g. come here!). They additionally contrasted a recognition condition
(was the gesture positive?) against an observation condition (which hand moved
higher in the movie?). In particular, they report in the results and their Table 4 that
the left anterior paracingulate cortex (putative BA32), thought to be a key node of the
putative ‘theory of mind’ network (pToM area) appeared in an interaction contrast
(recognizing expressive gestures - observing expressive gestures - recognizing orders
+ observing orders), and interpreted this ﬁnding as evidence for ToM involvement in
interpreting gestures that express inner states. From the evidence presented in the
report however, this interpretation is problematic, as they also report in the results
and their Table 3, that the left anterior paracingulate cortex (putative BA32) is more
active while observing gestures compared to recognizing them. While it is uncertain
from the tables alone whether overlapping regions of the paracingulate cortex were
present in these two contrasts, the paracingulate cortex was absent from the contrast
recognizing - observing. This would be difﬁcult to reconcile with the area being
responsible for recognition. The involvement of ToM regions in gesture recognition
therefore remains uncertain. In addition, although the TPJ is reliably recruited by
tasks requiring mentalizing (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003; Sommer et al., 2007), it is unlikely that this region specializes in
attributing mental states to others: it is likely that it serves domain general functions
relating to attention (Mitchell, 2008) and/or comparing sensory input with motor
commands (Decety and Lamm, 2007) which happen also to be important during
mental state attribution.
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pToM areas by pioneering the use of a well-established gestural communication task
into the ﬁeld of neuroscience: the game of ‘charades’. We recorded brain activity while
(romantically involved) couples played this game with each other. One partner would
ﬁrst be scanned while gesturing an action or object into a camera in the knowledge
that his partner would later need to guess the action/object based on his recorded
gestures. The other partner was to be scanned while decoding the gestures. The roles
were then reversed. This allowed us to measure brain activity while people invent
and execute gestures suitable to communicate a complex concept to another person,
and while another person is decoding these gestures to guess the original concept.
In addition, we examined if the brain activity recorded during this natural form of
communication was speciﬁc for a communicative setting. We replayed the movies of
their partner’s gestures to each participant on a separate day, but this time, did not
ask them to guess what their partner was trying to tell them. All participants reported
ﬁnding the game very motivating, and experienced the experiment as a genuine and
spontaneous form of communication.
Based on the idea that the pMNS might map the communicative actions of oth-
ers onto the programs for producing similar actions, we hypothesized that parts of
the areas involved in generating gestures would also become activated during the
observation of communicative actions. To examine if this system overlaps with the
pMNS for goal-directed actions, we examined if the pMNS as deﬁned in previous
experiments (Gazzola et al., 2007a) becomes active both during gesture production
and observation. Furthermore, several studies have shown the involvement of the TPJ
and mPFC in tasks where people have to explicitly infer the mental states of another
person. We therefore examined whether these pToM areas are involved during the
charades game. Activity during gesture production may reﬂect a theory-of-mind of
how the partner might interpret the gestures, and activity during gesture interpre-
tation may reﬂect a theory-of-mind of what the partner might have meant while
generating the gestures. pMNS and pToM areas could complement each other during
thecharadestask(deLangeetal.,2008;KeysersandGazzola,2007;Thiouxetal.,2008).
The pMNS areas have been shown to be relatively stimulus driven independent of
the task (e.g. de Lange et al., 2008; van der Gaag et al., 2007), while pToM areas seem
more recruited during tasks that explicitly direct peoples minds to the mental states
of others (de Lange et al., 2008). This line of reasoning would predict that pMNS areas
would respond during the charades game and the control condition because they
involved similar stimuli and motor actions. However, the pToM areas might respond
during the charades game because this encourages mental state attribution but not
during the control condition, which does not.50 PLAYING CHARADES IN THE FMRI
3.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twelve couples (total: 24 participants) were scanned while playing the game charades.
The mean age of the participants was 27.5 § 3.8 years. Each couple consisted of a man
and a woman involved in a romantic relationship for at least 6 months. As in previous
studies on emotional empathy (Singer et al., 2004), we included this criterion not
to study romantic relations speciﬁcally but to maximise the social relevance of this
experiment because we expected couples to be more motivated, more at ease, and
to have a better or faster understanding of each other’s gestures than a strangers do.
Participants were asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire about their neurological and medi-
cal history including whether they had metal objects in their body. This is a standard
procedure to ensure the safety of the participants whilst in the scanner. Participants
were also asked not to drink coffee before scanning commenced. The participants
freely consented to participating in the study by signing an informed consent form
and were scaled for their right-handedness on the Edinburgh Righthandedness scale
(Oldﬁeld, 1971). This entire study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of
the University Medical Center Groningen (2007/080).
Task / Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two separate sessions on different days. In the ﬁrst
session, the couple was required to play the game of charades. In the second, detailed
anatomical scans and a control condition were acquired. For the game of charades,
participants took turns going into the scanner, alternating gesturing and guessing of
words. Words were either objects (for example nutcracker, watch, pencil sharpener)
or actions (for example painting, knitting, shaving, see Tab. 3.1). Each participant
performed two gesture and two guess runs in which they gestured and guessed 14
words in total (7 per run). The set of words used was the same for each couple, but
word order was randomized between participants. After the last gesture-session, a T1
image was acquired.
Gesture run
During a gesture run, the participant was presented with a word on the screen and
was instructed to communicate this word to his or her partner by means of gestures.
Every word had to be gestured for 90 seconds. Prior to scanning participants were
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new gestures to provide their partner with multiple sources of information. The
participant could see how much time he/she needed to keep gesturing by a progress
baronthescreen. Aﬁxationcrosswaspresentedfor20saftereachword,whichserved
as our baseline. The gestures were recorded from the control room of the MR-scanner
with a video camera (Sony DSR-PDX10P). After the participant had gestured seven
words, he/she was taken out of the scanner and went into the waiting room, while
his/her partner went into the scanner to guess what he/she had gestured. During
this changeover, the experimenter cut the recording of the gestures into movies of 90s
in which the participant gestured a word (see online supplementary information for
an example of a gesture recording, movie S1). To ensure that the movies were cut at
exactly the moment the word was presented to the gesturing participant, the stimulus
computer’s sound card emitted a sound at the beginning of word presentation. The
output of the sound card was connected to the audio input of the video camera, thus
allowing the auditory signal to serve as a marker for cutting. To minimize the amount
of head motion in the participants, the upper arms of the participant were ﬁxed to
the bed by means of a Velcro strap band. This left the participants free to gesture
with their lower arms, hand, and ﬁngers, which was sufﬁcient to ensure 86% percent
correct gesture recognition.
Guess run
During a guess run, the participant was shown the movies that were recorded in
the gesture run of their partner. The task they had to perform was to guess what
their partner was trying to gesture to them. Participants were asked to consider the
gestures for at least 50 seconds before committing to a speciﬁc interpretation of the
gestures. This was done to ensure at least 50 seconds of data in each trial to examine
the time course of activity (i.e. is brain activity in region X sustained for as long as
participants are interpreting the gestures?). This was done by showing a progress
Actions Objects
peel fruit fold nutcracker telephone
ride a bike drive a car pencil sharpener winding stairs
shufﬂe cards play the piano pistol ashtray
polish nails squeeze fruit electric eel bow
juggle paint watch handcuffs
knit light ﬁreworks board game glove
throw a snowball shave canoe cork screw
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bar under the movie, changing from red to green after 50 seconds, indicating the
beginning of the period (50-90s post stimulus onset) during which participants could
decide on their interpretation of the gestures, whenever they felt conﬁdent. After
the button press with which the participants indicated to be ready to respond, a
multiple choice menu was presented. In this menu they had to choose the correct
word from ﬁve alternatives. One of the alternatives was always ‘none of the above’
and the correct answer was always present in the multiple-choice menu. The correct
answer was never the option ‘none of the above’. This marked the end of a trial. Two
consecutive trials were separated by 20 seconds of a white ﬁxation cross against a
black background, which served as our baseline.
Passive observation run
As a control condition for the guess run, the participants watched the movies again
which they had seen during the guessing condition. This time, they were instructed
not to guess what was gestured, but only to passively view them. To keep the run
exactly the same as the original guess run, the movie would stop at the moment the
participant during the original run had pushed the button. The same multiple-choice
menu would appear and the participant had to answer again. This time, however,
they had to select the word written in green letters. The green word was the correct
answer. A ﬁxation cross was presented between two consecutive trials for 20 seconds
and served as our baseline.
Data Acquisition
Functional imaging data was recorded with a Philips 3.0T MR scanner, using gradient
echo planar imaging (EPI). T2* weighted images revealed changes in blood oxygen
level. Repetition time was 1.33 seconds. The whole brain was scanned in 28 (axial)
slices with a thickness of 4.5mm. In the ﬁrst session, a fast structural image (“fast
anatomy”) was acquired of the participant’s brain, while in the second session an
additional structural image of higher resolution was acquired. Both were structural,
T1-weighted images.
Data Analysis / Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed using the Statistical Parametric Mapping Software, version 2
(SPM2). EPI data were corrected for slice timing and realigned. The T1 image was
co-registered to the mean EPI and segmented, the normalization parameters to nor-
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and applied to all the EPI images. Normalized EPI images were then smoothed with
a Gaussian kernel of 10mm. Three general linear models were estimated: one for
the gesturing, one for the guessing and one for the passive observation sessions. All
words, whether they were actions or objects, guessed correctly or incorrectly, were
modelled together in one condition. The predictor in the gesture run consisted of the
whole period during which the gesture was executed (90s). In the active guessing and
passive observation runs two predictors were included in the general linear model: (a)
theperiodinwhichthemoviewasshownuntilbuttonpressand(b)frombutton-press
until the participant had given the answer. All predictors were convolved with the
hemodynamic response function. Each participant’s mean parameter estimates were
then tested at the second level (one-sampled t-test). Activations are displayed on
a mean anatomical image of all participants (see Fig. 3.1). To examine differences
between object words and action words, the data was also modelled using separate
predictors for the two categories but the contrasts ‘guessing objects-guessing actions’,
and the reverse contrast, were not signiﬁcant at pÇ0.05 (FDR corrected) in any voxel.
Therefore only analyses using a single predictor are reported here. The same applies
to the gesture analyses. To control for head motion, we included six motion parame-
ters as covariates of no interest (translation and rotation in x, y and z directions) and
excluded four participants, who moved more than the voxel size (3.5x3.5x4.5mm).
Thus, the analyses and results presented in this paper are based on 20 participants.
Comparisons Guessing vs Passive Observation
Given that passive observation always had to be acquired after guessing, differences
between these conditions could in theory be linked, amongst others, to systematic
differences in the MR-signal across sessions. We examined this possibility by calcu-
lating average global maps for each participant (i.e. a contrast with ones in the last
columns of the SPM design matrix for the two sessions). These maps were compared
in a paired t-test. There were no signiﬁcant differences at pÇ0.05 (FDR corrected).
Localizing shared circuits
We deﬁne shared circuits as those voxels that are active both during an execution and
an observation condition. This was done by thresholding the group-level analysis of
the gesturing condition (vs. passive baseline) at pÇ0.001 (uncorrected) to create a
binary map (all above-threshold voxels have the value 1 and all the other have the
value 0) and applying this image as a mask in the second level analysis of guessing or
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Putative Mirror Neuron System ROIs
The areas which together form the mirror neuron system were deﬁned based on a
previousstudydoneinourlabwith16participants(Gazzolaetal.,2007a). Inthisstudy,
healthy participants observed and performed goal-directed hand actions. The subset
of areas that are active both during the execution and the observation condition form
the pMNS. The areas included a section of the ventral-and dorsal premotor cortex, the
parietal lobe (including Brodmann Area (BA) 2 and the cortex along the intraparietal
sulcus and the supramarginal gyrus) and the middle temporal gyrus (see Fig. 3.3 for
location and size of the rois).
Putative Theory of Mind areas ROIs
Themedialprefrontalcortexandthetemporo-parietaljunctionareconsideredtypical
theory-of-mind areas. We included both these areas in our analyses. We based the
ROIs in the medial prefrontal cortex on the review article of Amodio and Frith (2006)
in which different tasks are outlined that lead to activation in this area. Based on
this meta-analysis, we drew our ROI in the anterior rostral medial frontal cortex.
Activations in this region are associated with mentalizing, person-perception and self-
knowledge. This roughly corresponds to Brodmann area 10. We used the Talairach
coordinates from that article to hand-draw a quadrilateral ROI (from (-2,34,5) and (-
2,26,15) to (-2,71,5) and (-2,55,44) respectively). This triangular shape started medially
(at X=§2) and extended laterally 13 mm to cover the grey matter (until X=§15). To ﬁt
the ROI in the best possible way to our participants’ data, we multiplied this hand
drawn image with a thresheld mask (È 0.3) of the mean grey matter segment that was
obtained through segmenting the brain of each individual participant.
In a similar fashion we deﬁned the temporal parietal junction on the basis of coordi-
nates mentioned in Mitchell (2008). Mitchell (2008) gives an overview of all different
peak coordinates associated with the temporal parietal junction. To construct our
ROI, we calculated the mean of these three coordinate-pairs ((54,-51,18), (54,-54,24),
(60,-57,15))andusedthisasthecentrepointofaspherewitharadiusof10mmsphere.
Again, we multiplied this with the mean grey matter segment to exclude out-of-brain
voxels as much as possible. For the location and sizes of these regions of interest, see
Figure 3.4.
Calculating the ﬁnite impulse response for the ROIs
For each ROI, we extracted the average BOLD response around two events of interest:
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guessed. During guessing and passive observation 28 peri-stimulus timebins were
extracted, in which each bin had the same length as the repetition time (1.33s). The
signal was extracted from the period commencing 8 bins before gesture onset and
continuing until 20 bins following it. The same was done for the button press, includ-
ing 20 bins before and 8 bins after. During gesturing, the average BOLD response
was extracted for the whole period in which the gesture was performed, starting at 8
bins before the onset and lasting for 84 bins. The MarsBar toolbox in SPM2 was used
for this extraction (Brett et al., 2002). This modeling resulted in para-stimulus time
histograms, which show the development of brain activity over time (see Fig. 3.3-3.4).
Thresholding
All ﬁnal whole brain analysis results are thresheld at pÇ0.001 (uncorrected). Only
clusters that additionally survived a false discovery rate correction at pÇ0.05 are
reported. This means that all whole brain results presented in this manuscript survive
fdr correction at pÇ0.05, but are presented at pÇ0.001 (uncorrected) because this
turned out to be the most stringent of the two. Note that in the case of masking, the
correction is only applied after the masking. Given that the mPFC failed to show
signiﬁcant activation at these thresholds, we additionally performed a small volume
corrected analysis at pÇ0.05 within the volume deﬁned as our mPFC ROI to challenge
our negative ﬁndings. For the regions of interest analysis, we specify the signiﬁcance
of any difference with pÇ0.05. This was done for the reader to have the freedom to
challenge negative ﬁndings at a permissive threshold (pÇ0.05), while at the same time
providing more stringent evidence for the key positive results.
3.3 RESULTS
3.3.1 Behavioural Results
During guessing the participants were asked to consider each movie for at least
50 seconds after which they could push the button when they thought they knew
what was being gestured to enter the multiple-choice menu. The average latency
to response was 58 seconds. Participants were equally accurate on both categories:
82.5% of the object words were guessed correctly against 86.5% of the action words
(t(17) = -1, p È .33). We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between the two types of
gestures,neitherintermsoflatencytorespond(58.7s§6.5sforactionand60.8s§6.8s
for object words, t(17) = -1.16, p È .26) nor in terms of accuracy (6.06 § 0.73sd correct
out of 7 action and 5.78 § 1.11sd correct our of 7 object words, t(17) = -1, p È .33).
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that were guessed correctly: 58s § 5s for the 289 correct guesses versus 68s § 12s for
the 47 incorrect guesses (t(16) = -4.18, p Ç .0005).
3.3.2 Whole Brain fMRI Results
Main effects of guessing
Activation clusters during guessing compared to baseline are shown in Table 3.2 and
Figure 3.1-A. Of particular interest were the clusters of activity found along the pre-
central gyrus (BA 6) and extending into the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44 and 45), in the
middle and superior temporal areas (including the TPJ), the primary somatosensory
cortex (BA 2 in particular) and the supramarginal gyri. Inspection of the medial wall
(see Figure 3.2) revealed activations in the superior medial gyrus in what Amodio and
Frith (Amodio and Frith, 2006) call the posterior section of the rostral medial frontal
cortex but not in the anterior section associated with theory-of-mind (our mPFC ROI).
During this condition, reductions in the BOLD signal were found in the precuneus,
right insula, and bilaterally the angular gyrus and the operculum (OP 1 to 4). There
were no differences in activation when object words are compared with action words
or vice versa (not shown).
Main effects of passive observation
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1-B show activation clusters during passive observation com-
pared to passive baseline. Clusters of activity were found in locations very similar to
those during active guessing, including BA 6, 44, 45, 2, middle and superior temporal
areas (including the TPJ), and supramarginal gyri. Inspection of the medial wall (see
Figure 3.2) revealed activations in the superior medial gyrus and adjacent middle
cingulate gyrus in what Amodio and Frith (Amodio and Frith, 2006) call the posterior
section of the rostral medial frontal cortex but not in the anterior section associated
with theory-of-mind (our mPFC ROI). Reductions in the BOLD signal were found in
the precuneus, the caudate nucleus and two small clusters in the cerebellum.
Main effects of gesturing
All activation clusters during gesturing compared to a passive baseline are shown in
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1-C. Notably, clusters of activity were found in the primary, pre-
and supplementary motor areas (BA 4a/p and 6), BA 44 and 45. Both inferior and
superior parietal lobules were involved, together with somatosensory cortices and
the middle and superior temporal gyri (including the TPJ). Inspection of the medial3.3 RESULTS 57
wall (see Figure 3.2) revealed activations in the superior medial gyrus and adjacent
middle cingulate cortex in what Amodio and Frith (Amodio and Frith, 2006) call the
posterior section of the rostral medial frontal cortex but not in the anterior section
associated with theory-of-mind (our mPFC ROI). Instead, the most anterior sections
show evidence of reduced BOLD relative to baseline. Extensive clusters were found
in the precuneus, the angular gyrus bilateral, the medial prefrontal cortex and the
left temporal pole, which were more active during the baseline than during gesturing.
Additional reductions in BOLD signal were found in the more posterior superior parts
of BA 17 and 18 and in the right hippocampus and amygdala.
Similarities and differences between guessing and passive observation
The comparison of activity between guessing and passive observation is rendered
more difﬁcult by the fact that they were acquired in separate sessions, and results
should be considered with care. Counterbalancing the order of acquisition would
however have interfered with the aims of the experiments for two reasons. First, an
instruction not to engage in active guessing would be even more difﬁcult during a
passive observation trial if participants would know that they later need to guess
the meaning of the same movie. Second, capturing the neural processes involved in
interpretinggesturesinanecologicallyplausiblewaywouldbedisturbedby‘passively’
viewing the movies before. Using different movies for passive observation and active
guessing would not be a solution either because the stimuli might differ in important
ways.
To exclude the possibility that differences in brain activity between guessing and
passive observation could simply be due to systematic differences in the state of the
scanner, we additionally compared the mean fMRI signal between the two sessions
(using a two-sample t-test comparing the globals in the two sessions, see Methods).
No region in the brain showed such an effect under a threshold of p Ç 0.05 (FDR
corrected). This means that functional differences cannot be due to differences in the
mean signal alone.
Two analyses were then performed to compare brain activity during the processing
of the same movies during active guessing versus passive observation: one to map
differences and one to map similarities between the two conditions. Areas, which
were recruited to a greater extent during guessing than during passive observation
were as follows: the inferior and middle temporal gyri and areas V5/MT+ bilaterally,
and more anterior in the brain a cluster in BA 44. Again, inspection of the medial wall
(see Figure 3.2) showed no clusters of activation in the mPFC ROI associated with
theory-of-mind. Differences due to a greater involvement during passive observation
thanduringguessingwerelocatedintheangulargyrusandtheprecuneus. Thesewere58 PLAYING CHARADES IN THE FMRI
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Figure 3.1: Activation maps rendered on the mean anatomy of all 20 subjects. (A-D)
Main effects guessing-baseline, passive observation-baseline, gesture-baseline,
guessing-passive observation. (E) Areas similarly activated during guessing and
passive observation (i.e. guessing-baseline pÇ0.001 & passive observation-baseline
pÇ0.001 & guessing-passive observation pÈ0.001). (F-I) A, B, D and E, each masked
inclusively with C. All images are thresholded at t = 3.58 which corresponds to an
uncorrected p·0.001. All voxels also survive a false discovery rate at pÇ0.05.
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Figure 3.2: Same as Fig. 3.1, but activations are now shown on the left (x=-5) and right
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areas that were deactivated compared to the passive baseline in the main effects. A
full description and visualization of the areas can be found in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1-
D. In contrast, much larger areas were recruited during both active guessing and
passive observation without signiﬁcant difference between these conditions. These
included the precentral gyrus (BA 6) and BA 44 and 45, the somatosensory cortex
(BA2), the inferior parietal lobule, and the middle and superior temporal areas. For a
full description and visualization of the areas, see Table 3.6 and Figure 3.1-E.
Guessing masked with gesturing, passive observation masked with gesturing (shared
circuits)
We deﬁned shared circuits as voxels recruited both during the execution and the
observation of gestures. Masking the activity during guessing with the activity during
gesturing shows, among others, shared recruitment of the following areas: the precen-
tral gyrus (BA 6) extending into the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44 and 45), the primary
somatosensory cortex (BA2 in particular), the middle and superior temporal areas
and the supramarginal gyri. Roughly the same pattern emerges when the activity
during observing is masked with the activity during gesturing. Figures 3.1-F and 3.1-G
detail these activations.
Similarities and differences between guessing and passive observation masked with
gesturing
Contrasting active guessing with passive observation and masking this with the acti-
vation during gesturing shows noticeable peaks in the right inferior parietal lobule
and in the left BA 44 (Fig. 3.1-H). Substantially larger areas remain when the activity
that is present during both active guessing and passive observation is masked with
activity during gesturing, without there being a signiﬁcant difference between these
conditions. These include much of the somatosensory, premotor, middle temporal-
and supramarginal cortex (Fig. 3.1-I).
3.3.3 Regions of Interest fMRI Results
Putative mirror neuron system (Figure 3.3)
The bar plot of the parameter estimates during the different conditions show that
all conditions activate all putative mirror neuron areas signiﬁcantly even at an un-
corrected threshold of P Ç 0.001. The time courses show further that all areas are
substantially activated during the whole period of each condition (as evidenced by60 PLAYING CHARADES IN THE FMRI
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Putative theory-of-mind areas (Figure 3.4)
The medial prefrontal cortex shows no signiﬁcant response to any of the conditions
when applying an uncorrected threshold of P Ç 0.001, in contrast to the temporo-
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Figure 3.4: Same as Fig. 3.3 for pToM areas.3.4 DISCUSSION 63
parietal junction. The time courses conﬁrm this observation: activation almost
never reaches signiﬁcantly above the baseline activity, except at the end of a movie
during the passive observation condition. The temporo-parietal junction is recruited
signiﬁcantly during both guessing and passive observation, but not during gesturing.
This is also conﬁrmed in its time courses.
3.4 DISCUSSION
In this experiment romantically involved couples played the game of charades in the
scanner, taking turns as either the sender (gesturing) or receiver (guessing) of gestures.
In this motivating context, they very naturally generated and decoded novel gestures
with a communicative intention. The main goals of the study were to investigate to
what extent (a) the pMNS for transitive hand actions and (b) pToM areas are involved
in deliberate communication through gestures, and (c) how dependent the activity in
these areas is on the communicative intention induced by the task. We analyzed the
involvement of these two networks in two ways: through a whole-brain and a region-
of-interest (ROI) analysis. Both analyses gave similar results. The pMNS does indeed
become activated during communication through gestures, with highly overlapping
brain areas involved in sending and receiving the gestural message. In contrast, the
most typical of pToM areas, the anterior rostral medial frontal cortex associated with
theory-of-mind (Amodio and Frith, 2006) (which we will refer to as mPFC) was not
recruited beyond baseline levels during either sending or receiving gestural messages;
the TPJ was engaged during observation but not during gesturing. The pMNS and TPJ
were signiﬁcantly activated both during guessing and passive viewing. The hypothesis
that the TPJ would only be activated during the guessing conditions that explicitly
encourages decoding the mental states (i.e. what is he trying to tell me?) but not the
control condition (passive viewing), was not conﬁrmed.
Involvement of the putative mirror neuron system
Our study shows that brain regions associated with the pMNS for goal-directed,
transitiveactionswererecruitedduringgesturalcommunication-evenwhenphysical
objects are not being present. A whole-brain analysis, in which the execution of
gestures is used to mask the guessing or passive observation of gestures, shows a
large overlap between the areas recruited in the three conditions (Fig. 3.1-F, 3.1-G).
Furthermore, the ROI analysis of the pMNS, as deﬁned using actions directed at
objects (Gazzola et al., 2007a), shows sustained activity in these areas during the
whole period of gesturing, guessing and passive observation (Fig. 3.3). Combining
the study of Gazzola et al. (2007a) with the results of the current study show that64 PLAYING CHARADES IN THE FMRI
the same set of voxels in the brain is therefore involved in (a) mapping the object-
directed hand actions of others onto the neural substrates involved in executing
similar object-directed hand actions and (b) mapping the gestures of others onto
the neural substrates involved in executing similar gestures. This extends previous
ﬁndings (Montgomery et al., 2007) by showing that even in the absence of imitation
trials, and during a genuinely communicative task, the brain regions associated with
the pMNS for goal-directed actions are consistently activated. See Supplementary
Information 1 for a discussion of how this ﬁnding relates to the question of whether
the pMNS requires objects to be activated.
To maintain the ﬂow of the game, control conditions involving the static vision
of hands or meaningless hand actions were not included in this study. One might
therefore question whether the activity found in the ROIs during gesture viewing
(guessing or passive observation) is speciﬁc to actions or whether it reﬂects unspeciﬁc
attentional resources. The ROIs used to extract the signal in the pMNS have been
extensively examined in our laboratory using the same scanner and analysis software
(Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Gazzola et al., 2007a,b). Supplementary Information 2
illustrates the peak percent signal changes of the time courses measured in Gazzola
et al. (2007a) (their Fig. S3) and those observed during the same time period of the
gesture condition in the present experiment. Doing so revealed that activations in
the guessing condition here exceeded those of the control conditions of Gazzola et al.
(2007a) in all but the right ventral premotor ROI. Indeed, in the same ROIs, the activity
in the present experiment often exceeded even the vision of goal directed actions in
all but the right ventral premotor ROI. Although comparisons across experiments
are problematic and should be interpreted with caution, this does suggest that the
activity during the viewing of gestures in the present experiment reﬂects genuine
action processing that exceeds that during the sight of mere movements.
Interestingly,thebrainactivityinducedwhileengagedinactiveguessingoverlapped
considerably with that obtained during the second showing of the exact same visual
stimuli but without the task (Fig. 3.1-F,3.1-G). As noted in the results, quantitative
comparisons across different sessions are problematic, and conclusions drawn from
these comparisons have to be considered with care. A quantitative comparison be-
tween activity in the two conditions within the conﬁnes of regions involved in gesture
production however did reveal signiﬁcantly higher BOLD during active guessing com-
pared to passive viewing. The areas particularly involved were BA44 and the MTG
(Fig. 3.1-H). These differences are unlikely to be due to systematic differences in
the sensitivity of the scanner, as there were no signiﬁcant differences in these areas
between the globals extracted by the general linear model on the two scanning days
(see methods). These differences were also marginal compared to the much more
extensive network of premotor, parietal and temporal regions of the pMNS that did
not show a signiﬁcant difference between the two tasks (Fig. 3.1-I). This ﬁnding is in3.4 DISCUSSION 65
line with a previous study which showed that the pMNS for facial movements is only
marginally affected by task (van der Gaag et al., 2007). A number of studies (Brass
et al., 2000; Kilner et al., 2007) have shown that observing other people’s behaviour
interferes with the observer’s own movements even if it would be beneﬁcial for the
observer to ignore the movements of the other person. We believe that the similarity
between the activity in passive viewing and active guessing, and the fact that both
signiﬁcantly activate the pMNS, highlights the tendency of the pMNS and/or the
subjects to process the actions of others even if the experimenter’s instructions do
not explicitly encourage them to do so. With ’and/or the subject’ we refer to the fact
that upon debrieﬁng, some of our participants reported ﬁnding it hard to refrain
entirely from interpreting the gestures in the passive viewing condition. They did
report however, that they interpreted the actions more during the guessing condition.
It should be noted that activation of the pMNS regions during gesture observation
and production can, but does not have to reﬂect activity in mirror neurons within
these voxels. This is because a voxel involved in two tasks could contain a population
of neurons involved in both, as has been shown in the monkey (Gallese et al., 1996;
Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002) and/or two distinct populations, each of which
being involved in only one of the two tasks, interdigitated within the volume of the
voxel (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008).
Involvement of Theory-of-Mind areas
Because playing charades could require the explicit guessing of the communicative
mental state of the gesturer (“what was he trying to tell me?”), our second experimen-
tal question was whether pToM areas, including the mPFC and the TPJ, would be
signiﬁcantly recruited during the gesturing, active guessing and/or passive viewing.
Medial Prefrontal Cortex
Previous studies have shown that mentalizing is associated with activity in the mPFC
(Brunetetal.,2000;Castellietal.,2000;GallagherandFrith,2003;Gallagheretal.,2000,
2002; Iacoboni et al., 2004; Siegal and Varley, 2002; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Walter
et al., 2004). More speciﬁcally, Sommer et al. (2007) showed that true belief reasoning
(which might be closer to what participants need to do here compared to false-belief
reasoning) involves the mPFC. Furthermore, Kampe et al. (2003), as well as Walter
et al. (2004), and Ciaramidaro et al. (2007) found the anterior paracingulate cortex to
be recruited while recognizing the communicative intentions of others (for reviews
see Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006). In our experiment, neither the ROI
nor the whole brain analysis revealed activations above baseline in the mPFC during66 PLAYING CHARADES IN THE FMRI
any of the conditions. This was true using a threshold of pÇ0.001, and for the ROI
analysis at using pÇ0.01 (see Fig. 3.4). This negative ﬁnding suggests that the mPFC
may not play an active role in gestural communication. This ﬁnding seems different
from Gallagher and Frith (2004) conclusions that the left anterior paracingulate cortex
was selectively more involved in recognizing gestures expressing inner states. This
difference may be due to the fact that our gestures referred to objects (nutcracker)
and object-directed actions (riding a bicycle) while Gallagher and Frith’s expressive
gestures referred to inner states (I feel cold). Thinking about the inner states of others
is indeed known to be particularly effective at triggering mPFC activity (Amodio and
Frith, 2006).
We asked participants to consider the movies of their partner’s actions for at least
50 seconds before reporting their interpretation of the gestures. This requirement was
established to ascertain sufﬁcient data points to examine the time course of activity. A
consequence of this requirement, however, is the participants may have guessed the
meaning of the gestures early in the trial, and before they gave their answer. Could the
lack of mPFC activity in the whole-brain and ROI analysis be due to these trials? We
believe not. If this were the case, the time course extracted from the mPFC ROI during
the guessing condition should exceed the baseline activity or that during observation
condition at least early in the trial. Our data (Fig. 3.4) does not support this hypothesis.
It should be note however, that all conditions in our experiment were compared
against a passive baseline. It has been argued that a seemingly passive baseline
actually goes hand-in-hand with increased metabolism in the mPFC (Raichle and
Snyder, 2007), possibly because of self referential processing. Such default, self-
referential activity would have been suspended by our tasks, leading to a decrease in
mPFC activity that may have masked mentalizing processes of comparatively smaller
metabolic demands.
Temporal Parietal Junction
We found that the TPJ was signiﬁcantly activated during guessing and passive obser-
vation but not gesturing. The TPJ has been associated with the ability to mentalize
(Pelphrey et al., 2004; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe et al.,
2004), but other studies suggest that this involvement might reﬂect attentional reori-
entation necessary for mentalizing rather than mentalizing per se (Decety and Lamm,
2007; Mitchell, 2008). It therefore remains unclear what can be deduced from its acti-
vation in some of our conditions. It might be that activity truly reﬂects mentalizing
(Scholz et al., 2009), suggesting that the decoding of gestures but not their generation
requires mentalizing. What sheds doubt on this interpretation is that during mentaliz-
ing tasks, the TPJ typically coactivates with mPFC, and this coactivation may be more3.5 CONCLUSIONS 67
unique for mentalizing than the activity of either region taken alone. Alternatively, ac-
tivity in the TPJ may reﬂect attentional reorienting (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Mitchell,
2008) (for instance between the gestures as an outer stimulus and the hypothesis
about their meaning as an inner stimulus), which gesture interpretation may share
with mentalizing. Finally, some have interpreted TPJ activity during the attribution of
agency (Decety and Lamm, 2007), an interpretation that would match our ﬁnding TPJ
activity only during to the third person conditions (guessing and passive observation)
Further experiments are needed to disentangle these alternatives.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
The putative mirror neuron system (pMNS) is recruited by observing communicative
gestures (both with and without an instruction to interpret) and by the production of
similar gestures. In contrast, the mPFC, which is often associated with mentalizing
and ToM, was not recruited above baseline during gestural communication. Finally
the TPJ, which is associated with mentalizing but also attention reorienting and the
attribution of agency, was recruited during both passive observation and guessing.
This suggests that observing gestures recruits a combination of TPJ and pMNS both
when participants actively decode gestures and when they passively watch them. The
pMNS - but not the TPJ - is recruited during the generation of similar gestures. These
ﬁndings are in accordance with the idea that gestural communication could build
upon a pMNS for goal-directed hand actions (Gentilucci and Corballis, 2006; Rizzo-
latti and Arbib, 1998). The pMNS could create a simulated ﬁrst person perspective of
the gestures through a combination of forward and reverse models in the somatosen-
sory and motor domain (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). This simulation could then
provide additional information for associating the vision of gestures to their mean-
ing. Evidence for mentalizing during gestural communication in this experiment is
weak however. During gesture interpretation, TPJ activity could reﬂect the fact that
information from the pMNS could feed into pToM components (the TPJ) (de Lange
et al., 2008; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Thioux et al., 2008), but it is unclear why the
mPFC would not have been active if activity truly reﬂects mentalizing. During gesture
generation, neither the TPJ nor the mPFC were active above baseline. Alternatively,
TPJ activity during gestural interpretation may reﬂect the attribution of agency to the
action representations in the pMNS (Decety and Lamm, 2007).
We have introduced the game of charades in neuroimaging research as a motivating
social game to study gestural communication. This provides a new tool to study the
involvement of pMNS in a genuinely communicational context. By extending this
method to study virtual or neurological lesions it can be determined whether these
regions play a necessary role in understanding and generating communicative ges-68 PLAYING CHARADES IN THE FMRI
tures. A number of studies using gesturing tasks have found impairments in gesture
recognition following motor skill impairment (Cubelli et al., 2006; Pazzaglia et al.,
2008; Rothi et al., 1985). This suggests that the pMNS may indeed play a critical role.
A recent study (Pazzaglia et al., 2008) shows that premotor and parietal lesions that
impair hand action execution (as compared to mouth action execution) selectively
impair the recognition of hand gestures (and their sounds). This conﬁrms that lesions
in the pMNS can selectively affect the production and perception of particular motor
programs. This ﬁnding would be expected if simulation were important in gestural
communication given that the pMNS is roughly somatotopically organized (Buccino
et al., 2001; Gazzola et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2007; Wheaton et al., 2004). Never-
theless, although gesture recognition is impaired in apraxic patients, performance
typically remains substantially above chance level, suggesting that the pMNS cannot
be the only route to associate gestures with meaning. Understanding the comple-
mentary nature of various sources of information within the brain during gestural
communication will be an important focus of future research (de Lange et al., 2008;
Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Thioux et al., 2008).BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Each of the following tables specify for each supra-threshold cluster of activation
during the indicated contrast, the t-value, location, anatomical description and, when
available, probabilistically determined Brodmann area according to the anatomy
toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Clustersize T Hem. Area BA
(K) X Y Z X Y Z
65367 17.30 50 -72 3 50 -68 -2 Bilateral Middle Temporal Gyrus       
15.87 28 -54 57 28 -50 52 Bilateral Inferior Parietal Lobule       
14.77 56 -46 21 56 -42 16 Bilateral Superior Temporal Gyrus       
13.90 48 -32 41 48 -28 36 Bilateral SupraMarginal Gyrus        
13.15 34 -40 57 34 -36 52 Bilateral Postcentral Gyrus     2
10.03 60 14 33 60 18 28 Bilateral Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44, 45
8.19 -40 18 -17 -40 22 -22 Bilateral Temporal Pole        
7.69 -40 -30 69 -40 -26 64 Bilateral Precentral Gyrus     4a, 6
4719 13.3 -26 -58 13 -26 -54 8 Bilateral Precuneus 18
489 6.09 42 -14 17 42 -10 12 R Insula Lobe (OP 3)
404 7.23 -52 -68 45 -52 -64 40 Bilateral Angular Gyrus
Talairach MNI
Reductions in BOLD signal during Guessing
Main effects of guessing P (unc) < 0.001; T > 3.58; N = 20; K > 10
Table 3.2: Activation Table for the contrast Guessing - Baseline.
Clustersize T-value Hem. Area BA
(K) X Y Z X Y Z
74505 15.20 50 -70 3 50 -66 -2 Bilateral Middle / Superior Temporal Gyrus
12.32 -30 -52 55 -30 -48 50 Bilateral Inferior Parietal Lobule       
11.99 32 -36 51 32 -32 46 Bilateral Postcentral Gyrus     3a
10.34 -38 -40 57 -38 -36 52 Bilateral Postcentral Gyrus     2
9.62 60 4 43 60 8 38 Bilateral Precentral Gyrus    6
9.31 10 8 73 10 12 68 Bilateral SMA    6
9.14 38 4 41 38 8 36 Bilateral Middle Frontal Gyrus       
9.10 60 12 33 60 16 28 Bilateral Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44
8.96 -60 -46 29 -60 -42 24 Bilateral SupraMarginal Gyrus        
8.42 -54 -28 57 -54 -24 52 Bilateral Postcentral Gyrus   1
8.14 54 12 -9 54 16 -14 Bilateral Temporal Pole        
1287 9.16 -24 -56 17 -24 -52 12 L Precuneus
97 4.21 -4 -52 -29 -4 -48 -34 L Cerebelum (IX)
26 4.49 -16 14 21 -16 18 16 L Caudate Nucleus
Talairach MNI
Reductions in BOLD signal during Observation
P (unc) < 0.001; T > 3.58;  Main effects of passive observation 
Table 3.3: Activation Table for the contrast Passive Observation - Baseline.
7778 Activation Tables
Clustersize T Hem. Area BA
(K) X Y Z X Y Z
14.55 -28 -58 71 -28 -54 66 Bilateral Superior Parietal Lobule       
13.81 44 -24 59 44 -20 54 Bilateral Postcentral Gyrus 3b
13.46 -36 -18 67 -36 -14 62 Bilateral Precentral Gyrus 6
13.41 4 -4 73 4 0 68 Bilateral SMA  6
12.04 -46 -36 43 -46 -32 38 Bilateral Inferior Parietal Lobule       
11.98 -52 2 15 -52 6 10 Bilateral Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44
10.61 -52 -66 3 -52 -62 -2 Bilateral Middle Temporal Gyrus       
10.03 66 -38 27 66 -34 22 Bilateral Superior Temporal Gyrus       
5.38 26 -76 45 26 -72 40 Bilateral Superior Occipital Gyrus       
615 6.26 32 42 33 32 46 28 Bilateral Middle Frontal Gyrus       
3228 9.03 4 -64 37 4 -60 32 R Precuneus  
675 6.58 50 10 -19 50 14 -24 R Temporal Pole 
610 7.15 -54 -66 43 -54 -62 38 L Angular Gyrus 
588 7.83 52 -68 47 52 -64 42 R Angular Gyrus 
21 4.17 -42 10 -29 -42 14 -34 L Medial Temporal Pole
P (unc) < 0.001; T > 3.58; N = 20; K > 10 Main effects of gesturing
Talairach MNI
Reductions in BOLD signal during Gesturing
Table 3.4: Activation Table for the contrast Gesturing - Baseline.
Clustersize T Hem. Area BA
(K) X Y Z X Y Z
3035 5.82 44 -72 3 44 -68 -2 R Middle Temporal Gyrus
5.30 26 -92 -3 26 -88 -8 R Lingual Gyrus      18
2304 6.18 -42 -72 1 -42 -68 -4 L Inferior Occipital Gyrus (V5/MT+) 
6.14 -44 -70 3 -44 -66 -2 L Middle Occipital Gyrus
1213 6.50 36 -48 65 36 -44 60 R Superior Parietal Lobule        2
280 5.83 26 -30 1 26 -26 -4 R Hippocampus
201 4.69 -48 10 27 -48 14 22 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus  44 / 45
3116 7.68 -8 -66 37 -8 -62 32 Bilateral Precuneus
3.76 4 -34 41 4 -30 36 R Middle Cingulate Cortex
618 6.38 -46 -66 37 -46 -62 32 L Angular Gyrus
355 5.64 52 -68 45 52 -64 40 R Angular Gyrus
5.63 54 -66 43 54 -62 38 R Inferior Parietal Lobule
265 4.22 10 -30 73 10 -26 68 Bilateral Paracentral Lobule 6
Talairach MNI
 Observation - Guessing
P (unc) < 0.001; T > 3.58; N = 20; K > 10 Guessing - Observation
Table 3.5: Activation Table for the contrast Guessing - Passive Observation.79
Guessing = Observation P (unc) < 0.001; T > 3.58; N = 20; K > 10
Clustersize T Talairach MNI Hem. Area BA
(K) X Y Z X Y Z
51164 17.12 36 -78 -3 36 -74 -8 R Inferior Occipital Gyrus
15.47 14 -88 -9 14 -84 -14 R Lingual Gyrus 18
14.58 -4 -90 -7 -4 -86 -12 L Calcarine Gyrus 18
14.02 -30 -92 21 -30 -88 16 L Middle Occipital Gyrus
13.79 -28 -84 -5 -28 -80 -10 L Inferior Occipital Gyrus
13.36 58 -46 21 58 -42 16 R Superior Temporal Gyrus
12.92 18 -96 15 18 -92 10 R Cuneus
12.75 42 -60 -9 42 -56 -14 R Inferior Temporal Gyrus
12.32 26 -82 -5 26 -78 -10 R Fusiform Gyrus
11.57 -44 -58 -11 -44 -54 -16 L Fusiform Gyrus
11.20 32 -38 59 32 -34 54 R Postcentral Gyrus 3b
11.09 32 -88 21 32 -84 16 R Middle Occipital Gyrus
11.00 -50 -4 43 -50 0 38 L Precentral Gyrus
10.73 54 -72 13 54 -68 8 R Middle Temporal Gyrus (hOC5 V5/MT+)
10.67 36 -34 49 36 -30 44 R Postcentral Gyrus 2
10.41 -32 -56 65 -32 -52 60 L Superior Parietal Lobule 
10.10 32 -66 -17 32 -62 -22 R Cerebelum VI
9.63 26 -58 57 26 -54 52 R Inferior Parietal Lobule 
9.62 60 4 43 60 8 38 R Precentral Gyrus  6
9.51 -46 -70 15 -46 -66 10 L Middle Temporal Gyrus
9.46 52 12 33 52 16 28 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis)  44
9.36 22 -8 69 22 -4 64 R Superior Frontal Gyrus  6
9.00 -52 8 21 -52 12 16 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Opercularis)    44
8.90 -16 -78 -17 -16 -74 -22 L Cerebelum VI
8.88 -26 -8 63 -26 -4 58 L Middle Frontal Gyrus
8.72 -52 -30 45 -52 -26 40 L Inferior Parietal Lobule  2
8.65 40 -4 67 40 0 62 R Middle Frontal Gyrus
8.63 -44 -40 -13 -44 -36 -18 L Inferior Temporal Gyrus
8.17 -32 26 1 -32 30 -4 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis)
8.09 -4 8 63 -4 12 58 L SMA 6
8.09 24 -60 67 24 -56 62 R Superior Parietal Lobule 
8.06 -56 -26 53 -56 -22 48 L Inferior Parietal Lobule   1
7.99 40 -44 53 40 -40 48 R Inferior Parietal Lobule  (hIP2)      
7.89 20 -28 7 20 -24 2 R Thalamus
7.82 -58 -46 27 -58 -42 22 L Superior Temporal Gyrus
7.82 4 8 67 4 12 62 R SMA  6
7.77 -22 -88 43 -22 -84 38 L Superior Occipital Gyrus 45
7.39 -52 24 27 -52 28 22 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis) 
7.34 -42 18 -15 -42 22 -20 L Temporal Pole
6.93 56 22 29 56 26 24 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Triangularis)  45
6.80 36 -26 63 36 -22 58 R Precentral Gyrus  4a
6.55 -46 -30 65 -46 -26 60 L Postcentral Gyrus 1
6.30 46 -38 45 46 -34 40 R SupraMarginal Gyrus
6.08 44 -74 -21 44 -70 -26 R Cerebelum Crus 1
5.81 -12 -72 69 -12 -68 64 L Precuneus
5.77 -10 14 47 -10 18 42 L Superior Medial Gyrus
5.65 -14 -4 5 -14 0 0 L Pallidum
5.43 -18 -72 -25 -18 -68 -30 L Cerebelum Crus 1
5.29 54 10 -13 54 14 -18 R Temporal Pole
5.15 -20 14 1 -20 18 -4 L Putamen
5.13 -60 -22 27 -60 -18 22 L Postcentral Gyrus (OP 1)   
4.98 26 8 -15 26 12 -20 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus (p. Orbitalis)
4.85 26 16 9 26 20 4 R Putamen
4.46 -42 48 3 -42 52 -2 L Middle Orbital Gyrus
4.46 -12 -24 9 -12 -20 4 L Thalamus
4.45 12 8 7 12 12 2 R Caudate Nucleus
3.73 -52 4 -27 -52 8 -32 L Medial Temporal Pole
28 4.36 -32 -10 -17 -32 -6 -22 L Hippocampus (Amyg. LB)
13 3.81 -14 -26 51 -14 -22 46 L Middle Cingulate Cortex
Table 3.6: Activation Table for the contrast Guessing equals Passive Observation.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 1
DOES THE MNS NEED OBJECTS TO BE ACTIVATED?
Some studies have investigated whether the MNS can respond to actions not directed
at objects (Buccino et al., 2001; Umiltà et al., 2001, e.g.). Can the current study provide
further insights into this question? While it is true that none of our stimuli had an
object physically present, all of the words people had to mime referred to objects
(Tab. 3.1 in main article). Accordingly, the production and observation of our gestures
may have involved mentally ﬁlling in objects that were implied by the gestures. Single-
cell recordings in the monkey (Umiltà et al., 2001) support this view: implying the
presence of objects can make mirror neurons selective to viewing actions for which
the object is not physically present. In monkeys, implying the presence of an object
cannot be done by miming the action without the object (which did not trigger
activity in Umiltà et al. (2001)), but can be achieved by placing an occluding screen
in front of the object. Humans, unlike monkeys, routinely engage in “let’s pretend”
play as children (Fein, 1981). This raises the question of whether miming might be
more effective at implying the presence of objects to the MNS. (Buccino et al., 2001)
showed that most of the pMNS seems to respond to the sight of grasping a cup but
not when the cup was absent. Our data however shows activity in those parietal
nodes of the pMNS in which (Buccino et al., 2001), found activity only for the movies
including the object. This may suggest that a simple mimed grasp may fail to conjure
up a mental object, but that within the context of our experiment, more elaborate
gestures simulating the presence of an object may be more effective. In conclusion,
the apparently simple question of whether the pMNS responds to actions not directed
to physically present objects becomes more complex if one considers that mimed
actionsmaydifferintheireffectivenessatconjuringmentalrepresentationsofobjects.
A similar difﬁculty applies to communicative gestures (e.g. Montgomery et al., 2007,
“come here!” gesture), which always imply another person as a target. However, what
our experiment does show is that in the context of deliberate gestural communication,
gestures can recruit the pMNS even if their object is not physically present.
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Figure 3.5: Peak percent signal changes of the time courses measured in Gazzola et al.
(2007a, their Fig. S3) and those observed during the same time period of the gesture
condition in the present experiment.
814
MAPPING THE INFORMATION FLOW FROM ONE BRAIN TO
ANOTHER DURING GESTURAL COMMUNICATION
Publishedas: Schippers, M.B., Roebroeck, A., Renken, R., Nanetti, L., Keysers, C.(2010)
Mapping the information ﬂow from one brain to another during gestural communi-
cation. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA. 107 (20) 9388-9393. doi:10.1073/pnas.1001791107
ABSTRACT
Both the putative Mirror Neuron System (pMNS) and the ventral medial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) are deemed important for social interaction: the pMNS because it supposedly
‘resonates’ with the actions of others, the vmPFC because it is involved in mentalizing. Strictly
speaking the resonance property of the pMNS has never been investigated. Classical fMRI
experiments have only investigated whether pMNS regions augment their activity when an
action is seen or executed. Resonance, however, entails more than only ‘going on and off
together’: activity in the pMNS of an observer should continuously follow the more subtle
changes over time in activity of the pMNS of the actor. Here we directly explore if such
resonance indeed occurs during continuous streams of actions. We let participants play the
game of charades, while we measure brain activity of both gesturer and guesser. We then
apply a new method to localize directed inﬂuences between the brains of the participants:
between brains Granger Causality Mapping. Results show that a guesser’s brain activity in
regionsinvolvedinmentalizingandmirroringechothetemporalstructureofagesturer’sbrain
activity. This provides evidence for resonance theories and indicates a ﬁne-grained temporal
interplay between regions involved in motor planning and regions involved in thinking about
the mental states of others. Furthermore, this new method enables experiments to be more
ecologically valid by providing the opportunity to leave social interaction unconstrained. This,
in turn, would allow us to tap into the neural substrates of social deﬁcits, such as autism
spectrum disorder.
.........................................................................................
4.1 INTRODUCTION
How do humans understand each other? In the last decade two parallel lines of
researchhaveinvestigatedthisquestion. Ontheonehand,theﬁndingthatsomebrain
regions and neurons involved in performing an action are also active while viewing
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the actions of others (jointly referred to as the Mirror Neuron System, MNS, (Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2006; Chong et al., 2008; Dinstein et al., 2007; Fadiga et al., 1995; Filimon
et al., 2007; Gallese et al., 1996; Gazzola et al., 2006; Grèzes et al., 2003; Iacoboni
et al., 1999; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Kilner et al., 2009; Ricciardi et al., 2009; Turella
et al., 2009) has lead to the idea that we understand the actions of others in part by
transforming them into the motor vocabulary of our own actions. On the other hand,
reﬂecting on other people’s thoughts and beliefs is mediated by another part of the
brain, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC, including the anterior cingulate
and paracingulate gyrus). This area is consistently activated when we think about
other people’s mental states (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006; Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Sommer et al., 2007). Given that we often deduce the beliefs and
attitude of others through their actions, it is intuitively appealing to believe that these
two networks would work together to achieve a coherent representation of the mental
states of others (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Brass et al., 2007). However, a recent
meta-analysis has shown that these two networks are often found to be dissociated
(Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). In what follows, we will ﬁrst brieﬂy describe some
key issues that have limited our understanding of how these two systems contribute
to reading the mental states of other individuals during naturalistic situations, and
then present a new experimental paradigm to explore their role and interaction in a
naturalistic communicative situation.
Inhumans,thedorsalandventralpremotor,somatosensorycortex,anteriorinferior
parietal lobule and mid-temporal gyrus have the peculiar property of being active not
only when we perform an action but also when we witness similar actions of others
(Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Chong et al., 2008; Dinstein et al., 2007; Filimon et al., 2007;
Gazzola et al., 2006; Grèzes et al., 2003; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Keysers and Gazzola,
2009; Kilner et al., 2009; Ricciardi et al., 2009; Turella et al., 2009; Keysers, 2009). This
set of brain regions has therefore jointly been referred to as the putative MNS (pMNS)
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). It has been proposed that through this system, the brain
of two interacting individuals ‘resonate’ with each other: “other people’s mental states
are represented by [...] tracking [...] their states with resonant states of one’s own”
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998). In this context, the term‘resonance’ is used rather
loosely and metaphorically; not in a strict physical sense but rather to suggest that
the ups and downs in the activity of one person’s motor system lead to sequences of
actions and rest, which trigger similar ups and downs in the activity of the observer’s
(GalleseandGoldman,1998;Galleseetal.,2004;Rizzolattietal.,2001). Thisconceptof
resonance is very inﬂuential, however the only case in which this proposed temporal
‘tracking through resonant states’ has really been tested is for viewing repetitive cyclic
ups and downs of the wrist (Borroni et al., 2005). Whether it applies to the natural
streams of actions that typically lead us to read the minds of others, e.g. the sight
of two gesticulating individuals on the side of the road, remains untested. This is4.1 INTRODUCTION 85
because experimental designs so far have merely tested whether the pMNS becomes
active at the transition between a control condition and the sight of a single complex
action. This shows that the pMNS of the observer is indeed triggered by the sight
of an action. Single cell recordings (Keysers et al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2010) and
magnetoencephalography (Caetano et al., 2007) show that the temporal proﬁle of
this activity is indeed similar during action observation and execution, potentially
providing a neural basis for resonance. The concept of resonance, however, entails
more than only ‘going on and off together’ at the beginning and end of a single action:
it involves a continuous tracking of the more subtle changes in activity during the
execution and observation of entire streams of action. Natural social interactions are
composed of complex sequences of actions where it is often difﬁcult to know when
one action ends and another starts. Here we will directly explore if such resonance
indeed occurs within the pMNS during such continuous streams of actions.
The literature on the role of the vmPFC in social interaction suffers from another
problem. The vmPFC not only seems to be involved in reﬂecting on the mental
states of others (Amodio and Frith, 2006), it is also one of the brain regions that
systematically decreases its activity whenever participants process external stimuli
(the ‘default network’) (Raichle and Snyder, 2007). Studies investigating mentalizing
and the default network show strongly overlapping results while exploring seemingly
very different functions (Spreng et al., 2009). The fact that the vmPFC is not typically
found to be active while people observe the behaviors of others (Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009) is therefore difﬁcult to interpret: is activity due to interpreting another
mind masked by the fact that its overall level of activity is reduced compared to
baseline because of attention to external stimuli? A powerful way to examine this
possibility would be to look at the activity of the vmPFC during the observation of
longer streams of actions, as the overall level of activity in the default network might
then be decreased but the subtle ups-and-downs could still reﬂect the mentalizing
activity of this region in response to the sequence of actions.
Here, participants played the game of charades in the MR-scanner to allow us to
examine brain activity during longer streams of gestures. The game of charades was
chosen because its success as a commercial game shows how powerfully it triggers
the naturalistic motivation to communicate a mental state to a partner through hand
actions. It also has the advantage of making the participants generate and observe
streams of actions that are naturalistic both in duration and complexity. Given that
the type of gestures involved in this game are hand actions, charades can serve to
examine the unresolved issue of whether the pMNS would make two individuals’
brains resonate during longer streams of actions. Furthermore, since the aim of
charades is also to make one player guess a concept that is in the mind of the other
player, it is also a powerful instrument to check if ﬂuctuations in the activity of the
vmPFCduringlongerstreamsofgesturescouldreﬂectmentalizingprocessestriggered86 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN BRAINS
by the behavior of another individual. Indeed both the pMNS (Montgomery et al.,
2007; Pazzaglia et al., 2008; Schippers et al., 2009) and the vmPFC (Montgomery et al.,
2007) have been implicated in the observation of single gestures, maximizing our
chances to examine the yet unexplored issue of whether the activity of these regions
during longer streams of actions would indeed resonate with the activity of the brain
of the gesturer.
We therefore asked couples to take turns in the fMRI scanner while we measured
their brain activity. Each partner knew that on half of the trials, they would see a word
on a screen and would have to gesture this word into a video camera for their partner
later to guess; and on the other half, they would see a video of their partner’s gestures
and have to guess what the word had been. Using this manipulation, a single fMRI
scanner was enough to measure the brain activity both when one person generates
gestures and (later) when another person decodes these very gestures. By aligning
the time courses of the two brains’ activity, as measured using fMRI, relative to the
video recording, we can then directly investigate the temporal coupling of the two
brains activity during gestural communication. In order to do this quantitatively, we
introduce a new analysis method: we extend Granger Causality Mapping originally
used to track information ﬂow within a brain (Roebroeck et al., 2005) to a between
brainGrangerCausalityMapping(bbGCM,Fig.4.1andSupplementaryInformation2).
BbGCMquantiﬁestheinﬂuencefromaselectedseedregionYinthegesturer’sbrainto
all voxels Xi of the guesser’s brain by statistically comparing the G-causalities in both
directions, i.e. (Y ! Xi)¡(Xi !Y ) (Roebroeck et al., 2005). A preliminary analysis
of the same data using a traditional general linear model approach ignoring the
temporal relationship between the brain activities of each couple has been published
previously (Schippers et al., 2009) and shows involvement of pMNS areas, but not the
vmPFC. Using bbGCM, however, we will show that even if one ignores the beginning
and end of a gesture, activity in both the pMNS and the vmPFC of the observer does
carry ﬁne grained information about the time course of the activity in the brain of
the gesturer, providing a powerful demonstration of resonance across brains during
gestural communication.
4.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twelve couples (total: 24 participants) were scanned while playing the game charades.
Four participants had moved more than the voxel-size during the gesturing phase,
which lead us to exclude 3 couples from the data analysis that contained these partici-
pants. All the analyses in this paper are performed on 18 participants. The mean age4.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 87
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Figure 4.1: Between brains Granger Causality during active guessing. (A) Time series
X in the guesser’s brain is stimulus aligned with Y in the gesturer’s brain. The
ﬁxation periods between words (blue) are discarded. Guesser typically responded
beforetherecorded90s. Response(red)andpost-response(grey)periodswerethus
removed. 15TR at onset and 5TR at offset of each guessing period were trimmed
to remove transients. (B) Two regressions are compared at autoregressive order
three (see Methods): one including only the past of X itself, and one additionally
considering the past of Y. The residual error (variance) reduction from ¾2(²) to
¾2(²0) quantiﬁes how much Y G-causes X. (C) Reverse regressions are compared,
and differential, directed inﬂuences exists if one variable helps more in predicting
the other (see also Supplementary Information 2).88 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN BRAINS
of the participants was 27.5 § 3.8 years. Each couple consisted of a man and a woman
involved in a romantic relationship for at least 6 months. More details are described
in Supplementary Information 1.
Task / Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two separate sessions on different days. In the ﬁrst
session, the couple was required to play the game of charades. In the second, detailed
anatomical scans and a passive observation control condition were acquired. For
the game of charades, participants took turns going into the scanner, alternating
gesturing and guessing of words. Words were either objects (for example nutcracker,
watch, pencil sharpener) or actions (for example painting, knitting, shaving, see
Table 4.1 in Supplementary Information 1). Each participant performed two gesture
and two guess runs in which they gestured 14 words and guessed 14 words in total (7
per run).
During a gesture run, the participant was presented with a word on the screen and
was instructed to communicate this word to his or her partner by means of gestures.
Every word had to be gestured for 90 seconds and was then followed by a 20 seconds
ﬁxation cross. During a guess run, the participant was shown the movies that were
recorded in the gesture run of their partner. The task they had to perform was to guess
what their partner was trying to gesture to them. Participants were asked to consider
the gestures for at least 50 seconds before committing to a speciﬁc interpretation
of the gestures. This was done to ensure at least 50 seconds of data in each trial to
examine the time course of activity using between brains Granger causality. As a
control condition for the guess run, the participants watched the movies they had
seen during the guessing condition again. This time, they were instructed not to guess
what was gestured, but only to passively view them. More details are described in
Supplementary Information 1.
Granger causality analyses
Granger causality analyses were performed as described in Roebroeck et al. (2005)
but applied here to data from different brains (see Supplementary Information 2). In
short, given two time-series (for a seed and another point on the cortical surface),
autoregressive models are estimated that quantify G-causality. Given a seed, maps
are created that specify G-causal inﬂuence from the seed in the gesturer to all of the
guesser’s brain, as well as inﬂuence in the reverse direction, i.e. from anywhere in the
guesser’s brain to the seed in the gesturer’s brain. These two directions of G-causality
are then subtracted from each other to generate differential G-causality maps, such4.3 RESULTS 89
that positive values indicate more G-causality from the gesturer to the guesser than
fromtheguessertothegesturer. AseparatedifferentialG-mapwascalculatedforeach
of the 8 seed regions (see below) for each participant. These differential G-causality
maps were then taken, separately for each seen region map, to the second level (see
below) and thresholded for multiple comparisons at pÇ0.05 using a cluster threshold
determined by a Monte Carlo simulation method (Forman et al., 1995; Hagler et al.,
2006). The order of the estimated autoregressive models was 3, i.e. the 3 preceding
time points are taken into account to predict the current activity, corresponding to »4
seconds (3TR).
Seed ROIs
TheROIsthatwereusedasseedsinthebetweenbrainsGrangercausalityanalysiswere
deﬁned as those ‘mirror’ areas that were active both during gesturing and guessing
using a traditional GLM analysis on the same data (Schippers et al., 2009).
Instantaneous Motion Energy GLM
We extracted motion energy from the gesture movies using Matlab. For two consec-
utive frames of the recorded movies, motion energy was quantiﬁed in every pixel
as the sum of the squared differences in the red, green and blue channels and then
summed over all pixels. This time course was then mean corrected, convolved with
the hemodynamic response function and sampled at the acquisition rate of the fMRI
signal (TR = 1.33s).
4.3 RESULTS
4.3.1 BbGCM: gesturer to guesser
The resulting bbGCMs are shown in Figure 4.2 separately for each ROI (top 4 rows),
as well as summarized over all ROIs (bottom row). They show that activity in the
pMNS of the gesturer indeed predicts brain activity in the brain of the guesser more
than the other way around (warm colors). Given that we used only the very recent
past (4 seconds) of the gesturer’s brain activity in the analysis, this provides the ﬁrst
evidence, to our knowledge, that the moment-to-moment activity in the guesser’s
pMNS indeed mirrors the close past of the gesturer’s pMNS activity during gestural
communication. Notably, regions of the vmPFC cortex (including the anterior cingu-
late and paracingulate gyrus) are also G-caused by activity in the pMNS. The opposite
directionality (guesser to gesturer) is much rarer (only found in a small region on90 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN BRAINS
seed: gesturer's brain  target: guesser's brain
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All
t = -6.5 t = ± 2.11 t = 6.5
Between brains Granger: gesturer to guesser
 Order 3 
Figure 4.2: Results of second-level bbGCM. Granger analyses executed separately for
the left and right seed are shown together. The right side represents the guesser’s
brain showing t-values of the paired t-test between gesturer ! guesser versus
guesser ! gesturer G-causality (Random Effects, n=18). Upper four rows: differen-
tial G-causality originating from the seeds on the left. Bottom row: summary of all
seeds (solid colors, left) and bbGCMs (right) with an outline of the pMNS according
to a traditional GLM (Schippers et al., 2009) for visual orientation. BbGCM maps
are statistically thresholded at pÇ0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons by using
a Monte Carlo simulation-based cluster-size threshold adjustment (Forman et al.,
1995; Hagler et al., 2006)
the mesial wall, cold colors). This suggests that bbGCM is indeed able to track the
prevalent direction of information ﬂow between brains which has to be in the gesturer
to guesser direction given that the guesser could see the gesturer in the video but not
vice versa.4.3 RESULTS 91
4.3.2 BbGCM: gesturer to passive observation
To examine whether these results were dependent on the observer actively trying
to guess the meaning of the observed gestures, we had participants watch the same
gesture movies again but with an instruction not to actively interpret the movies
(see Methods). We computed between-brain inﬂuences between the gesturer’s brain
activity while generating the gestures and their partner’s during this control condi-
tion (Fig. 4.3A and Fig. 4.4). We then directly contrasted these results with those
during active guessing (Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3B). Directed inﬂuence was signiﬁcantly
reduced within the ventral premotor and parietal regions associated with the pMNS
when directly comparing the two situations (Fig. 4.3C and Fig. 4.5), and differential
G-causality was more consistent during deliberate guessing than passive viewing
(Fig. 4.3A vs. Fig. 4.3B). This suggests that a task to decode gestures does inﬂuence the
consistency(andthereforestatisticalsigniﬁcance)withwhichanobserver’sbraintime
locks onto the gestures, and thereby pMNS activity, of the gesturer. An instruction not
to interpret the gestures however cannot ensure that participants indeed refrained
entirely from interpretation and a traditional GLM analyses of the same data set
(Schippers et al., 2009) showed that overall activity during active guessing and passive
observation is indeed similar. Accordingly, contrasting bbGCM during active guessing
and passive viewing is a very conservative approach to localizing the neural basis
of gesture interpretation that would exclude all neural processes that are triggered
automatically by the vision of gestures. However, at debrieﬁng, participants reported
having interpreted the gestures at least less consistently during passive viewing than
active guessing, and we did ﬁnd differences in bbGCM results. This shows that an
instruction not to interpret the gestures of a partner does seem to partially decouple
the observer’s brain regions from the pMNS of the gesturer.
4.3.3 BbGCM: gesturer to a random guesser
To further test whether bbGCM is indeed identifying information ﬂow based on the
ﬁne-grained temporal chain of behaviors that makes each social interaction unique,
we recalculated bbGCMs while pairing each gesturer’s brain activity with that of a
randomly selected guesser that had viewed different gestures of another gesturer
(Fig. 4.3D and Fig. 4.6). Virtually no vertices (vertices refer to the nodes on the cortical
surface, and are therefore similar to voxels except that they are on a cortical surface
instead of a brain volume) demonstrated signiﬁcant differential G-causality in this
control analysis and there was signiﬁcantly more G-causality from gesturer to guesser
than from gesturer to random guesser (Fig. 4.3E and Fig. 4.7). Because the sequence
of words used for each couple was randomized, the original guesser and his/her92 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN BRAINS
randomly selected control guesser saw a different sequence of words being gestured
to them. As a yet stricter control analysis, we therefore repeated this control analysis
by substituting ‘word by word’ the time series of the original guesser with that of a
randomly selected control viewing the same word being gestured to him/her but
by someone else than the original gesturer (Fig. 4.8). Differential G-causality was
again signiﬁcantly stronger for the original gesturer-guesser pair. This provides direct
evidencethatthebrainactivityoftheguesserwasindeedanechooftheuniquewayin
which his/her particular partner generated these gestures and suggests that bbGCM
can indeed track the unique way in which two brains time lock onto one another
during communication.
4.3.4 GLM: using instantaneous motion energy of the gestures as predictor
Here we used bbGCM to indentify brain regions involved in tracking the gestures
of others. To test whether this new technique can unravel the involvement of brain
regions that more traditional techniques do not, we compared bbGCM with a classical
GLM in which we enter two regressors. One contains the timing of the gesture movies
(as a boxcar function), and the other the ﬂuctuation of instantaneous motion energy
within each movie, both of which were convolved with the hemodynamic response
function. This analysis shows that while the brain is strongly reacting to the on-
and offset of the movies (see Schippers et al., 2009, their Figure 1a), it does not
show a correlation between the ﬂuctuations in the movement of the gesturer (as
approximated using instantaneous motion energy in the movie) and ﬂuctuations
in brain activity of the guesser as the parameter estimates for the predictor motion-
energy was not signiﬁcantly above zero in any cluster (See Fig. 4.9).
4.4 DISCUSSION
In the present study, we introduced bbGCM to investigate to which degree two brains
‘resonate’ during gestural communication. We show that activity in the pMNS and the
vmPFC of the guesser is Granger-caused by ﬂuctuations in activity in the pMNS of the
gesturer. These ﬁndings have three sets of implications. First, they show that pMNS
regions indeed ‘resonate’ across brains, thereby providing evidence for resonance
theories (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001).
Second, they extend our understanding of the neural basis of gestural communication
by providing evidence for a ﬁne grained temporal interplay between regions involved
in motor planning (pMNS) and regions involved in thinking about the mental states
of others (vmPFC). Third, they demonstrate more generally that G-causality can be
used to map directional information ﬂow across brains during social interactions4.4 DISCUSSION 93
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Figure 4.3: Speciﬁcity of G-Causality. (A) t-values for (gesturer ! passive observer) -
(passive observer ! gesturer) differential G-causality. (B) Same as (A) but for the
original active guessing condition as in Fig. 4.2. (C) Paired t-test of (B)-(A). (D)
t-values for (gesturer !random guesser) - (random guesser ! gesturer) differential
G-causality. (E) Paired t-test for (B)-(D). All maps are statistically thresholded at
pÇ0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons by using a Monte Carlo simulation-
based cluster-size threshold adjustment (Forman et al., 1995; Hagler et al., 2006),
and represent the summary of the results for the 8 seed regions. See Figures 4.4-4.8
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without the need for the experimenter to impose temporal structure on the social
interaction.
Before going into details of each of these, we would like to discuss how such G-
causality should be interpreted (see also Supplementary Information 2). Directed
G-causality between brains has to be mediated by what the guesser can perceive: the
observable gestures of the gesturer. BbGCM as we apply it is therefore not a method to
determine direct causal interactions across brains, but a method to map brain regions
that are at opposite ends of a longer indirect chain of causality that goes through
the external world: neural activity in the gesturer causes both the execution of the
gestures and the BOLD signal that we measure with fMRI. The video-taped gestures
are seen by the guesser, which causes brain activity and an observable BOLD response
that we again measure with fMRI. Keeping the indirect nature of the causal pathway
in mind, our bbGCM maps brain regions in the receiver that echo the brain activity of
the sender. By ‘echo’ in this context, we mean providing temporal information about
the state of the other person’s brain region. In general, the directed bbGCM should
be interpreted with a further issue in mind. Because it is calculated by contrasting
bbGCM in two directions (Brain A ! Brain B minus Brain B ! Brain A), a value larger
thanzeroisevidenceforaninﬂuenceofbrainAonbrainB,whereastheoppositeisnot
evidence for a lack of inﬂuence from A ! B. This is because, in addition to a potential
lack of statistical power, negative ﬁndings with directed bbGCM could originate from
two very different scenarios: because there is no signiﬁcant information ﬂow in either
direction, or because the inﬂuence is signiﬁcant but equally strong in both directions.
Inourexperiment, thelatterpossibilityisunlikely, astheguessercanviewthegesturer
but the gesturer cannot see the guesser. It is therefore unlikely that the guesser’s brain
could inﬂuence the gesturer’s. The second scenario will, however, be more likely
in future experiments in which two interacting partners might be able to mutually
observe each other in real time.
We still know relatively little about the neural basis of mind reading and gestural
communication. However, two sets of brain regions could play a role: pMNS areas
and the vmPFC. Our ﬁndings support the idea that both play a role: we show that
BOLD activity in functionally deﬁned regions of the pMNS and in the vmPFC are
G-caused by BOLD activity in the pMNS of the gesturer. This strengthens the idea that
simulation and mentalizing both contribute to our interpretation of other people’s
gestures(KeysersandGazzola,2007;deLangeetal.,2008;Thiouxetal.,2008). Because
of the constraints of traditional data analysis (e.g. GLM analysis), the degree to which
the sequences of complex actions composing a gestural phrase (McNeill, 1992) would
be parsed (Byrne, 2003) similarly by the gesturer and guesser has never been explored.
Our ﬁnding of signiﬁcant G-causality between the pMNS in the two brains using
a temporal window of 3 (i.e. regressing the brain activity of the guesser onto the
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to our knowledge, that the two brain activities go up and down together in naturalistic
gestural communication. Reducing the order to 1 (i.e. considering only the past 1.33
secondsofthegesturer)muchreducesthisdifferentialG-causality(SeeFig.4.10). This
showsthatthepMNSofcommunicativepartnersindeedresonateswitheachother(in
the loose sense used in this literature) as had been suggested by simulation accounts
of mind reading and communication (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004;
Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Moreover, it informs us that this
resonance is not most evident at the second-to-second time scale of time window 1,
but at a more moderate time scale of several (»4s) seconds that is commensurable
withthetimeittakestoplan, generateandperceiveagesturalelement(McNeill,1992).
BbGCM is therefore a powerful tool to test the temporal resonance phenomenon
at the core of simulation accounts of communication. It furthermore shows that
the pMNS indeed provides the time-resolved information about the state of the
gesturer’s motor system that would be required for motor simulation to be useful
for communication in a naturalistic context. This adds to the evidence that the
excitability of an observer’s motor system ﬂuctuates in synch with the repetitive wrist
ﬂexion of another individual by showing that the concept of resonance indeed applies
to the complex, non repetitive and non rhythmical streams of gestures that are more
typical of real mind-reading situations and may have been essential in the early state
of language evolution (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). Additionally, this ﬁnding dovetails
with the observation that brain activity in both these regions predicts the accuracy
with which participants can judge the moment to moment emotional state of another
individual (Zaki et al., 2009).
The fact that vmPFC activity was also G-caused by pMNS activity in the gesturer
is surprising. This region is well known to play a role in inferring mental states from
written stories or cartoons (Amodio and Frith, 2006) and activity in this region is
increased while participants try to interpret certain gestures (Montgomery et al.,
2007). These ﬁndings suggest that the vmPFC might be involved in attributing mental
states to others, and could do so during gestures and actions. However, a previously
published preliminary GLM analysis of our data revealed that this region does not
demonstrate more brain activity while guessing gestures than while ﬁxating a cross
(Schippers et al., 2009). In addition, during the free-viewing of a Hollywood movie,
the vmPFC does not seem to synchronize across viewers (Hasson et al., 2004). The
inferential nature of these processes seems to detach brain activity in this region
from the exact timing of the stimulus, leading it not to synchronize across viewers
and therefore also making it difﬁcult to link activity in this region directly to the
stimulus itself. Indeed activity in this region also does not simply correlate with the
low level motion contained in the stimuli (see Fig.4.9). Here, on the other hand,
we show that activity in this brain region in a guesser does contain information (in
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regions involved in planning and executing gestures in the gesturer. This supports
the idea that the pMNS and mentalizing brain areas may work in concert to derive
mental states from observed actions (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Thioux et al., 2008).
A traditional GLM analysis of the same data (Schippers et al., 2009) may have been
unable to detect the involvement of the vmPFC because this region is also part of the
default network (Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009). The default network
is a set of brain regions that demonstrate augmented metabolism during passive
baseline conditions, supposedly because they contain neurons that are involved in
the self-referential processes we engage in while not performing a particular task
(Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Spreng et al., 2009). During guessing, these self-referential
processes would have been suspended, lowering the BOLD in this brain region below
baseline. The activity, in this region, of a smaller number of neurons engaging in
the mental state attribution required by the game of charades would then have been
maskedbytheconcurrentreductionofself-referentialactivity. OurbbGCMcandetect
such activity nevertheless, because it examines not whether activity overall goes up
or down relative to a baseline condition, but rather whether ﬂuctuations in activity
during the stream of gestures covaries with the past activity of the gesture execution
system of the gesturer. This changes the interpretation of the same data set compared
to a classical GLM analysis which showed that only the pMNS but not the vmPFC
demonstrate augmented activity compared to baseline during the active decoding of
gestures (Schippers et al., 2009).
A number of control analyses served to establish that bbGCM indeed tracks a
speciﬁc information ﬂow between two communicating participants. When pairing
the time course of a given gesturer with that of a randomly selected guesser, instead
of the one that had actually observed the gestures, signiﬁcantly less between brain
inﬂuences were observed compared to the analysis with the active guessing condition
(Fig.4.3E).ThissuggeststhatbbGCMindeedrevealedthespeciﬁceffectofaparticular
pattern of gestures on the brain activity of the guesser. Furthermore, we found that
active guessing, but not passive viewing of the same gestures leads to signiﬁcant
bbGCM of the pMNS and vmPFC (Fig. 4.3A). This shows that an instruction to actively
decode the gestures increases the coherence between the activities in the two brains.
Given that the brain activity of our guesser is not directly caused by brain activity
in the gesturer but by the pre-recorded movie of his/her gestures, one might argue
that measuring the brain activity of the gesturer is not necessary to map brain regions
involved in social information transfer. Instead, quantifying what is in the stimulus
would sufﬁce to localize those brain regions in the guesser’s brain that respond to that
stimulus. We tested this approach by using instantaneous motion energy from the
gesture movies as a predictor in a GLM analysis. Results show no correlation between
their activity and the instantaneous motion energy from the movies, indicating that
using this particular measure with a traditional GLM approach does not provide any4.4 DISCUSSION 97
extra information. While alternative approaches to quantifying the content of the
stimulus and introducing time-lagged versions of these predictors into a GLM may
help, the fundamental problem with such a stimulus centered approach is that quanti-
fyingtherelevantdimensionsofanaturalisticstreamofgesturesisfarfromtrivial: itis
ahighlymultidimensionalstimulus, andtransformingitintounivariatetimeseriesfor
a GLM requires knowledge of what aspects of the stimulus are relevant for the brain
of the observer - a knowledge that we often lack. BbGCM has the elegant property of
circumventing this problem altogether and thereby directly testing those theories, like
the pMNS ‘resonance’ theory of mind reading (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti
and Arbib, 1998), which are formulated not as a link between a stimulus and a neural
state, but between the neural states of two individuals.
As an alternative for this method, one might show the same gestures to many partic-
ipants, andexaminewhatbrainregionssynchronizeacrossparticipants(Hassonetal.,
2004). Between-viewer correlation also has the elegant property of circumventing the
problem of quantifying the stimulus, and is conceptually related to our approach. It
however has other limitations: it requires many viewers of the same stimulus and, in
its standard form, only examines instantaneous dependencies between brain regions
(i.e. it does not allow for time shifts between the brain activity of different viewers).
BbGCM overcomes these limitations: It can be applied to pairs of interacting part-
ners, with only one participant viewing any particular communicative episode, and
is therefore more suited for studying dyadic communication. Additionally, it allows
examination of dependencies between brain activity over a longer time period (the
G-causality order, in our case 4s), which is more appropriate for the analysis of brain
activity during communication, where several seconds can separate the planning of a
gesture from its execution and perception. BbGCM and between-viewer correlation
could be combined to a between viewer GCM: if the brain activity of one viewer
contains information about the brain activity of another viewer, in the absence of
direct communication between the viewers, this shared information has to be infor-
mation about the stimulus. Between-viewer GCM would thus map regions containing
information about the stimulus while allowing for slight time shifts across viewers.
More generally, for the ﬁeld of social neuroscience, our ﬁndings show that it is
possible to map the brain regions involved in the ﬂow of information across individu-
als with fMRI without imposing a temporal structure on the social interaction and
without depending on certain choices for the quantiﬁcation of the information in a
stimulus. A similar approach seems to be suited for analyzing EEG data during social
interactions (Babiloni et al., 2006). Demonstrating bbGCM between one brain region
in partner 1 and another region in partner 2 then allows a data driven identiﬁcation
of brain regions that could play a role in the information ﬂow across participants.
Much as for other data analysis techniques (Hasson et al., 2004), further experiments
that control the content of the stimulus seen by participants are then needed to iso-98 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN BRAINS
late which aspects of the complex interaction were encoded in the brain activity in
these brain regions, and virtual lesions using transcranial magnetic stimulation will
be needed to examine whether these brain regions are necessary for normal social
interactions.
In conclusion, bbGCM has advantages over existing techniques: it can map the
information transfer from brain to brain in pairs of participants without having to
impose temporal structure on social interactions and without requiring knowledge
about the relevant dimensions of the complex social stimulus. Here we used this
approach to show for the ﬁrst time that even for naturalistic streams of gestural
communication, the core prediction of MNS theories of communication and mind
reading hold: the pMNS of the guesser does indeed reﬂect moment to moment
information about the state of the motor system of the gesturer. In addition, using
this method, we narrow the gap between literatures exploring the pMNS and that
exploring mentalizing by show that the vmPFC of the observer could add to this
mirroring by also resonating with the motor system of the gesturer. More generally,
we hope that this technique will enable and inspire the investigation of one of the
most deﬁning feature of human beings: their capacity to transfer knowledge from
one person to another. In particular, the opportunity to leave the social interaction
unconstrained will enable experiments to be more ecologically valid. This, in turn,
could allow us to tap into the neural substrates of social deﬁcits and ask questions
like: Which neural substrates are responsible for the difﬁculty autistic individuals
have in taking turns during communication?
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MATERIALS AND METHODS IN DETAIL
Participants
Twelve couples (total: 24 participants) were scanned while playing the game charades.
Four participants had moved more than the voxel-size during the gesturing phase,
which lead us to exclude 3 couples from the data analysis that contained these partici-
pants. All the analyses in this paper are performed on 18 participants. The mean age
of the participants was 27.5 § 3.8 years. Each couple consisted of a man and a woman
involved in a romantic relationship for at least 6 months. We included this criterion
for two reasons. First, we expected thatthe participantswould be more motivatedand
more at ease during gesturing if they knew it was their partner who had to interpret
their gestures. Second, we expected them to have a better or faster understanding of
each other’s gestures since they knew each other better than a stranger would. Our
aimwasnottostudy speciﬁcallyromanticprocesses, butsimply tolettheparticipants
feel as comfortable as possible during the game. Participants were prescreened to
exclude those with a history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Participants were
also asked not to drink coffee before scanning commenced. The participants freely
consented to participating in the study by signing an informed consent form and
were scaled for their right-handedness on the Edinburgh Right-handedness scale
(Oldﬁeld, 1971). This entire study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of
the University Medical Centre Groningen (2007/080).
Task / Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two separate sessions on different days. In the ﬁrst
session, the couple was required to play the game of charades. In the second, detailed
anatomical scans and a passive observation control condition were acquired. For
the game of charades, participants took turns going into the scanner, alternating
gesturing and guessing of words. Words were either objects (for example nutcracker,
watch, pencil sharpener) or actions (for example painting, knitting, shaving, see
Table 4.1). Each participant performed two gesture and two guess runs in which they
gestured 14 words and guessed 14 words in total (7 per run). The set of words used
was the same for each couple, but word order was randomized between participants.
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After the last gesture-session, a T1-weighted anatomical image was acquired. See
Fig. 4.11 for a schematic overview of the experiment.
Gesture run: during a gesture run, the participant was presented with a word on
the screen and was instructed to communicate this word to his or her partner by
means of gestures (see Table 4.1 for an overview of the words). Every word had
to be gestured for 90 seconds. Prior to scanning participants were trained not to
repeat the same gesture over and over again, but to keep generating new gestures to
provide their partner with multiple sources of information. The participant could see
how much time he/she needed to keep gesturing by a progress bar on the screen. A
ﬁxationcrosswaspresentedfor20saftereachword, whichservedasourbaseline(see
Fig. 4.11 for a detailed overview). The gestures were recorded from the control room
of the MR-scanner with a video camera (Sony DSR-PDX10P). After the participant
had gestured seven words, he/she was taken out of the scanner and went into the
waiting room, while his/her partner went into the scanner to guess what he/she
had gestured. During this changeover, the experimenter cut the recording of the
gestures into movies of 90s in which the participant gestured a word. To ensure that
the movies were cut at exactly the moment the word was presented to the gesturing
participant, the stimulus computer’s sound card emitted a sound at the beginning
of word presentation. The output of the sound card was connected to the audio
input of the video camera, thus allowing the auditory signal to serve as a marker for
cutting. To minimize the amount of head motion in the participants, the upper arms
of the participant were ﬁxed to the bed by means of a Velcro strap band. This left the
participant free to gesture with his lower arms and ﬁngers, which still allowed 86%
percent correct gesture recognition.
Guess run: during a guess run, the participant was shown the movies that were
recorded in the gesture run of their partner. The task they had to perform was to guess
what their partner was trying to gesture to them. Participants were asked to consider
the gestures for at least 50 seconds before committing to a speciﬁc interpretation
Actions Objects
peel fruit fold nutcracker telephone
ride a bike drive a car pencil sharpener winding stairs
shufﬂe cards play the piano pistol ashtray
polish nails squeeze fruit electric eel bow
juggle paint watch handcuffs
knit light ﬁreworks board game glove
throw a snowball shave canoe cork screw
Table 4.1: Action and object words used in the charades106 Supplementary Information 1
of the gestures. This was done to ensure at least 50 seconds of data in each trial to
examine the time course of activity using between brains Granger causality. This was
done by showing a progress bar below the movie, changing from red to green after 50
seconds, indicating the beginning of the period (50-90s post stimulus onset) during
which participants could decide on their interpretation of the gestures, whenever
they felt conﬁdent, by pressing a button on their 4-button button-box, triggering the
appearance of a multiple choice screen. In the multiple-choice menu they had to
choose the correct word from ﬁve alternatives. One of the alternatives was always
‘none of the above’ and the correct answer was always present in the multiple-choice
menu. The correct answer was never the option ‘none of the above’. This marked the
end of a trial. Two consecutive trials were separated by 20s of a white ﬁxation cross
against a black background, which served as our baseline (Fig. 4.11).
Passive observation run: As a control condition for the guess run, the participants
watched the movies they had seen during the guessing condition again. This time,
they were instructed not to guess what was gestured, but only to passively view them.
We are aware that such instructions cannot ensure that participants entirely stopped
to interpret the gestures, but at debrieﬁng, participants reported having interpreted
the gestures at least less consistently than during the guess run. To keep the run
exactly the same as the original guess run, the movie stopped at the moment the
participant during the original run had pushed the button. The same multiple-choice
menu then appeared and the participant had to answer again. This time, however,
they had to select the word written in green letters. The green word was the correct
answer. A ﬁxation cross was presented between two consecutive trials for 20 seconds
and served as our baseline.
Data Acquisition
Functional imaging data was recorded with a Philips 3.0T MR scanner, using gradient
echo planar imaging (EPI) and an 8-channel head coil using SENSE technology. T2*
weighted images revealed changes in blood oxygen level. Volume repetition time (TR)
was 1.33 seconds. The whole brain was scanned in 28 (axial) slices with a thickness
of 4.5mm. Further imaging parameters include echo time (TE) 28 ms, ﬁeld of view
224 x 224 mm, 64 x 62 matrix, SENSE acceleration factor 2.4, ensuing 3D voxel size
3.5 x 3.5 x 4.5mm. This set of imaging parameters were chosen to cover the entire
neo-cortex while at the same time providing a TR short enough to expect sufﬁcient
power in a Granger Causality analysis (Roebroeck et al., 2005). In the ﬁrst session, a
fast structural image (“fast anatomy”) was acquired of the participant’s brain, while in
the second session an additional structural image of higher resolution was acquired.
Both were structural, T1-weighted images acquired with a T1TFE sequence (echo107
time 3.5 ms, repetition time 7.6 ms, 224 x 160 x 256 matrix, 1 x 1 x 1 mm3 voxels).
Data pre-processing
All analyses and preprocessing was performed in BrainVoyager QX 1.10 along with
custom written C++ code for the between brains Granger causality analyses. The
pre-processing steps included slice scan time correction, 3D motion correction and
temporal ﬁltering (consisting of linear trend removal and a high pass ﬁlter with a
cut-off at 0.004Hz). The images were not smoothed spatially. Functional images were
co registered with the structural images and morphed into Talairach space.
The structural images were corrected for inhomogeneity (to improve segmentation
results), normalized into Talairach space after which the cortical grey matter/white
matter boundary was segmented into a topologically correct surface representation.
After segmentation, the cortical surface representations of all subjects were aligned
using a cortical curvature based alignment procedure. This procedure aligns the sulci
and the gyri of the different brains using their cortical curvature-maps (Fischl et al.,
1999). Included in the cortex-based alignment was also the Colin (27) brain (Holmes
et al., 1998). The fMRI time courses were resampled on the curvature aligned cortical
surface representations.
Behavioral Results
During guessing the participants were asked to consider each movie for at least 50
seconds. After the 50s they could push the button when they thought they knew
what was being gestured to enter the multiple-choice menu. The average latency
to response was 58 seconds. Participants were equally accurate on both categories:
82.5% of the object words were guessed correctly against 86.5% of the action words
(t(17)=-1, pÈ.33). We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between the two types of
gestures,neitherintermsoflatencytorespond(58.7s§6.5sforactionand60.8s§6.8s
for object words, t(17)=1.16, pÈ.26) nor in terms of accuracy (6.06 § 0.73sd correct out
of 7 action and 5.78 § 1.11sd correct our of 7 object words, t(17)=-1, pÈ.33). Words
that were guessed incorrectly were watched signiﬁcantly longer than words that were
guessed correctly: 58s § 5s for the 289 correct guesses versus 68s § 12s for the 47
incorrect guesses (t(16)=-4.41, pÇ.0005).
Granger causality analyses
Granger causality analyses were performed as described in Roebroeck et al. (2005)
but applied here to data from different brains Supplementary Information 2. In108 Supplementary Information 1
short, given two time-series (for a seed and another point on the cortical surface),
autoregressive models are estimated that quantify G-causality. Given a seed in the
gesturer,mapsarecreatedthatspecifyG-causalinﬂuencefromtheseedinthegesturer
to all of the guesser’s brain, as well as inﬂuence in the reverse direction, i.e. from
anywhereintheguesser’sbraintotheseedinthegesturer’sbrain. Thesetwodirections
of G-causality are then subtracted from each other to generate differential G-causality
maps, such that positive values indicate more G-causality from the gesturer to the
guesser than from the guesser to the gesturer.
This differential G-causality measure was used for three reasons. First, it generates
values that are approximately normally distributed, with a mean of zero under the
null hypothesis of an absence of (indirect) causal relationship at the neural level
between the two brains, and are thus suitable for parametric testing at the second
level (see below and Roebroeck et al., 2005). Second, given that the guesser saw the
gesturer but not the other way around (one-way video feed), we know that there
should be more information ﬂow gesturer ! guesser than guesser ! gesturer (the
latter could only be due to anticipatory neural computations), allowing a directed
hypothesis testing. Thirdly, it has been shown that when the BOLD signal is used
to estimate G-causality, the differential G-causality (i.e. X ! Y - Y ! X) is more
robust than testing the individual components due to the ﬁltering properties of the
hemodynamic response and the relatively low sampling rate of fMRI (Roebroeck et al.,
2005). A separate differential G-map was calculated for each of the 8 seed regions
(see below) for each gesturer. These differential G-causality maps were then taken,
separately for each seed region map, to the second level (see below) and thresholded
for multiple comparisons at pÇ0.05 using a cluster threshold determined by a Monte
Carlo simulation method (Forman et al., 1995; Hagler et al., 2006). The order of the
estimated autoregressive models was 3, i.e. the 3 preceding time points are taken
into account to predict the current activity, corresponding to »4 seconds (3TR). This
interval was chosen a priori because it roughly covers the time it takes for a typical
gestural phrase to unfold (McNeill, 1992), and would therefore permit the analysis to
include time points involved in planning a gestural phrase in the regression of time
points involved in perceiving the end of the phrase. In addition, an early exploratory
analysis conﬁrmed this expectation. Performing the analysis with orders of 1TR or
5TR revealed similar but weaker effects (Fig. 4.10, due to too little relevant history
used in the order-1 models and power loss due to the increased amount of estimated
parameters in the order-5 models. It is likely that other experimental paradigms may
need different bbGCM orders, depending on the time scale of the semantic units
involved.109
Seed ROIs
TheROIsthatwereusedasseedsinthebetweenbrainsGrangercausalityanalysiswere
deﬁned as those ‘mirror’ areas that were active both during gesturing and guessing
using a traditional GLM analysis on the same data (Schippers et al., 2009). The GLM
for gesturing was estimated using the entire period in which the gesture was executed
as the only predictor. The GLM for the guess runs included two predictors: 1) the
period from onset of the movie in which the gesturer was shown until the time of
button press and 2) from button press until the participant had given a response. All
predictors were convolved with canonical hemodynamic response functions. The
mean parameter estimates of the contrasts gesturing versus baseline and guessing
versus baseline were tested at the second level using a one-sample t-test. Both results
of the second-level random effects analysis of gesturing and guessing versus baseline
werethresholdedatpÇ0.0001. Weusedthisstringentcriteriontoreducethesizeofour
seeds. The resulting maps were binarized (i.e. contained value 1 at above-threshold
vertices and 0 at below-threshold vertices). The binary maps were multiplied and the
resulting clusters contained the middle temporal gyrus (LH: 69, RH: 256 vertices), the
ventral (LH: 42, RH: 123 vertices) and dorsal premotor cortex (LH: 69, RH 147 vertices)
and a larger cluster in the parietal lobe. To reduce the size of our parietal lobe seed,
we used only that part of the ROI that overlapped with area BA2 (LH: 529, RH: 552
vertices), because BA2 was found to be the most consistent location of mirror voxels
in a previous analysis of the execution and observation of goal directed behavior
(Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). The location of BA2 was deﬁned by projecting the
maximum probability map of BA2 from the anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005)
onto a cortical surface segmentation of the Colin brain (Holmes et al., 1998). These
particular ROIs were chosen because our primary aim was to examine the resonance
theory of mind-reading which suggests that the pMNS of to people resonate with
each other, with the pMNS in the gesturer involved in triggering the gestures, which
are then viewed by the guesser, triggering activity in the pMNS of the guesser.
Time series
The input of the Granger causality analysis consisted of the average time course of the
seed of the gesturer during gesturing as well as all the corresponding time courses of
the vertices of the guesser’s brain during guessing. The time courses were truncated to
contain only those parts that reﬂected the steady-state part of either the gesturing or
the guessing. We excluded 1) 15TR from the beginning and 5TR from the end of both
the gesturing and the observation, thereby removing the on- and offset transients
(Fig. 4.1, green blocks), 2) the period from the button press of the guesser until the110 Supplementary Information 1
onset of the next gesture (Fig. 4.1, red and grey blocks), and 3) the baseline ﬁxation
cross period between two trials (Fig. 4.1, blue blocks). Additionally, information about
the beginning and end of each separate gesture-part was taken into account in the
Granger causality analysis, such that autoregressive model estimation was pooled
over calculations on separate blocks rather than calculated over a single time-course
with all blocks concatenated. On average, participants watched the gesture movies
for 58 seconds, which corresponds to §43 TR. This means that on average 43 - 15 - 5 =
23TR per trial were included in the Granger analyses, cumulating to 23 x 14 = 322TR
per participant.
Second level Granger analysis
Random effects’ testing was performed by t-tests at the second level. Two-tailed one-
sample t-tests were computed for a single differential G-causality maps, with a null-
hypothesis of a zero value (i.e. there is as much G-causality from Gesturer ! Guesser
than from Guesser ! Gesturer). Two-tailed paired t-tests were computed when
differential G-causality maps were compared between conditions/situations, with a
null-hypothesis of a zero value for the difference of the maps. Random effects t-maps
were then statistically thresholded at pÇ0.05 and corrected for multiple comparisons
by using a Monte Carlo simulation-based cluster-size threshold adjustment (Hagler
et al., 2006).
Motion Energy GLM
We extracted motion energy from the gesture movies using Matlab. For two consec-
utive frames of the recorded movies, motion energy was quantiﬁed in every pixel
as the sum of the squared differences in the red, green and blue channels and then
summed over all pixels. This time course was then mean corrected, convolved with
the hemodynamic response function and sampled at the acquisition rate of the fMRI
signal (TR = 1.33s). The GLM included three predictors: 1) a boxcar having values
1 for the period from onset of the movie in which the gesturer was shown until the
time of button press and zero elsewhere 2) a boxcar having values 1 from the time
of button press until the end of the response procedure and zero elsewhere, 3) the
mean corrected, convolved and sub sampled motion energy time course. Predictors 1
and 2 were then also convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response functions.
The mean parameter estimates of predictors 1 and 3 were then averaged for each
participant and tested at the second level using a one-sample t-test (see Fig. 4.9).
Predictor 1 but not 3 showed above threshold clusters.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 2
GRANGER CAUSALITY AND ITS APPLICATION TO FMRI
Granger causality or G-causality was proposed by Clive Granger (Granger, 1969, 1980)
and partially based upon earlier ideas of Norbert Wiener (Wiener, 1956). The aim
was to give an operational deﬁnition of what causality or inﬂuence could mean for
observations, structured in time, of multiple variables of interest. Granger clearly did
not mean to equate such a deﬁnition to an interventional notion of causality that
demands that one can only establish true causality if a process is actively interfered
with and the consequences, observed (c.f. Pearl, 2000). Rather, G-causality quantiﬁes
a very useful, pragmatic statistical notion of information transfer (see below) between
two stochastic processes.
A stochastic process X(t) is a random variable that is observed repeatedly in time
in an orderly fashion. The general idea of G-causality is that Y(t) G-causes another
process X(t) if the prediction of X’s values improves when we use past values of Y,
given that all other relevant information is taken into account. Here, all other relevant
information is understood to contain at least the past values of X itself. The vehicle
most often used to make predictions in this context is the linear autoregressive (AR)
model. Two regressions are compared: one including only the past of X itself, and one
additionally considering the past of Y:
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The residual error (variance) reduction from ¾2(²) to ¾2(²0) quantiﬁes how much Y
G-causes X. In the present study, the index i runs from 1 to 3 (the so-called autoregres-
sive order) which determines how far into the past we look for useful information to
predict X’s values. The autoregressive order needs to be carefully chosen (see Methods
and Fig. 4.10). When G-causality is applied to fMRI, the rich spatial structure in the
fMRI signal can be used. fMRI gives 10’s of thousands of independent time-courses
(for each volume element or voxel) of activity throughout the brain. The technique of
fMRI Granger Causality Mapping (GCM) explores all regions in the brain that interact
with a single selected reference region using G-causality as a measure of directed
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inﬂuence or information ﬂow. By employing an autoregressive model containing the
reference region and, in turn, every other voxel in the brain, the sources and targets of
inﬂuence for the reference region can be mapped (Roebroeck et al., 2005).
Here, Granger causality mapping was applied to data from different brains in
between brain Granger Causality Mapping (bbGCM). Given a seed selected in one
brain (the gesturer), maps are created that specify G-causal inﬂuence from the seed
in the gesturer to all of the guesser’s brain, as well as inﬂuence in the reverse direction,
i.e. from anywhere in the guesser’s brain to the seed in the gesturer’s brain. In this
way we quantify information transfer (in the Granger causal or information theoretic
sense, see below) between two brains during gestural communication (see Figure 4.2).
Simulations have shown that if two populations of neurons inﬂuence each other
strictly in a X ! Y direction, if BOLD is used to make inferences about the neural
populations, the low-pass ﬁltering effect of the hemodynamic response function and
the low sampling rate of fMRI lead to a certain cross-talk between the X ! Y and Y
! X G-causality, such that the Y ! X direction in the BOLD is no longer zero. The
same simulations have however also shown that the difference between X ! Y and
Y ! X, called the ‘differential G-causality’, remains positive (Roebroeck et al., 2005).
When applying G-causality to BOLD signal, it is therefore advisable to interpret the
differential G-causality, and limit inferences to stating that X inﬂuences Y more than
the other way around or vice versa.
In addition to detecting potential directed causal inﬂuences, G-causality has been
shown to be a way to quantify information transfer between two variables. In infor-
mation theory, a branch of mathematical statistics, Mutual information is used as a
mathematical quantity that measures how much one random variable X tells us about
another Y (Cover and Thomas, 1991; Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Speciﬁcally, mutual
information measures to what degree the uncertainty about the value of one random
variable X is reduced if we know the value of another random variable Y. Here uncer-
tainty is mathematically quantiﬁed as entropy: the higher the entropy of X, the more
uncertain we are about X’s value. Schreiber (2000) used these information-theoretic
concepts to deﬁne the notion of transfer entropy as a measure of directed (time-
asymmetric) information transfer between stochastic processes. Transfer entropy
from Y(t) to X(t) is the degree to which Y(t) disambiguates (i.e. reduces the uncertainty
about) the future of X(t) beyond the degree to which X(t) already disambiguates its
own future. Interestingly, one can show that, if X(t) and Y(t) values have a Gaussian
distribution at each time point, transfer entropy is mathematically equivalent to
G-causality quantiﬁed within an autoregressive model (Barnett et al., 2009).
In the context of social neuroscience, a key question is to study what brain regions
are involved in information transferred from one brain to another. Given that G-
causality quantiﬁes time-directed information transfer, bbGCM should be seen as
a tool to map which regions of one brain show evidence, in the measured signal113
and at the time scale used, of receiving information from (or sending information
to) the seed selected in the other brain. Finding signiﬁcant differential G-causality
betweenregionsintwobrainsthensuggestthatacausalchainofevents(inthestricter
interventional sense see Pearl, 2000) may connect these two brain regions. This causal
chain of event is necessarily indirect (i.e. mediated through the bodies of the agents
and the world, here the gesture and their observation). Such G-causality is then an
invitation to:
¦ Test whether these regions showing G-causality are indeed linked by a causal
chain in the interventional, strong sense of causality tout-court, for instance by
using TMS to manipulate the region of one brain and measure the effect on the
other.
¦ Manipulate the visual/auditory channels connecting the two individuals to
identify how one brain inﬂuences the other.SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
seed: gesturer's brain  target: guesser's brain during passive observation
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PMd
PMv
All
t = -6.5 t = ± 2.11 t = 6.5
Between brains Granger: gesturer to passive 
observation
Figure 4.4: Results of second-level bbGCM for gesturer to passive observation (Ran-
dom Effects, n=18). Conventions as in Fig. 4.2, but using brain activity during
passive observation instead of guessing for the guesser.
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T-test: gesturer to guesser versus
gesturer to passive observation
Supplementary figure 2. Comparison (paired t-test) between gesturer-to-Guesser 
bbGCM and gesturer-to-passive observation bbGCM (Random Effects, n=18 
participants). Warm colors indicate higher differential Granger values for the original 
analysis (active guessing). Further conventions as in Fig. 2 (of main article).
Figure 4.5: Comparison (paired t-test) between gesturer ! guesser bbGCM and ges-
turer ! passive observation bbGCM (Random Effects, n=18 participants). Warm
colors indicate higher differential Granger values for the original analysis (active
guessing). Further conventions as in Fig. 4.2.116 Supplementary Figures
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  guesser
Supplementary figure 3. bbGCM using brain activity from a randomly selected 
guesser that had seen the gestures of a different gesturer (Random Effects, n=18). 
The right side therefore represents the guesser’s brain showing t-values of the paired 
t-test between gesturer -> random guesser versus random guesser -> gesturer G-
causality. Conventions as in Fig. 2 (of main article).
Figure4.6:bbGCMusingbrainactivityfromarandomlyselectedguesserthathadseen
the gestures of a different gesturer (Random Effects, n=18). The right side therefore
representstheguesser’sbrainshowingt-valuesofthepairedt-testbetweengesturer
! random guesser versus random guesser ! gesturer G-causality. Conventions as
in Fig. 4.2.117
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Supplementary figure 4. Comparison gesturer-to-guesser bbGCM vs gesturer-to-
random guesser bbGCM (Random Effects, n=18 participants). Warm colors indicate 
higher differential Granger values for the gesturer-to-guesser analysis. Conventions 
as in Fig. 2 (of main article).
Figure 4.7: Comparison gesturer ! guesser bbGCM vs gesturer ! random guesser
bbGCM (Random Effects, n=18 participants). Warm colors indicate higher dif-
ferential Granger values for the gesturer ! guesser analysis. Conventions as in
Fig. 4.2.118 Supplementary Figures
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to corresponding word of random guesser
Supplementary figure 5. Comparison gesturer-to-guesser bbGCM vs one in which 
the activity of the gesturer was paired with a patchwork of episodes in which a 
different, randomly selected guesser (that might be different for each word) saw the 
same word as the original guesser being gestured by a different gesturer (Random 
Effects, n=18 participants). Conventions as in Fig. 2 (of main article).
Figure 4.8: Comparison gesturer-to-guesser bbGCM vs one in which the activity of the
gesturer was paired with a patchwork of episodes in which a different, randomly
selected guesser (that might be different for each word) saw the same word as
the original guesser being gestured by a different gesturer (Random Effects, n=18
participants). Conventions as in Fig. 4.2.r119
Guessing > Baseline
Motion Energy > Baseline
A
B
Supplementary figure 6. Activation maps of all 18 subjects for 
the GLM with motion energy and the guessing period as 
regressors. (a) Main effect guessing-baseline. (b) Main effect 
motion energy-baseline. All images are thresholded at t = 3.58 
which corresponds to an uncorrected p<0.001.
t = -15 t = ± 3.58 t = 15
Figure 4.9: Activation maps of all 18 subjects for the GLM with motion energy and the
guessing period as regressors. (a) Main effect guessing-baseline. (b) Main effect
motion energy-baseline. All images are thresholded at t=3.58 which corresponds to
an uncorrected pÇ0.001.
t = -6.5 t = ± 2.11 t = 6.5
Between brains Granger: gesturer to guesser
Order 3 
Order 1 
Order 5 
all seeds
seed: gesturer's brain  target: guesser's brain
Supplementary Figure 7. bbGCM at temporal windows 1,3 and 5 (Random Effects, 
n=18). Only the summary representation is shown for each order, all other 
conventions as in Fig. 2 (of main article).
Figure 4.10: bbGCM at temporal windows 1,3 and 5 (Random Effects, n=18). Only
the summary representation is shown for each order, all other conventions as in
Fig. 4.2.120 Supplementary Figures
Subject  has  to  gesture  the 
depicted  word.  A  progress  bar 
on the screen indicates the time.
Subject  has  to  guess  the 
gestured word in the movie. 
Can only respond after 45s  
Gesturing Guessing Gesturing Guessing Gesturing Guessing Guessing Gesturing
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Supplementary Figure 8. Example time line of the 
paradigm of the Charades experiment. Orange signals 
times in which the female is in the scanner, blue times in 
which the male is in the scanner. A hand represents 
gesturing runs, and eye, guessing runs. Each change of 
color signifies that one partner went out of the scanner and 
the other was placed into the scanner. Gesture runs were 
composed of 7 words, and each word had to be gestured 
for 90s, as signaled by a progress bar. Guess runs were 
composed of 7 movies of gestures, and the participant 
could only provide his/her answer once the progress bar 
had crossed the 50s mark. Twenty seconds of rest with a 
fixation cross always separated two words or movies.
Figure 4.11: Example time line of the paradigm of the Charades experiment. Orange
signals times in which the female is in the scanner, blue times in which the male
is in the scanner. A hand represents gesturing runs, and eye, guessing runs. Each
change of color signiﬁes that one partner went out of the scanner and the other
was placed into the scanner. Gesture runs were composed of 7 words, and each
word had to be gestured for 90s, as signaled by a progress bar. Guess runs were
composed of 7 movies of gestures, and the participant could only provide his/her
answer once the progress bar had crossed the 50s mark. Twenty seconds of rest
with a ﬁxation cross always separated two words or movies.5
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ABSTRACT
Granger causality analyses aim to reveal the direction of inﬂuence between brain areas by
analyzing temporal precedence: if a signal change in area A consistently precedes a signal
change in area B, then A Granger-causes B. fMRI-based Granger causality inferences are
mediated by the hemodynamic response function which can vary across brain regions. This
variability might induce a bias in Granger causality analyses. Here we use simulations to
investigate the effect of hemodynamic response variability on Granger causality analyses at
thelevelofagroupoftwentyparticipants. Weusedasetofhemodynamicresponsesmeasured
by Handwerker et al. (2004) and simulated 200 experiments in which time series with known
directions of inﬂuence are convolved with these hemodynamic responses and submitted
to Granger causality analysis. Results show that the average chance to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
Granger causality effect when no actual inﬂuence is present in the data stays well below the
p-level imposed on the second level statistics. Most importantly, when the analyses reveal
a signiﬁcant directed inﬂuence, this direction was accurate in the vast majority of the cases.
The sensitivity of the analyses however depended on the neuronal delay between the source
and target regions and their relative hemodynamic delay. Inﬂuences ﬂowing from regions to
one with the same or a slower hemodynamic response function were detected in over 80% of
the cases when the neuronal delay was at least 100ms. Inﬂuences ﬂowing to a region with a
faster hemodynamic delay were detected in over 80% of the cases when delays are above 1s.
.........................................................................................
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Granger causality is a measure of directed inﬂuence between two time series. Origi-
nally conceptualized by Wiener and formalized by Granger (Wiener, 1956; Granger,
1969), it was introduced as a connectivity analysis for fMRI data in 2003 by Goebel
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Figure5.1:AfasterhemodynamicresponsefunctioncouldleadtoaninvertedGranger
causality result
et al. (2003). Granger formalized causality between two time series using the concept
of temporal precedence: if a signal change in A is consistently followed by a signal
change in B, A Granger-causes B.
When applied to fMRI, Granger causality indicates the direction of inﬂuence be-
tween BOLD time series of different brain areas. Results of Granger causality analyses
are interpreted as indicating connectivity on a neuronal level. However, fMRI mea-
sures BOLD responses rather than neuronal activity directly, therefore this inference
is mediated by the hemodynamic response in the brain. The hemodynamic response
is not equal across brain regions (Rajapakse et al., 1998; Aguirre et al., 1998; Kruggel
and von Cramon, 1999; Handwerker et al., 2004) and this regional variability could
cause problems for Granger causality analyses (David et al., 2008; de Marco et al.,
2009; Roebroeck et al., 2005; Friston, 2009; Chang et al., 2008). On the one hand, it is
feared that spurious Granger causality ﬁndings could be reported as a difference in
hemodynamic response might introduce temporal relations where there are none.
On the other hand a difference in hemodynamic response might invert the reported
direction of Granger causality. The intuitive idea behind this last problem is as follows:
If region A causes activity changes in region B and region B has a faster hemodynamic
response than region A, a Granger causality analysis might indicate a net inﬂuence
going from B to A rather than the true underlying causality from A to B (see Figure 5.1).
Roebroeck et al. (2005) warned against this possible confound and suggested using
the modulation of connectivity between different conditions, rather than within one
condition.
Deshpande et al. (2009) investigated the effect of differences in hemodynamic re-
sponsefunctiononthesensitivityofGrangercausalityanalysesinsinglesubjects. They
found that even when intra-subject differences in hemodynamic response function
are present, Granger causality is still sensitive to inﬂuences in the order of a hundred
milliseconds. This result seems counterintuitive with differences in hemodynamic
delay as big as 2.5s (Handwerker et al., 2004). However, as Deshpande et al. (2009)5.2 METHODS 125
note, differences between hemodynamic responses are not just due to a temporal
shift of the whole response. Rather, parameters that varied most between regions
were onset time and time-to-peak (Handwerker et al., 2004). This means that con-
volution of time series of neuronal activity with a hemodynamic response function
is not mathematically equivalent to a shift in time. The difference in hemodynamic
response does not remove the characteristic temporal relation between the two time
series, which could be an explanation why the effect of regional variability of the
hemodynamic response was not as disastrous as initially expected.
The study of Deshpande et al. (2009) shows how sensitivy of Granger causality is
affected by variability in hemodynamic response at the level of the single subject.
However, Granger causality at group level is of more interest than at single subject
level for most studies. Furthermore, as within subject variability varies across subjects
(Aguirre et al., 1998) results from Deshpande et al. (2009) cannot be extrapolated
trivially to group results. In this article, we investigate whether differences in hemo-
dynamic response have an effect on group level Granger causality results. We use
simulations to answer the following three questions. (1) When no actual directed
inﬂuence is present between two time series, what is the chance to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
Granger causality result (i.e. a false positive)? (2) When an actual directed inﬂuence is
presentbetweentwotimeseries, howoftenwilldifferencesinhemodynamicresponse
lead to a signiﬁcant inverted Granger causality direction and (3) how often will the
true direction be detected (sensitivity)?
Hemodynamic response shapes as measured by Handwerker et al. (2004) are used
in the current simulations. These hemodynamic response shapes were measured
subject by subject for 20 individuals, permitting us to simulate data for an appropriate
sized ‘group study’ that will take realistic intersubject variability into account. Unfor-
tunately, due to the fact that participants were performing a task while their hemo-
dynamic responses were measured, the BOLD latencies conﬂate neuronal latencies
and hemodynamic latencies. This inﬂates the actual variability of the hemodynamic
responses. Ideally, one would use data where local ﬁeld potentials were measured
simultaneously to disentangle these sources of variance. Awaiting such a dataset, the
current work will most likely represent a scenario worse than reality.
5.2 METHODS
We simulated 200 experiments, each time generating a pair of time series of neuronal
activity for sixteen connections for twenty subjects. The time series were generated
with a known directed inﬂuence which ranged from no inﬂuence to a strong inﬂuence.
Each of these pairs of time series were subsequently convolved with a combination
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from four different areas measured by Handwerker et al. (2004). In other words, we
simulated a time series of neuronal activity for region A and a time series of neuronal
activity for region B which contained a directed inﬂuence from region A to B (see
next paragraph for more details). We then convolved the ﬁrst time series with one of
the four hemodynamic responses and the second time series with either the same
or another hemodynamic response of the same subject. Thereafter, we repeat the
same procedure for each and every of the 20 subjects based on the subject-unique
set of hemodynamic responses empirically measured by Handwerker et al. (2004).
This means that we simulate variability in hemodynamic responses between brain
regions and between participants in our data set. We repeated this for every possible
combination of hemodynamic responses of that subject. Note that we do not treat
the hemodynamic response functions as belonging to a particular brain area, but
as a representative set of hemodynamic responses. In this way, we could simulate
connections between areas having the same hemodynamic response, but do not
interpret this as a connection between an area and itself.
For each connection we then calculated the difference Granger causality result
(subtracting the inﬂuence of region B on region A from the inﬂuence of region A on
region B) and assessed this difference statistically with a t-test across subjects. We
then calculated the proportion of correct and inverted Granger causality results. A
correct result here indicates a signiﬁcant net inﬂuence from region A to region B,
while an inverted result indicates a signiﬁcant net inﬂuence from region B to region A.
Supplementary Information 5 gives a schematic overview of the simulations.
5.2.1 Generation of fMRI time series
One of the constraints of Granger causality analyses is that time series should be
wide-sense stationary. Hence, in our simulation, only that part of an fMRI time series
is generated which does not include on and offset effects. This could represent for
example resting-state data, but also the steady-state part of a long stimulus (see e.g.
Schippers et al., 2010).
For each simulation, two time series (xi and yi) are modeled as in Roebroeck
et al. (2005). Neuronal interactions (local ﬁeld potentials) are simulated using a bi-
dimensional ﬁrst-order vector autoregressive process (see Equation 5.1). The autocor-
relation of xi and yi is set to 0.9, and the inﬂuence of xi onto yi varies systematically
between 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, and 0.9 (from here on indicated as Granger causality strength).
Both signals are simulated for 15000 time steps of 10 ms (150 sec). Target time series
yi is then shifted to represent the neuronal transmission delay. We systematically
varied this neuronal delay with the following values: 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000,
and 2000 ms. Both signals are convolved using subject and area speciﬁc hemody-5.2 METHODS 127
namic response models and gaussian noise is added to represent physiological noise
in the BOLD response. Subsequently, the signal is down sampled to 1 s (resembling
an acquisition rate (TR) of an MR-scanner) and gaussian noise is again added to
represent acquisition noise. After each step the signals are normalized to zero mean
and unit variance. The total amount of noise added was either 20% or 100%. After
noise was added at two different stages of the simulation, the standard deviation of
the signal had increased to 120% and 200% of the original standard deviation for the
respective noise levels. This means the SNR is 5:1 in the 20% noise case and 1:1 in the
100% noise case.
·
xi
yi
¸
Æ A
·
xi¡1
yi¡1
¸
Å
·
"xi
"yi
¸
A Æ
·
0.9 0
0.5 0.9
¸
,§Æ
·
1 0
0 1
¸
(5.1)
5.2.2 Generation of hemodynamic response function
Handwerker et al. (2004) obtained models of hemodynamic response functions for
primary visual cortex, supplementary eye ﬁelds, primary motor cortex and frontal
eye ﬁelds (in the current article referred to as respectively areas 1 to 4) for twenty
participants. Daniel Handwerker kindly provided us with the data. In their study,
participants ﬁxated on a cross and responded with a button press to a checkerboard
appearing for 200ms on their left or right hemiﬁeld. The hemodynamic response
shapewascomputedbyaveragingoveralltrialswithinananatomicallydeﬁnedregion
of interest. Subsequently, measured hemodynamic responses were ﬁtted with the
sum of two gamma functions. See Supplementary Information 1 and Supplementary
Information 2 for details.
5.2.3 Granger Causality
Atimeseriesxi issaidtoGranger-causeanothertimeseries yi ifincludinginformation
about the past of x signiﬁcantly increases the prediction of the current value of y
with regard to this prediction based on the past values of y alone (Granger, 1969).
Granger Causality was implemented here according to Geweke (1982) using vector
autoregressive models. Following this approach, four autoregressive equations are128 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
calculated (see Equations 5.2-5.5).
xi Æ
L X
jÆ1
ajxi¡j Å²1i (5.2)
yi Æ
L X
jÆ1
ajyi¡j Å´1i (5.3)
Equations 5.2 and 5.3 calculate how much two time series, xi and yi, can be ex-
plained by their own past (xi¡j and yi¡j), resulting in residual error variances §1 and
¡1. The order is represented by L and speciﬁes how many previous time points are
taken into account.
xi Æ
L X
jÆ1
ajxi¡j Å
p X
jÆ1
bjyi¡j Å²2i (5.4)
yi Æ
L X
jÆ1
ajyi¡j Å
p X
jÆ1
bjxi¡j Å´2i (5.5)
In equations 5.4 and 5.5 the prediction is based on the time series’ own past and
the past of the other time series. This results in residual error variances §2 and ¡2.
The linear inﬂuence from xi to yi (Fx!y, eq. 5.6) and from yi to xi (Fy!x, eq. 5.7) can
now be calculated as the ratio between the variances of the residual error (F-values).
A reduction in error variance when including the past of another time series results in
a larger F-ratio.
Fx!y Æln
³var(´1i)
var(´2i)
´
(5.6)
Fy!x Æln
³var(²1i)
var(²2i)
´
(5.7)
Difference Granger causality (Fx!y ¡Fy!x) was calculated to assess the dominant
direction of information ﬂow.
5.2.4 Statistical analysis
The result of one experiment was obtained by performing a simulation for a single
combination of hemodynamic responses for every subject (from here on called a
connection). A t-test was then performed to test the null-hypothesis (Fx!y ÆFy!x) at
group level. The procedure is then repeated 200 times (representing 200 experiments),5.2 METHODS 129
target
source 1 2 3 4
1 0 0.34 0.57 0.68
2 -0.34 0 0.23 0.34
3 -0.57 -0.23 0 0.11
4 -0.68 -0.34 -0.11 0
Table 5.1: Overview of difference in the delay parameter (±1, see also Supplementary
Information 2) between source and target in seconds. The three groups are indi-
cated with dark gray (negative delay group), white (no delay group), and light gray
(positive delay group).
leading to a distribution of 200 t-values. We then counted how often t Ç -T(19, 0.05)
and t È T(19, 0.05) and used these proportions of inverted and correct results as
dependent variables in our statistical assessments.
The modeled connections can be divided into three groups: (1) no delay group
which contains connections in which source and target time series are convolved
with the same hemodynamic response function, (2) positive delay group in which the
source time series is convolved with a hemodynamic response function which has a
smaller delay parameter than the hemodynamic response function used for the target
time series, and, (3) negative delay group which contains connections in which the
source time series is convolved with a hemodynamic response function which has
a larger delay parameter than the hemodynamic response of the target time series.
Table 5.1 shows the average differences across subjects in delay parameter between
brain areas and the resulting division in three groups.
For each delay group, we separately analyzed how the proportion of correct and in-
verted results are inﬂuenced by noise, neuronal delay, and Granger causality strength
(gc-strength). Because the effect of these factors is dependent on the simulations
being nested within connections, we modeled the data with a multilevel variance
model. We veriﬁed this approach by calculating the intraclass correlation coefﬁcients
of the proportion of inverted and correct results (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). These
indicated that 31% of the variance of inverted results and 17% of the variance of
correct results can be explained by the fact that the data has a nested structure. A
multilevel model is in these cases an appropriate statistical approach. In all groups,
the factors noise, neuronal delay, and gc-strength were modeled as ﬁxed factors, while
connection was modeled as a random factor.
We also calculated the intraclass correlation coefﬁcient for the results of the simula-
tions in which there was no Granger causality present. This indicated that only 1% of
the variance could be explained by the nested structure of the data. In our opinion130 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
this was too few to necessitate a multilevel model. We tested a regression model in
which the proportion of false positives is explained by the factors noise and neuronal
delay. We tested our models against an alpha level p·0.05.
5.2.5 Comparison crosscorrelations in simulation data and experimental data
To analyze whether our simulations represent a physiologically plausible situation,
we compared lagged cross correlations in our generated time series with cross cor-
relations in time series of experimental data. We assessed lagged cross correlations
because in Granger causality the immediate past (t ¡1 at order 1) of the time series is
used. We calculated these crosscorrelations with lag 1 between our simulated pairs of
time series for each Granger causality strength (after convolution and downsampling
with no neuronal delay added). Next, we calculated crosscorrelations between re-
gions of the putative Mirror Neuron System (consisting of dorsal and ventral premotor
cortex, inferior parietal lobule and middle temporal gyrus) using data of a previous
experiment (Schippers et al., 2009). We compared these crosscorrelations of 18 sub-
jects in all connections from the experimental data and the simulation data with a
two-sampled t-test.
5.2.6 Likelihood of true direction given a detected direction
It makes sense, from the point of view of reporting the results of our simulations, to
examine the frequency with which a certain direction of inﬂuence is detected given a
certain underlying direction of connectivity. However, neuroimagers will typically be
confronted with the reverse question: given that they found a signiﬁcant differential
Granger causality suggesting information ﬂow from region X!Y, how likely is X!Y
to be the real direction of inﬂuence? In this empirical situation, the experimenter
will not know what the underlying strength of connection is (our GC factor) but they
can form an educated guess about the length of the neuronal delay between the
brain regions involved (see our discussion). The experimenter can also estimate the
difference in hemodynamic delay between the regions as described in our method
section.
To provide neuroimagers with an estimate of these conditional probabilities (i.e.
p(true direction X!Y|detected direction X!Y) and p(true direction Y!X|detected
direction X!Y), we will call X the region with the shorter and Y that with the longer
hemodynamic delay. We concentrated on the simulations with a 20% noise level that
seem closer to the empirical situation (see paragraph 5.3.3) and pooled the results of
our simulations at different GC levels. We then identiﬁed all simulations in which a
particular direction of inﬂuence was detected and counted how many of these cases5.3 RESULTS 131
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Figure 5.2: Mean proportion of correct and inverted results per neuronal delay.
had originated from simulations in which the underlying direction of inﬂuence was
in the same or the opposite direction. We did this separately for the various neuronal
delays and additionally summarized the situation for short (0.01-0.05s), medium
(0.1-0.5s) and long (1-2s) neuronal delays. We limited our analysis to the connections
between brain regions with different hemodynamic delays in our simulations to
examine if the direction of the detected inﬂuence (from the faster region X to the
slower region Y or vice-versa) inﬂuenced the results.
5.3 RESULTS
5.3.1 When no Granger causality is present in the data
Neither noise-level (b = 1.5¤10¡5, t(284) = 0.61, p = 0.54) nor neuronal delay (b = 1.9¤
10¡3, t(284) = 0.82, p = 0.4) has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the amount of false positives
in the simulations where no Granger-causality was present. The result of a one-tailed
t-test shows that on average the amount of false positives stays below 5% (t(287) =
-10.69, pÇ2.2¤10¡16). The95%conﬁdenceintervaloftheproportionoffalsepositives
ranged from 0.0397% to 0.0429%. Given that a t-test was thresheld at pÇ0.05, this
shows that the distribution of Granger causality is indeed well-behaved in a statistical
sense.132 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
5.3.2 When Granger causality is present in the data
An overview of the results when a Granger causality inﬂuence is present is given in
Figure 5.2 showing the percentage of correct and inverted results for all simulations
perneuronaldelay. Thenumberofcorrectresultsincreaseswithneuronaldelay, while
the amount of inverted results decreases. Noise decreases the amount of signiﬁcant
results found, both correct and inverted. Figures 5.3-5.6 show results per connection
and per Granger causality strength for a noise level of 20%. See Supplementary
Information 3 for the results at a noise level of 100%.
Negative delay group
In the negative delay group, the amount of inversions is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by noise, neuronal delay and their interaction. The inﬂuence of neuronal delay on
inverted results has the same direction for both noise levels (see Table 5.2b) with a
stronger effect for the 20% noise level than for the 100% noise level. The longer the
neuronal delay, the fewer inverted results are observed.
Correct results are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by noise, neuronal delay and their inter-
action. At a 20% noise level (see Table 5.2a), neuronal delay has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence,
but gc-strength does not. At a 100% noise level, the interaction between neuronal
delay and gc-strength is signiﬁcant. The stronger the gc-strength, the stronger the
inﬂuence of neuronal delay on the amount of correct results.
Further, it should be noted that in the negative delay group, Granger causality
behaves well for neuronal delays ¸ 1s. Here inversions are absent and signiﬁcant
Granger causality is always detected with appropriate power (È 80% of cases).
The amount of inverted results would be expected to depend on the average dif-
ference in delay between the hemodynamic response functions of the two brain
regions, with larger differences leading to more inversions, and on the variance of
the timing across participants, with larger variance leading to relatively more false
negatives (blue) and fewer inversions (red). The examination of Figure 5.6, in which
the data in each column is arranged with the topmost cell having the most favorable
and the bottom-most, the least favorable difference in average hemodynamic timing,
conﬁrms that inversions roughly increase from top to bottom, but that exceptions
exist. For instance comparing the bottom two panels of Figure 5.6, corresponding
to 3!1 and 4!1, one might be surprised to see that more inversions occur in the
3!1 than 4!1 conﬁguration despite the fact that area 3!1 should have the beneﬁt
of a less unfavorable difference in hemodynamic response function on average. We
hypothesized that the larger variance in the parameter ±1 in area 4 compared to 3 (see
Supplementary Information 2) would lead area 4 to have comparatively more false5.3 RESULTS 133
Figure 5.3: Proportion of correct (bright green), inverted (bright red) and non-
signiﬁcant (blue) results per connection and per neuronal delay for a noise-level of
20% and Granger causality strength of 0.1. Source (rows) and target (columns) are
sorted on their mean onset parameter. Connections are divided in a positive delay
group (green background), a no-delay group (white background) and a negative
delay group (red background). A correct result for a given connection and neuronal
delay signiﬁes that the group Granger causality analysis indicated the direction
of inﬂuence that was modeled in the time series (for example for connection ’3
to 1’, the correct direction of inﬂuence goes from area 3 to area 1). An inverted
result indicates a signiﬁcant Granger causality result with a direction opposite of
the direction that was modeled in the simulation. A non-signiﬁcant result indicates
a result that did not exceed the threshold.134 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
Figure 5.4: Proportion of correct (green), inverted (red) and non-signiﬁcant (blue)
results per connection and per neuronal delay for a noise-level of 20% and Granger
causality strength of 0.2. See also caption of Figure 5.3
Figure 5.5: Proportion of correct (green), inverted (red) and non-signiﬁcant (blue)
results per connection and per neuronal delay for a noise-level of 20% and Granger
causality strength of 0.5. See also caption of Figure 5.35.3 RESULTS 135
Figure 5.6: Proportion of correct (green), inverted (red) and non-signiﬁcant (blue)
results per connection and per neuronal delay for a noise-level of 20% and Granger
causality strength of 0.9. See also caption of Figure 5.3
negatives (because the granger values would be more variable) and less inversions.
Accordingly, if area 3 had the same variance in ±1 as area 4, the 3!1 case would then
indeed lead to less inversions than the 4!1 case. To test this hypothesis, we generated
artiﬁcially a region 3’ that has the same variance in parameters as area 4 but the
same average ±1 parameters (i.e. hemodynamic delay) as the original area 3. To do
so, we used for area 3’ all subject-speciﬁc parameters from area 4, but shifted all ±1
parameters by the difference in average ±1 between area 4 and 3. Doing so indeed
showed that with the same variance in hemodynamic response, 3’!1 demonstrates
less inversions than 4!1 (see Supplementary Information 4).
Positive delay group
The occurrence of inverted results in the positive delay group was too small (Ç 0.01%)
to perform meaningful statistical analyses. In this group, only the proportion of
correct results was assessed statistically.
The amount of correct results is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by noise, neuronal delay
and gc-strength, with a signiﬁcant interaction between noise and neuronal delay. At136 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
Negative delay group (proportion correct results)
A 20% noise
Estimate Std. Error P-value
(Intercept) 0.038920 0.068146 0.939
GC 0.039594 0.047388 0.813
delay 0.537016 0.032521 Ç1e-04
GC:delay 0.007621 0.061734 1.000
B 100% noise
Estimate Std. Error P-value
GC=0.1
(Intercept) 0.016212 0.004985 0.00228
delay 0.059474 0.003585 Ç1e-10
GC=0.2
(Intercept) 0.011177 0.010972 0.517
delay 0.100576 0.005264 Ç1e-10
GC=0.5
(Intercept) 0.010037 0.011411 0.608
delay 0.132431 0.006053 Ç1e-10
GC=0.9
(Intercept) 0.007403 0.012295 0.792
delay 0.149710 0.005765 Ç1e-10
(a) The effect of gc-strength and neuronal delay on
the proportion of correct results in the negative
delay group
Negative delay group (proportion inverted results)
20% noise
Estimate Std. Error P-value
(Intercept) 0.22156 0.09007 0.0472
gc-strength 0.11232 0.05079 0.0886
delay -0.15134 0.03486 Ç0.001
interaction -0.07594 0.06617 0.6065
100% noise
Estimate Std. Error P-value
(Intercept) 0.03357 0.007408 Ç0.001
gc-strength 0.014703 0.005099 0.0134
delay -0.019791 0.003499 Ç0.001
interaction -0.011352 0.006642 0.2568
(b)The effect of gc-strength and neuronal delay
on the proportion of inverted results in the
negative delay group
Table 5.2: Statistical results for the negative delay group
a noise-level of 20% only neuronal delay has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the amount
of correct results (see Table 5.3aA). When noise level is increased to 100%, there is
a signiﬁcant interaction between gc-strength and neuronal delay (see Table 5.3aB).
The inﬂuence of neuronal delay is larger in connections with a stronger Granger
causality inﬂuence. It should be noted that appropriate statistical power is obtained
at neuronal delays around 0.1s or 0.2s depending on Granger causality strength and
noise.
No delay group
The occurrence of inverted results in the no delay group was too small (Ç 0.01%)
to perform meaningful statistical analyses on. In this group, only the proportion of
correct results was assessed statistically.
The amount of correct results is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the interaction between
noise and neuronal delay as well as by the three-way interaction between gc-strength,
noise and neuronal delay. At a 20% noise level, the inﬂuence of gc-strength and neu-
ronal delay on the amount of correct results have the same direction: the stronger the5.3 RESULTS 137
Positive delay group (proportion correct results)
A 20% noise
Estimate Std. Error Pr(Èjzj)
(Intercept) 0.63621 0.12235 Ç0.001
GC 0.11163 0.05419 0.126
delay 0.23487 0.03719 Ç0.001
GC:delay -0.06861 0.07060 0.729
B 100% noise
Estimate Std. Error Pr(Èjzj)
GC=0.1
(Intercept) 0.056683 0.007962 Ç1e-10
delay 0.048286 0.005357 Ç1e-10
GC=0.2
(Intercept) 0.084099 0.017352 2.51e-6
delay 0.079624 0.009133 Ç1e-10
GC=0.5
(Intercept) 0.09549 0.02060 7.1e-6
delay 0.09549 0.01192 Ç1e-10
GC=0.9
(Intercept) 0.09854 0.02014 1.99e-6
delay 0.11721 0.01268 Ç1e-10
(a) Results for positive delay group
No delay group (proportion correct results)
A 20% noise
Estimate Std. Error Pr(Èjzj)
(Intercept) 0.35599 0.04121 Ç0.001
GC 0.27791 0.07824 0.00137
delay 0.43760 0.05369 Ç0.001
GC:delay -0.17573 0.10192 0.21702
B 100% noise
Estimate Std. Error Pr(Èjzj)
GC=0.1
(Intercept) 0.035270 0.006076 1.29e-8
delay 0.092478 0.005935 Ç1e-10
GC=0.2
(Intercept) 0.041930 0.006730 9.32e-10
delay 0.183667 0.008768 Ç1e-10
GC=0.5
(Intercept) 0.03988 0.00930 3.57e-5
delay 0.24319 0.01212 Ç1e-10
GC=0.9
(Intercept) 0.041050 0.008482 2.59e-6
delay 0.246919 0.010577 Ç1e-10
(b) Results for no delay group
Table 5.3: Statistical results for positive and no delay group
gc-strength and the longer the neuronal delay, the more correct results are reported
(see Table 5.3bA). At a noise-level of 100% the inﬂuence of neuronal delay is larger in
connections with a stronger Granger causality inﬂuence (see Table 5.3bB).
As for the positive delay group, inversions are also extremely rare in the no delay
group (Ç0.01%) and appropriate sensitivity is obtained for neuronal delays of 0.1s or
0.2s, depending on Granger causality strength and noise.
5.3.3 Comparison crosscorrelations in simulation data and experimental data
To investigate whether our simulations represent a physiologically plausible situa-
tion, we compared lagged cross correlations in our generated time series with cross
correlations in time series of experimental data. At a noise level of 20% the averaged
lagged crosscorrelations in the time series of our simulations (over all subjects and all
connections) are 0.39, 0.5, 0.56, and 0.56 for Granger causality strengths 0.1, 0.2, 0.5
and 0.9 respectively. At a noise-level of 100% these crosscorrelation drop to respec-
tively 0.09, 0.11, 0.13, and 0.13. The average lagged crosscorrelation between pMNS138 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
Short neuronal delays (0.01-0.05s)
Neuronal Detected Underlying direction Proportion
delay direction X!Y Y!X correct
0.01 X!Y 2993 488 0.86
Y!X 16 60 0.79
0.02 X!Y 3036 450 0.87
Y!X 10 69 0.87
0.05 X!Y 3222 406 0.89
Y!X 4 88 0.96
0.01-0.05 X!Y 9251 1344 0.87
Y!X 30 217 0.88
Medium neuronal delays (0.1-0.5s)
Neuronal Detected Underlying direction Proportion
delay direction X!Y Y!X correct
0.1 X!Y 3396 317 0.91
Y!X 1 134 0.99
0.2 X!Y 3723 169 0.96
Y!X 0 167 1.00
0.5 X!Y 4471 0 1.00
Y!X 0 365 1.00
0.1-0.5 X!Y 11590 486 0.96
Y!X 1 666 1.00
Long neuronal delays (1-2s)
Neuronal Detected Underlying direction Proportion
delay direction X!Y Y!X correct
1 X!Y 4798 0 1.00
Y!X 0 1140 1.00
2 X!Y 4800 0 1.00
Y!X 0 1200 1.00
1-2 X!Y 9599 666 0.9
Y!X 0 2340 1.00
Table 5.4: Likelihood of true direction given a detected direction
areas in the experimental data is 0.82. Crosscorrelations in the real experimental data
are signiﬁcantly higher than in the simulation data for all Granger causality strengths
and all noise-levels (in all cases df=287, t¸30.78, pÇ0.001), but were closer to the real
experimental data in the 20% than in the 100% noise condition.
5.3.4 Likelihood of true direction given a detected direction
Our results of the likelihood of detecting the true direction are summarized in Ta-
ble 5.4. While reading this table, it should be noted that 200 simulations were per-
formed for each of the 4 GC strengths, and that 6 connections had underlying con-
nectivity from the fast to the slower hemodynamic response region (X!Y), and 6 in
the opposite direction (Y!X). This means that at each delay, 4800 simulations were
performed in each direction. Accordingly, each of the columns at one delay could sum
to up to 4800 simulations at most, if and only if each simulation leads to a signiﬁcantly
non-zero differential Granger causality. Summaries for each range of latencies were
simply the sum of the simulations from the included latencies and therefore included
14400 simulations in each direction for the short and medium latencies and 9600 for
the long delays.
Inspecting this table reveals three important ﬁndings. First, in all cases, a detected5.4 DISCUSSION 139
direction of inﬂuence was always at least three times as likely to correspond to the
true underlying direction of inﬂuence than to the opposite underlying direction of
inﬂuence. At short delays (0.01-0.05s), the detected direction was accurate in over
85%, at medium delays (0.1-0.5s) in over 95%, and at long delays (1-2s) in 100% of the
cases. Second, the proportion of detected inﬂuences that were accurate was generally
similar in the X!Y and Y!X direction. Third, comparing how many simulations lead
to a detection in the X!Y and Y!X direction (independently of the true underlying
direction of inﬂuence) reavealed that the former was over 40 (for short), 18 (for
medium) and 4 times (for long delays) more likely to be detected than the latter.
5.4 DISCUSSION
In this article, we focused on the question whether regional differences in hemo-
dynamic response function can have an impact on group-level Granger causality
analyses. More speciﬁcally, we simulated 200 experiments that measured 16 pairs
of time series (connections) with a known directed inﬂuence between them. Each
time series in a pair was convolved with a different combination of hemodynamic
responses. We then calculated Granger causality and tested how often a group level
result (across 20 subjects) would be correctly detected (hit), falsely rejected (miss), or
detected but in the inverted direction (inversion).
The results of the simulations indicate several things. First, when no underlying
directed inﬂuence is simulated between two time series, the average chance to ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantgrouplevelresult,withthissetofhemodynamicresponses,stayswellbelow
the set threshold of 5% for the t-test assessing whether average Granger causality 6Æ 0.
Second, when the hemodynamic response of the source has a smaller or equal
delay parameter than the hemodynamic response of the target (the positive delay and
no delay groups), the chance to ﬁnd an inverted effect is near zero (Ç0.01%). However,
when the difference in hemodynamic delay between source and target goes against
the direction of inﬂuence (negative delay group), the chance to ﬁnd an inverted result
becomes substantial, in particular when the added neuronal delay between the two
time series is small (see Figures 5.3 - 5.6). Overall, only long neuronal delays of 1-2s
ensure that the chance of inversions is insigniﬁcant.
Third, when the analysis of the simulated data revealed a signiﬁcant differential
Granger causality value, the direction of the detected causality correctly reﬂects the
simulated direction of inﬂuence in over 79% of the cases.
Finally our simulations show that the sensitivity of Granger causality is adequate
(È80% hit ratio) for neuronal delays from 0.1 or 0.2s and longer when the source
region had the same or a faster hemodynamic delay than the target. When the source
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adequate at longer neuronal delays of 1-2s.
Worst case scenario
It should be emphasized that our simulations represent a worst-case scenario. We
assessed the physiological plausibility of our simulations by comparing lagged cross
correlations between time series from our simulation with these from data of a pre-
vious experiment (Schippers et al., 2009). This reveals that the dependencies in the
time series of our simulations are lower than those in real experimental data. Depen-
dencies between time series are therefor underestimated in our simulations, thereby
representing a scenario worse than reality.
Furthermore, we used models of hemodynamic response functions that were mea-
sured with fMRI while participants were presented with a simple task (Handwerker
et al., 2004). Latency differences (see Table 5.1) are thus inﬂuenced both by the ‘in-
trinsic’ hemodynamic response of that brain area and the delay of neuronal transfer
between different brain areas due to the task. Our simulations thus overestimate
hemodynamic latencies again representing a scenario worse than reality.
Neural latencies
Our simulations show that Granger causality results are strongly dependent on the
neuronal latency between two areas. Single cell recording in the macaque monkey
(Schmolesky et al., 1998) reveal that in the monkey, median latencies increase by ap-
proximately 20ms from one brain region in the visual hierarchy to the next. Simulated
neuronal delays of 100ms therefore correspond to about 5 processing stages in the
monkey, which could correspond to detecting an interaction between V1 and the
FEF (Essen et al., 1992). In humans, these delays are less well studied, but due to
increases in brain size, neuronal delays are probably longer. Nishitani and Hari (2002)
for instance recorded MEG signals while participants viewed lip movements. They
measured differences in peak responses of 100ms between responses in the occipital
cortex and the inferior frontal gyrus, and 200ms between the occipital cortex and the
primary motor cortex. Accordingly, the neuronal latencies in our simulations could
be split in three ranges. Short connections (e.g. V1 ! V2 or V1 ! V3) include short
latencies of 0.01, 0.02 and 0.05s. Long connections (e.g. V1 ! IFG) include medium
latencies of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.5. The longest latencies we used (1 or 2s) are probably more
representative of communication between brains (e.g. Schippers et al., 2010).5.4 DISCUSSION 141
How useful is Granger causality mapping?
The main conclusions of our simulations regard the sensitivity of Granger causality
analysisandtheirvalidity. Intermsofsensitivity, weshowthatGrangercausalityisnot
very sensitive for short range connections within a brain. At such short latencies (0.01-
0.05s) sensitivity is low throughout our simulations. Long-range connections can be
adequately studied using Granger causality as long as differences in hemodynamic
response do not go against the direction of information transfer. In these cases
sensitivity is adequate (È 80%), inversions are rare, and false positives are below
5%. Finally, Granger causality mapping is ideal for measuring situations with long
delays such as the ones encountered in the analysis of information transfer across
brains (Schippers et al., 2010) where sensitivity is high, inversions inexistent, and
false positives well controlled, independently of realistic variations in hemodynamic
response. Intermsofvalidity(whetheradetectedGrangercausalitycorrectlyreﬂected
the true underlying direction of inﬂuence), we found that at a realistic noise level
the majority of detected causalities accurately reﬂected the underlying direction of
inﬂuence. Coupled with the fact that less than 5% of cases in which no connection
was simulated lead to a false positive Granger causality result, this indicates that
Granger causality analysis remain extremely valid even in the context of differences
in hemodynamic responses.
Several researchers have suggested that differences in hemodynamic response func-
tionsbetweenbrainareascouldleadtospuriousGrangercausalityresults(Davidetal.,
2008; de Marco et al., 2009; Roebroeck et al., 2005; Friston, 2009; Chang et al., 2008).
Roebroeck et al. (2005) suggested that contrasting the differential Granger causality
values between different conditions may be the only way to avoid these spurious
effects. Because none of these researchers directly simulated realistic differences
in hemodynamic responses across individuals, these considerations were based on
intuition. Here, using realistic variations of hemodynamic response function at a
grouplevel, weshowthatspuriousﬁndingsareactuallyrare. Wethereforesuggestthat
differential Granger causality is a valid method to determine the dominant direction
of information ﬂow even within a single experimental condition at the group level.
This greatly increases the applicability of Granger causality by allowing its application
to situations in which control conditions not involving similar connections may be
difﬁcult to perform.
Estimation of hemodynamic response
The current simulations show that the difference in hemodynamic delay between two
brain areas contains important information about the sensitivity (but not the validity)142 EFFECT OF HRF VARIABILITY ON GRANGER CAUSALITY
of short and long range within brain Granger causality analyses. If the source area
of a connection has a hemodynamic delay that is as short or shorter than that of the
target region, Granger causality analyses have good sensitivity when a pÇ0.05 criteria
is used. At this threshold the majority of simulated inﬂuences were detected. When
the difference is negative however, i.e. information ﬂows from a region with a slower
to a region with a faster hemodynamic response, the risk of not detecting existing
connections is large. Accordingly, estimating the difference in hemodynamic delay
between two areas can be used to shed light on negative ﬁndings in Granger causality
analysis. If experimenters fail to detect a hypothesized information ﬂow from a brain
region with a faster to one with a slower response at a permissive threshold (pÇ0.05),
this negative ﬁnding is unlikely to be due to a lack of sensitivity and challenges
the hypothesis. If experimenters had hypothesized a direction of information ﬂow
from the slower to the faster region, and fail to detect this inﬂuence, they need to
keep in mind that sensitivity is lower, and a negative ﬁnding is less challenging to
their hypothesis. Importantly, pooling over the range of relationships between the
delays of the two regions we explored based on empirically measured HRF variance,
our data suggests that on average, if experimenters do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant differential
Grangercausalityresult,theycanberelativelyconﬁdentthattheresultisinthecorrect
direction.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
Based on the outcome of our simulations, examining the differential Granger causal-
ity across a group of participants provides a valid measure of underlying effective
connectivity. If a signiﬁcant differential Granger causality is detected, this ﬁnding
is (a) unlikely to have arisen without a true underlying information ﬂow between
these regions and (b) the detected direction of inﬂuence is likely to reﬂect the true
direction of inﬂuence. The sensitivity of the method however greatly varies based
on the neuronal delay separating the source and the target region and the difference
in hemodynamic delay between these regions. If information ﬂows from a region to
one with the same or a slower hemodynamic delay, Granger causality has adequate
sensitivity for longer within brain connections corresponding to neuronal delays of
at least 100ms. If the source region has a slower hemodynamic delay than the target
region, only between brain connections with delays of at least 1s can be detected
with appropriate sensitivity. Accordingly, our simulations suggest that when Granger
causality reveals signiﬁcant results, these results can be trusted even in the context of
systematic differences in hemodynamic delays. If the analysis however does not lead
to signiﬁcant results, the relative lack of sensitivity of the method should be kept in
mind in particular when used to analyze connections within a brain.5.5 CONCLUSIONS 143
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Figure 5.7: Hemodynamic response shapes for the four measured areas in 20 different
subjects, sorted on amount of variability.
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SPREAD PARAMETERS OF HEMODYNAMIC RESPONSE MODELS
The hemodynamic responses were obtained and published by Handwerker et al.
(2004). These HRFs were modeled by the sum of two gamma functions:
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Figure 5.8: Spread of the parameters that were used to ﬁt two gamma-functions on
the measured hemdynamic responses. See Figure 1 of Handwerker et al. (2004) for
a graphical explanation for the two-gamma functions.
147SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 3
RESULTS SIMULATIONS WITH 100% NOISE LEVEL
Figure 5.9: Proportion of correct (bright green), inverted (bright red) and non-
signiﬁcant (blue) results per connection and per neuronal delay for a noise-level of
100% and Granger causality strength of 0.1. Source (rows) and target (columns) are
sorted on their mean onset parameter. Connections are divided in a positive delay
group (green background), a no-delay group (white background) and a negative
delay group (red background). A correct result for a given connection and neuronal
delay signiﬁes that the group Granger causality analysis indicated the direction
of inﬂuence that was modeled in the time series (for example for connection ’3
to 1’, the correct direction of inﬂuence goes from area 3 to area 1). An inverted
result indicates a signiﬁcant Granger causality result with a direction opposite of
the direction that was modeled in the simulation. A non-signiﬁcant result indicates
a result that did not exceed the threshold.
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Figure 5.10: Proportion of correct (green), inverted (red) and non-signiﬁcant (blue)
resultsperconnectionandperdelayforanoise-levelof100%andGrangercausality
strength of 0.2. See also caption of Figure 5.9150 Supplementary Information 3
Figure 5.11: Proportion of correct (green), inverted (red) and non-signiﬁcant (blue)
resultsperconnectionandperdelayforanoise-levelof100%andGrangercausality
strength of 0.5. See also caption of Figure 5.9151
Figure 5.12: Proportion of correct (green), inverted (red) and non-signiﬁcant (blue)
resultsperconnectionandperdelayforanoise-levelof100%andGrangercausality
strength of 0.9. See also caption of Figure 5.9SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 4
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Figure 5.13: Results of Granger causality simulations in a connection with artiﬁcially
created hemodynamic responses. The hemodynamic response of the source is
created to have the same variance in parameters over subjects as area 4, but on
average a smaller delay parameter (hemodynamic delay, ±1). All subject-speciﬁc
parameters from area 4 are used to create area 3’, but the ±1 parameters are shifted
by the difference in average ±1 between area 4 and 3.
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SIMULATIONS OVERVIEW
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Figure 5.14: Overview of the procedure used to generate the simulated data for the
analysis presented in chapter 5.
Figure 5.14 shows the procedure used to generate the simulated data for the analysis
presented in this paper. (a) For each of the 20 subjects, Handwerker et al. (2004)
measured the hemodynamic response in four brain areas. We picked two of these
hemodynamic responses of one subject, and used these to generate simulated data
(see panel (b)). This procedure is then repeated for all 20 participants, using subject-
speciﬁc hemodynamic responses in each case. This represents the experimental unit
of our simulation, reﬂecting what would be the dataset of a 20 subject experiment
looking at one connection between two brain regions. We then repeat this 200 times
to generate a distribution of results. The same is then done by picking another two
brain regions (e.g. area 1 ! area 3), and so on for all 16 possible connections (we
also simulated area 1! area 1 to look at connections between regions with identical
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hemodynamicresponses). Thiswasdoneusing5differentGrangercausalitystrengths,
2 noise levels and 9 neuronal delays. (b) for each of the simulation, we generated
two time series using a bi-dimensional ﬁrst-order vector autoregressive process (see
Equation 5.1 in main article). Both signals are simulated for 15000 time steps of 10 ms
(150 sec). Target time series yi is then shifted to represent the neuronal transmission
delay. Both signals are convolved using subject and area speciﬁc hemodynamic
response models and gaussian noise is added to represent physiological noise in
the BOLD response. Subsequently, the signal is down sampled to 1 s (resembling
an acquisition rate (TR) of an MR-scanner) and gaussian noise is again added to
represent acquisition noise. After each step the signals are normalized to zero mean
and unit variance. The total amount of noise added was either 20% or 100%. After
noise was added at two different stages of the simulation, the standard deviation of
the signal had increased to 120% and 200% of the original standard deviation for the
respective noise levels.6
MAPPING THE FLOW OF INFORMATION WITHIN THE
PUTATIVE MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM DURING GESTURE
OBSERVATION
Submitted as: Schippers, M.B., Keysers, C. Mapping the ﬂow of information within
the putative mirror neuron system during gesture observation.
ABSTRACT
The putative Mirror Neuron System may either function as a strict feed-forward system
or as a dynamic control system. A strict feed-forward system would predict that action
observation leads to a predominantly temporal ! parietal ! premotor ﬂow of information
in which a visual representation is transformed into motor-programs which contribute to
action understanding. Instead, a dynamic feedback control system would predict that the
reverse direction of information ﬂow predominates because of a combination of inhibitory
forward and excitatory inverse models. Here we test which of these conﬂicting predictions
best matches the information ﬂow within the putative Mirror Neuron System (pMNS) and
between the pMNS and the rest of the brain during the observation of comparatively long
naturalistic stretches of communicative gestures. We used Granger causality to test the
dominant direction of inﬂuence. Our results ﬁt the predictions of the dynamic feedback
controlsystem: wefoundpredominantlyaninformationﬂowwithinthepMNSfrompremotor
to parietal and middle temporal cortices. This is more pronounced during an active guessing
task than while passively reviewing the same gestures. In particular, the ventral premotor
cortex sends signiﬁcantly more information to other pMNS areas than it receives during active
guessing than during passive observation.
.........................................................................................
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Predictionoffutureeventsisakeyfeatureofmanycognitiveabilities,suchaslanguage
and action and has even been suggested as “one of the main unitary principles of
cognition” (Bubic et al., 2010). Applied to the social domain, correct prediction of
other’s behavior helps in understanding other’s intentions (Blakemore and Frith, 2005;
Falck-Ytter et al., 2006), allows us to coordinate our behavior with others (Kokal et al.,
2009; Sebanz et al., 2006) and is important for effective communication (Garrod and
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Pickering, 2009).
Prediction of other’s behavior can be conceptualized on several levels and different
timescales. For example, on a high cognitive level, humans can deliberately mentalize
about beliefs and desires of others and how these will potentially inﬂuence their
future behavior (Frith and Frith, 1999). On a lower cognitive level and a smaller time
scale however, prediction of other’s behavior already occurs while the other person
is still performing the action (Umiltà et al., 2001; Urgesi et al., 2010). The putative
Mirror Neuron System (pMNS), a set of brain regions involved both in observing the
actions of others and in programming similar actions (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008),
has been suggested as a network that might be involved in predicting other people’s
behavior on the basis of perceptual-motor mapping (Blakemore and Frith, 2005;
Urgesi et al., 2010; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Hesse et al., 2009; Kilner et al., 2007b,a;
Lamm et al., 2007; Schubotz, 2007; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). The pMNS is a
network in the human brain consisting of ventral and dorsal premotor cortex, anterior
inferior parietal lobule and adjacent somatosensory area BA2 and middle temporal
gyrus (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Keysers, 2009). These
areas of the human brain, normally associated with planning, preparation, execution
and proprioception of our own actions, were found to be also involved in the hearing
or observation of actions (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Chong et al., 2008; Dinstein
etal.,2007;Filimonetal.,2007;Gazzolaetal.,2006). Theseareasshowatightcoupling
between perception and action, which has led to the idea that we understand the
actions of others in part by transforming them into the motor vocabulary of our own
actions.
Internal models (forward and inverse models) could play a key role in the transfor-
mation from observing an action to simulating this action internally and predicting
its sensory consequences (Wolpert et al., 2003). Forward and inverse models were
originallyconceptualizedinthecontextofactioncontrol(Wolpertetal.,2003). During
action execution the forward model sends an efference copy of the action to sensory
areas to predict sensory and proprioceptive consequences of that action (Greenwald,
1970; Voss et al., 2006). These predicted consequences can then be compared with
actual sensory input. If a mismatch is detected between actual and predicted sensory
input, the action can be adjusted. An inverse model follows the reverse path of a
forward model: it calculates what motor commands should be executed to achieve a
certain goal or end-state (Wolpert et al., 2003). It has been suggested that the pMNS
hosts such forward and inverse models. One of the consequences of these models
in the pMNS is that they would automatically work together to achieve a prediction
of other’s intentions and behaviors based on simulation (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008;
Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Kilner et al., 2007b,a; Lamm et al., 2007; Blakemore and
Decety, 2001; Csibra and Gergely, 2007; Miall, 2003). In particular during action ob-
servation the inverse model could be used to infer the motor program that could have6.1 INTRODUCTION 159
caused the sensory input (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007b; Blakemore
and Decety, 2001). Hebbian learning has been suggested to be a candidate process by
which these models are instantiated (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Keysers and Perrett,
2004). A conceptually similar model for the acquisition of these internal models is the
associative sequence learning theory (Heyes et al., 2000).
Within the pMNS the forward model for visual information would follow the path
of premotor cortices ! posterior parietal lobule ! middle temporal gyrus (MTG),
such that predicted visual consequences of the executed action are represented in the
MTG (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). The inverse model would then go in the opposite
direction of this path, MTG ! posterior parietal lobule ! premotor cortices. During
action observation, forward and inverse models can work together to achieve an
interpretation of the observed action. The observed action is ﬁrst internally simulated
inthepremotorcortex, whichisreachedthroughtheinversemodel. Thentheforward
model can be used to predict the sensory consequences of the internally simulated
action and be compared to the actual consequences to assess the accuracy of that
prediction (Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Wolpert et al., 2003).
Single cell recordings in the monkey give us further information about the working
of these forward and inverse models. When a monkey sees the actions of others,
about 10% of the neurons responsible for executing an action increase their ﬁring
rate (Gallese et al., 1996; Keysers et al., 2003) while very few reduce their ﬁring rate
(Kraskov et al., 2009). Accordingly, inverse models seem to be primarily excitatory. In
contrast, about 50% of neurons responding to the sight of a particular movement in
the temporal lobe decrease their ﬁring rate if the monkey is causing this movement
(Hietanen and Perrett, 1993, 1996), while none seems to augment its ﬁring rate during
motor execution. Accordingly, forward models appear to be primarily inhibitory, and
seem to subtract expected visual input from the actual input. A similar phenomenon
can be observed in the somatosensory domain: we are unable to tickle ourselves,
because a copy of the motor program inhibits the somatosensory processing of self
inducedtickling(Blakemoreetal.,1998). ThisarchitecturepredictsthatthepMNSacts
likeanegativefeedbackloop: whenweseeapredictablechainofevents,thebeginning
is fully represented in the visual cortex and triggers motor programs through the
inverse model. These motor programs are then forwarded to predict future visual
stimuli. If these stimuli conform to the predictions, they will be inhibited. The visual
! premotor stream of information is reduced and the premotor representations
triggered will not be substantially updated. If the visual information violates the
predictions, it will not be inhibited, leading to a renewed visual ! premotor stream of
information and an update of the motor representations.
Many have taken what is known about the anatomy and function of the mirror neu-
ron system to mean that during action observation the ﬂow of information goes from
temporal lobe ! posterior parietal lobe ! premotor cortex (thus visual information160 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN A BRAIN
represented in the temporal lobe triggers activity in mirror neurons of the posterior
parietal lobe which in turn triggers activity in mirror neurons in the premotor cortex).
This in turn is thought to contribute to an understanding of the actions of others (see
Kilner et al., 2007b, for an excellent discussion of this issue). We will call this account
a strict feed-forward account of action observation. In contrast, seeing the pMNS
as a combination of excitatory inverse and inhibitory forward models, as described
above, makes the pMNS a dynamic control system rather than a strict feed-forward
recognition system. Importantly, these two visions make different predictions with
regard to the dominant direction of information ﬂow during the observation of longer
sequences of actions.
A strict feed-forward account would predict that even while looking at longer se-
quences of actions, the dominant direction of information ﬂow is anterior, from
posterior visual to more anterior premotor regions. Instead, the dynamic control
system account makes the opposite prediction. When a sequence of actions starts,
the anterior ﬂow of information brieﬂy dominates. As soon as the ﬁrst motor pro-
grams are activated, however, forward models would start predicting the future visual
input in a posterior ﬂow of information from premotor to visual areas. Because this
posterior ﬂow is inhibitory (Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Hietanen and Perrett, 1993,
1996), the more predictable the observed action sequence, the more visual input is
inhibited, and the more the anterior ﬂow of information is therefore reduced. Ac-
cordingly, because action sequences are to a great extend predictable, the dynamic
control system model would predict that except for the initial phase of any action
observation, the posterior ﬂow of information would be dominant.
To test which of these conﬂicting predictions best ﬁts empirical data, we performed
an experiment in which participants were engaged in the game charades. They were
required to deduce what word their partner was gesturing while viewing a video of
these gestures of at least 50s. This data has previously been analyzed to examine
the relationship between the brain activity of the sender and receiver of the gestures
(Schippers et al., 2010, 2009), and results suggested that the pMNS indeed processes
the moment-to-moment state of the brain of the sender during gesture interpretation.
Here we will use the data of the observers’ brain to investigate the dominant direction
of information ﬂow within the pMNS during gesture observation using differential
Granger causality mapping (Schippers et al., 2010; Roebroeck etal., 2005; Goebel et al.,
2003; Jabbi and Keysers, 2008). This method contrasts the degree to which the BOLD
signal of one brain region predicts or is predicted by that in another brain region
(Roebroeck et al., 2005; Goebel et al., 2003).
Before applying Granger causality to this data, we examined if Granger causality
can indeed deduce the dominant ﬂow of neural information even when applied to
fMRI data, and in particular, whether differences in the hemodynamic response be-
tween different brain regions and between participants (Handwerker et al., 2004)6.1 INTRODUCTION 161
would make Granger causality analysis unreliable. Roebroeck et al. (2005) had alerted
potential Granger causality users to this risk: if neural activity in region A consistently
predicts neural activity in region B more than the other way around, but the hemo-
dynamic delay of region A is longer than that of region B, the BOLD signal of region
A might turn out to be predicted by that of B more than the other way around. The
effect of this hemodynamic variability has been assessed on a single-subject level by
Deshpande et al. (2009). However, noone had, to our knowledge, assessed whether for
thekindofgroupstudywewantedtoconduct, Grangercausalityanalyseswereindeed
rendered unreliable because of intra- and inter-subject variance in the hemodynamic
response functions. To directly assess this risk, we obtained the hemodynamic re-
sponse functions of 4 brain regions measured in 20 subjects by Handwerker et al.
(2004), and used them to convolve time series of simulated neural data of known
directional inﬂuence. This ensured that we could apply the same group analysis used
in this manuscript on data with realistic differences in hemodynamic delay, and check
how often a detected direction of inﬂuence corresponded to the actual direction of
inﬂuence. The data, submitted to this journal (Schippers et al., subm), show that
although Granger causality analysis often failed to detect a signiﬁcant directed inﬂu-
ence when there actually was one. Whenever Granger causality analysis did detect a
signiﬁcant directed inﬂuence between two brain regions, the detected direction of
dominant inﬂuence was actually accurate in over 80% of the cases. We take these
results to mean that we might fail to detect any directed information ﬂow in our
experiment using Granger causality, but that if we ﬁnd such directed information ﬂow,
the detected dominant direction of information ﬂow would inform us about which
model best describes the working of the pMNS: if the anterior ﬂow in the visual !
premotor direction dominates, a feed-forward account of the pMNS is best supported
by the data. If on the other hand the posterior ﬂow in the premotor ! visual direction
dominates, a dynamic control system model would better ﬁt the data.
Roebroeck et al. (2005) however suggested that the safest way to apply Granger
causality is to perform calculations in two different conditions. If the difference in
informationﬂow(asmeasuredbyGrangercausality)betweenregionsAandBchanges
from one condition to another, it is unlikely that this change could be an artifact of
hemodynamic delay differences, which should be condition independent (Roebroeck
et al., 2005). To enable this conservative approach, we showed our participants the
same gesture movies again on a later day, with an instruction to try not to interpret
the gestures. We reasoned that without an aim to decode the gestures, the pMNS of
the observer should generate fewer predictions. Accordingly, contrasting the results
of Granger causality during active guessing with those during passive observation
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6.2 MATERIAL AND METHODS
The data used for this analysis is the same as the one used to study information ﬂow
between brains in Schippers et al. (2010). Accordingly, the methods of data acquisition
have been described elsewhere (Schippers et al., 2010). Here we will therefore focus on
the issues regarding the speciﬁc data analysis applied here to measure the dominant
direction of information ﬂow within the pMNS. A detailed methods description is also
attached as Supplementary Methods.
Granger causality analyses
Granger causality (G-causality) utilizes the concept of temporal precedence to formal-
ize causality between two time series: if a signal change in A is consistently followed
by a signal change in B, A Granger-causes B. Mathematically, this is calculated by
comparing two regression equations: one in which the current value of a time series
yi is explained by its own past (yi¡j) with one in which the same time series yi is
explained both by its own past and the past of another time series (xi¡j). The ratio
between the error variances of the former and the latter quantiﬁes the inﬂuence x
exerts on y. Detailed descriptions of Granger causality can be found in Roebroeck
et al. (2005) and Schippers et al. (2010).
Granger causality analyses were performed as described in Roebroeck et al. (2005).
In short, given two time-series (for a seed and another point on the cortical surface),
autoregressive models are estimated that quantify G-causality. Given a seed, maps
are created that specify G-causal inﬂuence from the seed to the rest the brain, as
well as inﬂuence in the reverse direction, i.e. from anywhere in the brain to the
seed. These two directions of G-causality are then subtracted from each other to
generate differential G-causality maps, such that positive values indicate more G-
causality from the seed to the target than from the target to the seed. This differential
G-causality measure was used for two reasons. First, it generates values that are
approximately normally distributed, with a mean of zero under the null hypothesis
of an absence of (indirect) causal relationship at the neural level between seed and
target, and are thus suitable for parametric testing at the second level (see below and
Roebroeck et al. (2005). Second, it has been shown that when the BOLD signal is
used to estimate G-causality, the differential G-causality (i.e. X!Y - Y!X) is more
robust than testing the individual components due to the ﬁltering properties of the
hemodynamic response and the relatively low sampling rate of fMRI (Roebroeck et al.,
2005). A separate differential G-map was calculated for each of the 8 seed regions
(see below) for each participant. These differential G-causality maps were then taken,
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for multiple comparisons at pÇ0.05 using a cluster threshold determined by a Monte
Carlo simulation method (Forman et al., 1995; Hagler et al., 2006). The order of the
estimated autoregressive models was 1, i.e. taking one preceding time point into
account to predict the current activity, corresponding to 1.33 seconds (1TR). This
interval covers neuronal transfers within a brain.
Seed ROIs
The ROIs that were used as seeds in the Granger causality analysis were deﬁned as
those ‘putative mirror’ areas that were active both during gesturing and guessing
using a traditional General Linear Model (GLM) analysis on the same data. The
GLM for gesturing was estimated using the entire period in which the gesture was
executed as the only regressor. The GLM for the guess runs included two regressors:
1) the period from onset of the movie in which the gesturer was shown until the
time of button press (with which participants indicated they thought they knew
what was being gestured) and 2) from button press until the participant had given
a response (i.e. had chosen one of the answers from a multiple choice menu). All
regressors were convolved with canonical hemodynamic response functions. The
mean parameter estimates of the contrasts gesturing versus baseline (20s ﬁxation
cross) and guessing versus baseline were tested at the second level using a one-
sample t-test. Both results of the second-level random effects analysis of gesturing
andguessingversusbaselinewerethresholdedatpÇ0.0001(uncorr.). Allthesevertices
also survive an FDR-correction of p< 0.05. We used this stringent criterion to reduce
the size of our seeds. The resulting maps were binarized (i.e. contained value 1 at
above-threshold vertices1 and 0 at below-threshold vertices). The binary maps were
multiplied to implement a logical ‘and’. From the resulting clusters, we used the
typical mirror regions: the middle temporal gyrus (LH: 69, RH: 256 vertices), the
ventral (LH: 42, RH: 123 vertices) and dorsal premotor cortex (LH: 69, RH: 147 vertices)
and a larger cluster in the parietal lobe. We excluded one cluster at the posterior end
of the Sylvian ﬁssure. To reduce the size of our parietal lobe seed, we used only that
part of the ROI that overlapped with area BA2 (LH: 529, RH: 552 vertices), because BA2
was found to be the most consistent location of mirror voxels in a previous analysis
of the execution and observation of goal directed behavior (Gazzola and Keysers,
2008) and because there is increasing interest in the role of the somatosensory cortex
in action simulation (Caspers et al., 2010; Keysers et al., 2010). The location of BA2
was deﬁned by projecting the maximum probability map of BA2 from the anatomy
toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005) onto a cortical surface segmentation of the Colin brain
(Holmes et al., 1998). For informative purposes, we also included a seed region that
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contains all shared vertices of the parietal lobe minus those vertices of BA2. Results of
this analysis are presented in Supplementary Figure 6.5 and are extremely similar to
those obtained from BA2. These particular ROIs were chosen because our primary
aim was to examine the information ﬂow within the pMNS. For visual orientation, we
show the seeds in the ﬁgures (solid colors) together with an outline of the pMNS areas
when results of guessing and gesturing are thresheld at pÇ0.001 (uncorr.).
Time series
The input of the Granger causality analysis consisted of the average time course of
the seed during guessing or passive observation as well as all the corresponding time
courses of the vertices of the rest of the brain during guessing or passive observation.
The time courses were truncated to contain only those parts that reﬂected the steady-
state part of either the guessing or the passive observation. We excluded 1) 15TR
from the beginning and 5TR from the end of the observation, thereby removing
the on- and offset transients, 2) the period from the button press of the guesser
until the onset of the next gesture, and 3) the baseline ﬁxation cross period between
two trials. Additionally, information about the beginning and end of each separate
gesture-part was taken into account in the Granger causality analysis, such that
autoregressive model estimation was pooled over calculations on separate blocks
rather than calculated over a single time-course with all blocks concatenated. On
average, participants watched the gesture movies for 58 seconds, which corresponds
to §43 TR. This means that on average 43 - 15 - 5 = 23 TR per trial were included in
the Granger analyses, cumulating to around 23 x 14 = 322 TR per participant.
Second level Granger analysis
Random effects’ testing was performed by t-tests at the second level. Two-tailed
one-sample t-tests were computed for a single differential G-causality maps, with a
null-hypothesis of a zero value (i.e. there is as much G-causality from seed ! target
than from target ! seed). Two-tailed paired t-tests were computed when differential
G-causalitymapswerecomparedbetweenconditions,withanull-hypothesisofazero
value for the difference of the maps. Random effects t-maps were then statistically
thresholded at pÇ0.05 and corrected for multiple comparisons by using a Monte Carlo
simulation-based cluster-size threshold adjustment (Hagler et al., 2006).6.3 RESULTS 165
6.3 RESULTS
6.3.1 Behavioral Results
During guessing the participants were asked to consider each movie for at least 50
seconds. After the 50s they could push the button when they thought they knew
what was being gestured to enter the multiple-choice menu. The average latency
to response was 58 seconds. Participants were equally accurate on both categories:
82.5% of the object words were guessed correctly against 86.5% of the action words
(t(17)=-1, pÈ.33). We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between the two types of
gestures,neitherintermsoflatencytorespond(58.7s§6.5sforactionand60.8s§6.8s
for object words, t(17)=1.16, pÈ.26) nor in terms of accuracy (6.06 § 0.73sd correct out
of 7 action and 5.78 § 1.11sd correct our of 7 object words, t(17)=-1, pÈ.33). Words
that were guessed incorrectly were watched signiﬁcantly longer than words that were
guessed correctly: 58s § 5s for the 289 correct guesses versus 68s § 12s for the 47
incorrect guesses (t(16)=-4.41, pÇ.0005).
6.3.2 G-causality during guessing
Results of Granger causality from pMNS areas to the rest of the brain during guessing
are visualized in Figure 6.1. The ventral premotor cortex (PMv) inﬂuences large parts
of the brain more than the other way around, including all other pMNS areas. This is
evidenced in two ways. First, taking the PMv as a seed region (Fig. 6.1, fourth row)
shows large areas being more inﬂuenced by the PMv than the other way around.
Second, the PMv seems to send more information than it receives also when the seed
is placed in the middle temporal gyrus (MTG, Fig. 6.1, ﬁrst row, blue blob) or in the
somatosensory cortex of the pMNS (Fig. 6.1, second row, blue blob). Furthermore, all
nodes of the pMNS inﬂuence the middle temporal gyrus signiﬁcantly more than the
MTG inﬂuences them. The dorsal premotor cortex also inﬂuences the somatosensory
cortex in the parietal node of the pMNS network more than it receives from that area.
6.3.3 G-causality during passive observation
G-causality originating from pMNS seeds during passive observation shows inﬂu-
ences from both the dorsal and ventral premotor cortex to all other pMNS areas (see
ﬁgure 6.2). The middle temporal gyrus receives signiﬁcantly more inﬂuence from all
other pMNS areas than it sends. The parietal node mainly receives from other pMNS
areas and sends to part of the MTG.166 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN A BRAIN
seed  target
LH RH medial
MTG
Parietal
PMd
PMv
All
t = -6.5 t = ± 2.11 t = 6.5
Within brain Granger during guessing
Order 1
Figure 6.1: Results of second-level G-causality mapping during active guessing.
Granger analyses executed separately for the left and right seed are shown to-
gether. The left two columns represent the seed regions from which the analyses
havebeenperformed. Therightsiderepresentstheguesser’sbrainshowingtvalues
of the paired t test between seed!target and target!seed G-causality (random
effects, n = 18). Warm colors suggest that the seed region (shown on the left) sent
more information to these vertices than the other way around; cold colors indicate
that the seed region received more information from these vertices than the other
way around. Upper four rows: differential G-causality originating from the seeds
on the left. Bottom row: on the left a summary of all seeds (solid colors) and on
the right G-causality maps with an outline of the pMNS at a less stringent thresh-
old. G-causality maps are statistically thresheld at PÇ0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons by using a Monte Carlo simulation-based cluster-size threshold ad-
justment. MTG, middle temporal gyrus; PMd, dorsal premotor cortex; PMv, ventral
premotor cortex; LH, left hemisphere; RH, right hemisphere.6.3 RESULTS 167
seed  target
LH RH medial
MTG
Parietal
PMd
PMv
All
t = -6.5 t = ± 2.11 t = 6.5
Within brain Granger during passive observation
Order 1
Figure 6.2: Results of second-level G-causality during passive observation. Conven-
tions as in Fig. 6.1168 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN A BRAIN
seed  target
LH RH medial
MTG
Parietal
PMd
PMv
All
t = -6.5 t = ± 2.11 t = 6.5
Within brain Granger: paired t-test between
guessing and passive observation
Figure 6.3: Comparison (paired t test) between G-causality during guessing and G-
causality during passive observation (random effects, n = 18). Warm colors indicate
signiﬁcantly higher differential Granger values during guessing, thus more net seed
! target inﬂuence during guessing than during passive observation. Cold colors
indicate signiﬁcantly lower differential Granger values during guessing, thus more
target ! seed inﬂuence during guessing than during passive observation. Further
conventions as in Fig. 6.16.4 DISCUSSION 169
6.3.4 Comparing G-causality during guessing with G-causality during passive obser-
vation
Results of the paired t-test between G-causality during guessing and passive observa-
tion shows that the posterior ﬂow of information is more dominant during guessing
(see Figure 6.3). In particular the ventral premotor cortex sends signiﬁcantly more
to other pMNS areas during guessing than during passive observation. The middle
temporal gyrus receives signiﬁcantly more during guessing than during passive ob-
servation. The somatosensory cortex in the parietal pMNS node seems to play a
relay role. During active guessing compared to passive viewing, it receives more from
ventral premotor cortex than it sends, while it sends more to visual cortices than it
receives.
6.4 DISCUSSION
In this article we investigated the dominant direction of information ﬂow within the
putative Mirror Neuron System (pMNS) and between the pMNS and the rest of the
brain during the observation of comparatively long naturalistic stretches of commu-
nicative gestures. Letting participants observe these gestures for at least 50s allowed
using Granger causality to test the dominant direction of inﬂuence. We reasoned
that if the pMNS is a strict feed-forward system, the dominant direction of inﬂuence
should be from visual ! premotor cortices. If instead it functions as a dynamic feed-
back control system, with a combination of inhibitory forward and excitatory inverse
models, guessing the meaning of gestures of others should be accompanied by a
stronger information ﬂow from premotor regions to more posterior pMNS regions
than the other way around. Our results ﬁt the latter. We found a net information
ﬂow within the pMNS from premotor to parietal and middle temporal cortices. This
is more pronounced during an active guessing task than while passively reviewing
the same gestures. In particular, the ventral premotor cortex sends signiﬁcantly
more information to other pMNS areas during active guessing than during passive
observation.
This posterior ﬂow of information in the pMNS (e.g. premotor ! parietal ! MTG)
supports the idea that the main function of the pMNS could be a predictive one
(Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Kilner et al., 2007b; Miall, 2003). Posterior inﬂuences
betweenpMNSareaswouldthuscorrespondtoaforwardmodelthatinhibitsexpected
sensory input on the basis of the motor programs triggered by the inverse model
during the observation of the beginning of the action (Blakemore and Frith, 2005;
Urgesi et al., 2010; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Kilner et al.,
2007b; Csibra and Gergely, 2007; Miall, 2003).170 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN A BRAIN
If the dynamic control theory is right, then the relationship between visual cortices
(MTG) and premotor cortices should change during the period of guessing. At ﬁrst,
before the gestures can be predicted, the MTG should send to the premotor cortices
more or as much as it receives. As the gestures become more predictable, information
ﬂow from premotor cortex to MTG should start to prevail. To examine this possibility,
we also performed Granger causality from the MTG seed during the initial 15 volumes
corresponding to the relatively earlier phase of guessing. As expected, comparing the
analyses during the early and later phase revealed a reversal of dominant information
ﬂow. Intheearlyperiod, aforwardinformationﬂowdominates, withoccipitalcortices
sending more information to the MTG than it receives, and the MTG sending more
information to frontal areas than it receives. In contrast, in the later period, the same
MTG region now receives more information from the premotor cortex than it sends
to that regions, and information from the occipital lobe becomes less prominent (see
Figure 6.4)
In particular when the modulation of connectivity between passive observation
and guessing is considered, it can be seen that the inverse model is more dominant
during guessing than during passive observation. This would ﬁt with the task require-
ments, as during the guessing condition participants where actively trying to process
what was being gestured while during passive observation this tendency was being
inhibited. This data therefore suggests that the posterior information ﬂow from pre-
motor to visual cortices is augmented more than the anterior information ﬂow when
participants deliberately decode the actions of others. These connectivity results
complement the ﬁnding that activity in the pMNS can be inﬂuenced in a top-down
fashion by instructions given to participants (Engel et al., 2008).
The task during the passive observation condition, to try not to interpret the ges-
tures, is somewhat odd, akin to the proverbial: don’t think about a pink elephant. Our
participants will probably not have been able to fully refrain from interpreting the
gestures they were looking at. However, upon debrieﬁng, participants reported more
interpretation during guessing than during passive observation. Our results show a
signiﬁcant modulation of connectivity between these two tasks, which suggests that
the instructions indeed changed the way participants processed the movies.
Our results further show that the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) changes its con-
nectivity with the MTG, parietal lobule and PMd (see Figure 6.3, row 1 to 3) when the
two experimental conditions are compared. Examining results in the two conditions
separately reveals that this change is due to the fact that differential G-causality be-
tween the pMNS and the mPFC does not differ signiﬁcantly from zero during active
guessing, but does so during passive viewing, where the mPFC receives more infor-
mation than it sends to various nodes of the pMNS. Given that differential G-causality
can have a value of zero either because there is no information ﬂow between two
regions or because the information ﬂow is symmetrical, this result should not be in-6.4 DISCUSSION 171
terpreted as suggesting that the mPFC and the pMNS are not exchanging information
during gesture guessing. Instead they may exchange information on a symmetrical
basis. During passive viewing however, this region seems to receive more information
than it sends to the pMNS. Given that the mPFC is an area associated with social
cognition, in particular reasoning about others (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Brunet et al.,
2000; Castelli et al., 2002; Frith and Frith, 2006; Gallagher et al., 2000) and it has been
suggested that it might receive information from the mirror neuron system during
action observation (Agnew et al., 2007; Blakemore et al., 2004; Decety and Chaminade,
2003; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Ohnishi et al., 2004; Uddin et al., 2007) and gesture
observation (Schippers et al., 2010) this could add more mentalist interpretations
to the observed actions or gestures (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). If people actively
engage in mentalizing, such cognitions might in turn inﬂuence the pMNS (Keysers
and Gazzola, 2007). One interpretation of our pattern of connectivity during active
guessing and passive viewing could therefore be that during passive viewing, infor-
mation ﬂow dominates from the pMNS ! mPFC, because the processes occurring
in the pMNS are more automatic than the more deliberate mentalizing triggering
mPFC activity. If instructed to guess what word the other person is trying to gesture,
however, deliberate mentalizing is encouraged, providing more opportunity for the
mPFC ! pMNS information ﬂow. This would even out with the more automatic
pMNS ! mPFC information ﬂow and lead to a zero difference between the directions
ofinformationﬂow. EvidenceforthefactthatthemPFCindeedprocessesthegestures
more during active guessing comes from our previous study where we show that the
mPFC of the guesser does reﬂect the brain activity of the gesturer more during active
guessing than passive viewing (Schippers et al., 2010).
In this experiment, we try to deduce the dominant direction of neural information
ﬂow by applying Granger causality to fMRI measured BOLD signal. We therefore base
most of our conclusions on the difference in differential G-causality between guessing
andpassiveviewing,accordingtotherecommendationofRoebroecketal.(2005). One
might challenge these conclusions, however, on the basis that seeing the same movies
again might have lead to a reduction in visual processing, and therefore to less overall
ﬂow of information in the brain. Accordingly, the differences in differential Granger
causality we found across conditions could be due to a reduction of information ﬂow
in the passive viewing condition, rendering our results more difﬁcult to interpret. It is
important therefore, that simulations (Schippers et al., subm) show that if Granger
causality detects a directed inﬂuence (as it did in this experiment), this direction
correctly corresponds to the underlying dominant neural direction of inﬂuence in
over 80% of the cases even within a single experimental condition. This means that
even if we only consider the active guessing condition, the fact that we ﬁnd the
premotor regions to send more information to the visual regions than the other way
around based on BOLD, we have an 80% chance, that the actual direction of dominant172 MAPPING INFORMATION FLOW WITHIN A BRAIN
neural information ﬂow indeed is in the direction predicted by the dynamic feedback
control model of pMNS functioning.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research was supported by a VIDI grant of the Dutch science foundation (N.W.O.)
and a Marie Curie Excellence Grant of the European Commission to CK.BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agnew, Z. K., Bhakoo, K. K., and Puri, B. K. (2007). The human mirror system: a motor
resonance theory of mind-reading. Brain research reviews, 54(2):286–93.
Amodio, D. M. and Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex
and social cognition. Nature Reviews of Neuroscience, 7(4):268–77.
Blakemore, S. J. and Decety, J. (2001). From the perception of action to the under-
standing of intention. Nature Reviews of Neuroscience, 2(8):561–7.
Blakemore, S. J. and Frith, C. (2005). The role of motor contagion in the prediction of
action. Neuropsychology, 43(2):260–7.
Blakemore, S. J., Winston, J., and Frith, U. (2004). Social cognitive neuroscience:
where are we heading? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(5):216–22.
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M., and Frith, C. D. (1998). Central cancellation of
self-produced tickle sensation. Nature Neuroscience, 1(7):635–40.
Brunet, E., Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Baylé, M., and Decety, J. (2000). A pet investigation of the
attribution of intentions with a nonverbal task. Neuroimage, 11(2):157–166.
Bubic, A., von Cramon, D. Y., and Schubotz, R. I. (2010). Prediction, cognition and the
brain. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 25:1–15.
Caspers, S., Zilles, K., Laird, A. R., and Eickhoff, S. B. (2010). Ale meta-analysis of
action observation and imitation in the human brain. Neuroimage, 50(3):1148–67.
Castelli, F., Frith, C. D., Happè, F., and Frith, U. (2002). Autism, asperger syndrome and
brain mechanisms for the attribution of mental states to animated shapes. Brain,
125:1839–1849.
Chong, T. T.-J., Cunnington, R., Williams, M. A., Kanwisher, N., and Mattingley, J. B.
(2008). fmri adaptation reveals mirror neurons in human inferior parietal cortex.
Current biology, 18(20):1576–80.
Csibra, G. and Gergely, G. (2007). ’obsessed with goals’: functions and mechanisms of
teleological interpretation of actions in humans. Acta Psychologica, 124(1):60–78.
173174 Bibliography
Decety, J. and Chaminade, T. (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cogni-
tive neuroscience view on psychological identiﬁcation. Conscious and Cognition,
12:577–596.
Deshpande, G., Sathian, K., and Hu, X. (2009). Effect of hemodynamic variability on
granger causality analysis of fmri. Neuroimage, 52(3):884–896.
Dinstein, I., Hasson, U., Rubin, N., and Heeger, D. J. (2007). Brain areas selective for
both observed and executed movements. Journal of Neurophysiology, 98(3):1415–
27.
Eickhoff, S., Stephan, K. E., Mohlberg, H., Grefkes, C., Fink, G. R., Amunts, K., and
Zilles, K. (2005). A new spm toolbox for combining probabilistic cytoarchitectonic
maps and functional imaging data. Neuroimage, 25(4):1325–1335.
Engel, A., Burke, M., Fiehler, K., Bien, S., and Rösler, F. (2008). What activates the
human mirror neuron system during observation of artiﬁcial movements: bottom-
up visual features or top-down intentions? Neuropsychology, 46(7):2033–42.
Falck-Ytter, T., Gredebäck, G., and von Hofsten, C. (2006). Infants predict other
people’s action goals. Nature Neuroscience, 9(7):878–9.
Filimon, F., Nelson, J. D., Hagler, D. J., and Sereno, M. I. (2007). Human cortical repre-
sentations for reaching: mirror neurons for execution, observation, and imagery.
Neuroimage, 37(4):1315–28.
Fischl, B., Sereno, M. I., and Dale, A. M. (1999). Cortical surface-based analysis. ii:
Inﬂation, ﬂattening, and a surface-based coordinate system. Neuroimage, 9(2):195–
207.
Forman, S. D., Cohen, J. D., Fitzgerald, M., Eddy, W. F., Mintun, M. A., and Noll,
D. C. (1995). Improved assessment of signiﬁcant activation in functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fmri): use of a cluster-size threshold. Magnetic resonance in
medicine, 33(5):636–47.
Frith, C. D. and Frith, U. (1999). Interacting minds–a biological basis. Science,
286(5445):1692–1695.
Frith, C. D. and Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of mentalizing. Neuron, 50(4):531–
534.
Gallagher, H. L., Happè, F., Brunswick, N., Fletcher, P. C., Frith, U., and Frith, C. D.
(2000). Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: An fmri study of ‘theory of mind’
in verbal and nonverbal tasks. Neuropsychology, 38:11–21.Bibliography 175
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., and Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the
premotor cortex. Brain, 119(2):593–609.
Garrod, S. and Pickering, M. (2009). Joint action, interactive alignment, and dialog.
Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2):292–304.
Gazzola, V., Aziz-Zadeh, L., and Keysers, C. (2006). Empathy and the somatotopic
auditory mirror system in humans. Current biology, 16(18):1824–9.
Gazzola, V. and Keysers, C. (2008). The observation and execution of actions share
motor and somatosensory voxels in all tested subjects: Single-subject analyses of
unsmoothed fmri data. Cerebral Cortex, 19(6):1239–1255.
Goebel, R., Roebroeck, A., Kim, D.-S., and Formisano, E. (2003). Investigating directed
cortical interactions in time-resolved fmri data using vector autoregressive model-
ing and granger causality mapping. Magnetic resonance imaging, 21:1251–1261.
Greenwald, A. G. (1970). Sensory feedback mechanisms in performance control: with
special reference to the ideo-motor mechanism. Psychological Review, 77(2):73–99.
Hagler,D.J.,Saygin,A.P .,andSereno,M.I.(2006). Smoothingandclusterthresholding
for cortical surface-based group analysis of fmri data. Neuroimage, 33(4):1093–103.
Handwerker, D. A., Ollinger, J. M., and D’Esposito, M. (2004). Variation of bold
hemodynamic responses across subjects and brain regions and their effects on
statistical analyses. Neuroimage, 21(4):1639–51.
Hesse, M. D., Sparing, R., and Fink, G. R. (2009). End or means–the "what" and "how"
of observed intentional actions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(4):776–90.
Heyes, C., Ray, E., Peter, J., Slater, J., and Timothy, J. (2000). What is the signiﬁcance of
imitation in animals? Advances in the Study of Behavior, Volume 29:215–245.
Hietanen, J. K. and Perrett, D. I. (1993). Motion sensitive cells in the macaque superior
temporal polysensory area. i. lack of response to the sight of the animal’s own limb
movement. Experimental brain research, 93(1):117–28.
Hietanen, J. K. and Perrett, D. I. (1996). Motion sensitive cells in the macaque superior
temporal polysensory area: response discrimination between self-generated and
externally generated pattern motion. Behavioural brain research, 76(1-2):155–67.
Holmes, C. J., Hoge, R., Collins, L., Woods, R., Toga, A. W., and Evans, A. C. (1998).
Enhancement of mr images using registration for signal averaging. Journal of
computer assisted tomography, 22(2):324–33.176 Bibliography
Jabbi, M. and Keysers, C. (2008). Inferior frontal gyrus activity triggers anterior insula
response to emotional facial expressions. Emotion, 8(6):775–80.
Keysers, C. (2009). Mirror neurons. Current Biology, 19(21):R971–3.
Keysers, C. and Gazzola, V. (2007). Integrating simulation and theory of mind: from
self to social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(5):194–6.
Keysers, C. and Gazzola, V. (2009). Expanding the mirror: vicarious activity for actions,
emotions, and sensations. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 19(6):666–71.
Keysers, C., Kaas, J. H., and Gazzola, V. (2010). Somatosensation in social perception.
Nature Reviews of Neuroscience, 11(6):417–28.
Keysers, C., Kohler, E., Umiltà, M., Nanetti, L., Fogassi, L., and Gallese, V. (2003).
Audiovisual mirror neurons and action recognition. Experimental Brain Research,
153(4):628–636.
Keysers, C. and Perrett, D. (2004). Demystifying social cognition: A hebbian perspec-
tive. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(11):501–507.
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., and Frith, C. D. (2007a). The mirror-neuron system: a
bayesian perspective. Neuroreport, 18(6):619–23.
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., and Frith, C. D. (2007b). Predictive coding: an account of
the mirror neuron system. Cognitive Processes, 8(3):159–166.
Kokal, I., Gazzola, V., and Keysers, C. (2009). Acting together in and beyond the mirror
neuron system. Neuroimage, 47(4):2046–56.
Kraskov, A., Dancause, N., Quallo, M. M., Shepherd, S., and Lemon, R. N. (2009).
Corticospinal neurons in macaque ventral premotor cortex with mirror properties:
a potential mechanism for action suppression? Neuron, 64(6):922–30.
Lamm, C., Fischer, M. H., and Decety, J. (2007). Predicting the actions of others taps
into one’s own somatosensory representations–a functional mri study. Neuropsy-
chology, 45(11):2480–91.
Miall, R. C. (2003). Connecting mirror neurons and forward models. Neuroreport,
14(17):2135–7.
Ohnishi, T., Moriguchi, Y., Matsuda, H., Mori, T., Hirakata, M., Imabayashi, E., Hirao,
K., Nemoto, K., Kaga, M., Inagaki, M., Yamada, M., and Uno, A. (2004). The neural
network for the mirror system and mentalizing in normally developed children: an
fmri study. Neuroreport, 15(9):1483–7.Bibliography 177
Oldﬁeld, R. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: the edinburgh
inventory. Neuropsychology, 9(1):97–113.
Roebroeck, A., Formisano, E., and Goebel, R. (2005). Mapping directed inﬂuence over
the brain using granger causality. Neuroimage, 25:230–242.
Schippers, M., Renken, R., and Keysers, C. (subm). The effect of intra- and inter-
subject variability of hemodynamic responses on group level granger causality
analyses. Neuroimage.
Schippers, M. B., Gazzola, V., Goebel, R., and Keysers, C. (2009). Playing charades in
the fmri: are mirror and/or mentalizing areas involved in gestural communication?
PLoS ONE, 4(8):e6801.
Schippers, M. B., Roebroeck, A., Renken, R., Nanetti, L., and Keysers, C. (2010). Map-
ping the information ﬂow from one brain to another during gestural communica-
tion. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
107(20):9388–93.
Schubotz, R. I. (2007). Prediction of external events with our motor system: towards a
new framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(5):211–8.
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., and Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: bodies and minds
moving together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2):70–6.
Sebanz, N. and Knoblich, G. (2009). Prediction in joint action: What, when, and where.
Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2):353–367.
Uddin, L. Q., Iacoboni, M., Lange, C., and Keenan, J. P. (2007). The self and social
cognition: the role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 11(4):153–7.
Umiltà, M., Kohler, E., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., Fadiga, L., and Keysers, C. (2001). I know
what you are doing: A neurophysiological study. Neuron, 31:155–165.
Urgesi, C., Maieron, M., Avenanti, A., Tidoni, E., Fabbro, F., and Aglioti, S. M. (2010).
Simulating the future of actions in the human corticospinal system. Cerebral Cortex
Advance Access. DOI 10.1093/cercor/bhp292.
Voss, M., Ingram, J. N., Haggard, P., and Wolpert, D. M. (2006). Sensorimotor atten-
uation by central motor command signals in the absence of movement. Nature
Neuroscience, 9(1):26–7.178 Bibliography
Wolpert, D. M., Doya, K., and Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework
for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical transactions of the Royal
Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 358(1431):593–602.SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twelve couples (total: 24 participants) were scanned while playing the game charades.
We excluded participants who had moved more than the voxel size during the ges-
turing phase. All of the analyses in this paper were performed on the remaining 18
participants. The mean age of the participants was 27.5 § 3.8 years. Each couple con-
sisted of a man and a woman involved in a romantic relationship for at least 6 months.
Our aim was not to study speciﬁcally romantic processes, but simply to let partici-
pants feel as comfortable as possible during the game. Participants were prescreened
to exclude those with a history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Participants
were also asked not to drink coffee before scanning commenced. The participants
freely consented to participating in the study by signing an informed consent form
and were scaled for their right-handedness on the Edinburgh Righthandedness scale
(Oldﬁeld, 1971). This entire study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of
the University Medical Center Groningen (2007/080).
TASK / EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment consisted of two separate sessions on different days. In the ﬁrst
session, the couple was required to play the game of charades. In the second, detailed
anatomical scans and a passive observation control condition were acquired. For
the game of charades, participants took turns going into the scanner, alternating
gesturing and guessing of words. Words were either objects (for example nutcracker,
watch, pencil sharpener) or actions (for example painting, knitting, shaving). Each
participant performed two gesture and two guess runs in which they gestured 14
words and guessed 14 words in total (7 per run). The set of words used was the same
for each couple, but word order was randomized between participants. After the last
gesture-session, a T1-weighted anatomical image was acquired.
Gesture run: during a gesture run, the participant was presented with a word on the
screen and was instructed to communicate this word to his or her partner by means of
gestures. Every word had to be gestured for 90 seconds. Prior to scanning participants
weretrainednottorepeatthesamegestureoverandoveragain,buttokeepgenerating
new gestures to provide their partner with multiple sources of information. The
participant could see how much time he/she needed to keep gesturing by a progress
179180 Supplementary Methods
baronthescreen. Aﬁxationcrosswaspresentedfor20saftereachword,whichserved
as our baseline. The gestures were recorded from the control room of the MR-scanner
with a video camera (Sony DSR-PDX10P). After the participant had gestured seven
words, he/she was taken out of the scanner and went into the waiting room, while
his/her partner went into the scanner to guess what he/she had gestured. During
this changeover, the experimenter cut the recording of the gestures into movies of
90s in which the participant gestured a word. To ensure that the movies were cut at
exactly the moment the word was presented to the gesturing participant, the stimulus
computer’s sound card emitted a sound at the beginning of word presentation. The
output of the sound card was connected to the audio input of the video camera, thus
allowing the auditory signal to serve as a marker for cutting. To minimize the amount
of head motion in the participants, the upper arms of the participant were ﬁxed to the
bed by means of a Velcro strap band. This left the participant free to gesture with his
lower arms and ﬁngers, which still allowed 86% percent correct gesture recognition.
Guess run: during a guess run, the participant was shown the movies that were
recorded in the gesture run of their partner. The task they had to perform was to guess
what their partner was trying to gesture to them. Participants were asked to consider
thegesturesforatleast50secondsbeforecommittingtoaspeciﬁcinterpretationofthe
gestures. This was done to ensure at least 50 seconds of data in each trial to examine
the time course of activity using Granger causality. This was done by showing a
progress bar below the movie, changing from red to green after 50 seconds, indicating
the beginning of the period (50-90s post stimulus onset) during which participants
could decide on their interpretation of the gestures, whenever they felt conﬁdent,
by pressing a button on their 4-button button-box, triggering the appearance of a
multiple choice screen. In the multiple-choice menu they had to choose the correct
word from ﬁve alternatives. One of the alternatives was always ‘none of the above’
and the correct answer was always present in the multiple-choice menu. The correct
answer was never the option ‘none of the above’. This marked the end of a trial.
Two consecutive trials were separated by 20s of a white ﬁxation cross against a black
background, which served as our baseline.
Passive observation run: As a control condition for the guess run, the participants
watched the movies they had seen during the guessing condition again. This time,
they were instructed not to guess what was gestured, but only to passively view them.
We are aware that such instructions cannot ensure that participants entirely stopped
to interpret the gestures, but at debrieﬁng, participants reported having interpreted
the gestures at least less consistently than during the guess run. To keep the run
exactly the same as the original guess run, the movie stopped at the moment the
participant during the original run had pushed the button. The same multiple-choice
menu then appeared and the participant had to answer again. This time, however,
they had to select the word written in green letters. The green word was the correct181
answer. A ﬁxation cross was presented between two consecutive trials for 20 seconds
and served as our baseline.
DATA ACQUISITION
Functional imaging data was recorded with a Philips 3.0T MR scanner, using gradient
echo planar imaging (EPI) and an 8-channel head coil using SENSE technology. T2*
weighted images revealed changes in blood oxygen level. Volume repetition time (TR)
was 1.33 seconds. The whole brain was scanned in 28 (axial) slices with a thickness
of 4.5mm. Further imaging parameters include echo time (TE) 28 ms, ﬁeld of view
224 x 224 mm, 64 x 62 matrix, SENSE acceleration factor 2.4, ensuing 3D voxel size
3.5 x 3.5 x 4.5mm. This set of imaging parameters were chosen to cover the entire
neo-cortex while at the same time providing a TR short enough to expect sufﬁcient
power in a Granger Causality analysis (Roebroeck et al., 2005). In the ﬁrst session, a
fast structural image (“fast anatomy”) was acquired of the participant’s brain, while in
the second session an additional structural image of higher resolution was acquired.
Both were structural, T1-weighted images acquired with a T1TFE sequence (echo
time 3.5 ms, repetition time 7.6 ms, 224 x 160 x 256 matrix, 1 x 1 x 1 mm3 voxels).
DATA PRE-PROCESSING
All analyses and preprocessing was performed in BrainVoyager QX 1.10 along with
custom written C++ code for the Granger causality analyses. The pre-processing steps
included slice scan time correction, 3D motion correction and temporal ﬁltering
(consisting of linear trend removal and a high pass ﬁlter with a cut-off at 0.004Hz).
The images were not smoothed spatially. Functional images were co registered with
the structural images and morphed into Talairach space. The structural images were
corrected for inhomogeneity (to improve segmentation results), normalized into
Talairach space after which the cortical grey matter/white matter boundary was seg-
mented into a topologically correct surface representation. After segmentation, the
cortical surface representations of all subjects were aligned using a cortical curva-
ture based alignment procedure. This procedure aligns the sulci and the gyri of the
different brains using their cortical curvature-maps (Fischl et al., 1999). Included
in the cortex-based alignment was also the Colin (27) brain (Holmes et al., 1998).
The fMRI time courses were resampled on the curvature aligned cortical surface
representations.SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
time 0 s 50 s time of button press
seed: MTG Granger map during last period
(variable length)
Granger map during ﬁrst period
(15 TR = 20 s)
Figure 6.4: Comparison between Granger causality results between the ﬁrst period of
guessing (left in the ﬁgure, starting at the ﬁrst volume until the 15th volume) and
the last period of guessing (right in the ﬁgure, starting at the 16th volume until the
volume at the time of button press). The seed region is the middle temporal gyrus.
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Within brain Granger
Guessing 
Passive observation 
Seed: overlap in parietal 
lobe minus BA2
seed  target
Seed: BA2
Guessing 
Passive observation 
Figure 6.5: Comparison between Granger causality results of two seed regions in the
parietallobeduringguessingandpassiveobservation. Theupperrowshowsresults
for the BA2 seed region (which is used in the main article). The bottom row shows
results for a seed region that is composed of the overlap between gesturing and
guessing in the random effects analyses minus the vertices comprising BA2.7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Social neuroscience is essentially interested in how the human brain works in situa-
tions in which at least two brains are present. Even so, most studies have measured
brain activity of only one person in a social situation. The current thesis describes
results of the charades experiment in which brain activity of two persons was mea-
sured pseudo-simultaneously. Participants engaged in an actual game of charades
in which they took turns as a sender (gesturing) or receiver (guessing) of gestures.
The experiment was set up in a way that participants very naturally generated and
interpreted communicative gestures. This concluding chapter shortly summarizes
the results and describes implications of this research.
7.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIRROR SYSTEM
The putative Mirror Neuron System (pMNS) is a network of areas in the human brain
that have the property of being active both when an action is executed and when
it is observed (Buccino et al., 2001; Grafton et al., 1996; Grèzes et al., 1998; Grèzes
and Decety, 2001; Grèzes et al., 2003; Nishitani and Hari, 2000, 2002; Perani et al.,
2001; Gazzola et al., 2007b,a; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). In Chapter 3, we studied the
involvement of pMNS areas in gestural communication using a whole brain analysis
in which we masked activity during guessing with the activity during gesturing. This
showed that brain regions associated with the pMNS for goal-directed, transitive
actions were recruited during gestural communication. Furthermore, we investigated
theinvolvementofpMNSareasthrougharegion-of-interestanalysis,localizingpMNS
areas with a mask of a different study (Gazzola et al., 2007a). Combining the study
of Gazzola et al. (2007a) with the results of the current study show that the same set
of voxels in the brain is involved in (a) mapping the object-directed hand actions of
others onto the neural substrates involved in executing similar object-directed hand
actions and (b) mapping the gestures of others onto the neural substrates involved in
executing similar gestures.
In Chapter 4 we quantiﬁed for the ﬁrst time connectivity between brains using fMRI
andexplicitlytestedtheresonancepropertyforpMNSareasputforwardbysimulation
theory (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Results
of our between brains Granger causality mapping indicated that activity of pMNS
regions of the guesser indeed show a signiﬁcant Granger causal relation with pMNS
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regions of the gesturer. This means that pMNS regions in the guesser on a moment-
by-moment basis track the activity of the pMNS regions of the gesturer and in this
sense resonate with the pMNS activity in the gesturer. Importantly, we performed
these analyses not on the full time series of the gesturer and guesser, but excluded
the beginning and end of each interaction. This ensures that the Granger causal
relations between the pMNS areas of the gesturer and the guesser are not dominated
by the relatively trivial fact that pMNS regions in the observer will ‘turn on’ after these
regions were turned on in the gesturer, but that even during an ongoing interaction,
the observer’s pMNS continues to track the ups and downs of the gesturer’s pMNS
(and therefore, motor system).
InChapter6,wegainedfurtherinsightsinthefunctionofthepMNSbyinvestigating
the ﬂow of information from and to pMNS areas during gesture observation. We
compared hypotheses generated by two different models of the mirror system. Our
results were most compatible with the conceptualization of the pMNS as a dynamic
control system. During the relatively long gesture observation blocks (at least 50s),
the dominant direction of information ﬂow was posterior (premotor ! parietal !
temporal). In our opinion this indicates a predictive function of pMNS areas. When
we start observing a sequence of actions, the anterior ﬂow of information brieﬂy
dominates. As soon as the ﬁrst motor programs are activated, however, forward
modelswouldstartpredictingthefuturevisualinputinaposteriorﬂowofinformation
from premotor to visual areas. Because this posterior ﬂow is inhibitory (Keysers and
Perrett, 2004; Hietanen and Perrett, 1993, 1996) and the visual sequence of gestures is
relatively predictable, visual input is increasingly inhibited, and the anterior ﬂow of
information is decreased.
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTALIZING
The ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is known to play a role in social situ-
ations, in particular in situations in which reasoning about other people’s mental
states is required (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006). For a long time, the
ﬁeld of social neuroscience had been divided in those that believed that the pMNS
was the most important mean towards understanding others and those that thought
that mentalizing regions like the vmPFC plaid the lead role. It was recently proposed,
however, that rather than debating which system, pMNS or vmPFC, is more impor-
tant, we need to start thinking of how they interact to jointly enable human social
understanding (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007, 2009).
In Chapter 3, we used a classical GLM analysis and found that pMNS areas are con-
sistentlyactivatedabovebaselineduringgestureobservation. ThevmPFC,incontrast,
does not show an involvement in gesture observation, when such an involvement is7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTALIZING 187
deﬁnedas‘abovebaselineactivity’, neitherwhenanalyzedwithawhole-brainanalysis
nor when analyzed with a region-of-interest analysis. The between brains Granger
causality analysis in Chapter 4, however, revealed directed inﬂuences between pMNS
areas of the gesturer and the vmPFC of the guesser. These inﬂuences were present
from gesturer to guesser, but not from gesturer to passive observer. Finally, using
a within brain connectivity analysis in Chapter 6, we demonstrated that the pMNS
sends information to the vmPFC during passive observation, while no differential
Granger causality inﬂuence was found between pMNS and vmPFC during active
guessing. A zero ﬁnding of differential Granger causality can indicate either no in-
formation ﬂow at all, or a symmetrical information ﬂow. Since our between brains
analysis indicated a relationship between pMNS areas of the gesturer and the vmPFC
of the guesser, it seems unlikely that no information ﬂow between the pMNS areas
of the guesser and the vmPFC of the guesser is present. Therefore, we interpret this
ﬁnding as a symmetrical ﬂow of information between pMNS areas and the vmPFC.
Our between brains Granger causality method could reveal tight relationships
between pMNS areas and the vmPFC in our data, while a classic GLM analysis of
the same data, as presented in Chapter 3, did not show simple on/off activation of
the vmPFC of the guesser. This apparent incongruency between results obtained
using the same data but different methods might be partly attributed to the fact that
we used a passive baseline in the GLM analyses. A passive baseline (e.g. a ﬁxation
cross) is not as passive as it might seem. A network of areas (the ‘default’ network)
has been found to augment their activity during baseline when compared to many
different types of tasks (Raichle et al., 2001; Gusnard et al., 2001). In effect, activity in
these areas is suspended during task performance, leading to a decrease of activity.
As the vmPFC is considered part of the default network (Gusnard et al., 2001) this
might have masked our results.However, even though the vmPFC might not seem to
be involved in guessing communicative gestures when analyzed with a classical GLM,
activity in the vmPFC of the guesser does contain information about the time course
of activity in the regions involved in planning and executing gestures in the gesturer
(see Supplementary Information 2 of Chapter 4).
The vmPFC is typically involved in inferential processes (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007;
van der Meer et al., 2010; Overwalle and Baetens, 2009), while the pMNS is engaged by
more direct perceptual processes. This difference in types of processes in the pMNS
and the vmPFC could also provide an interpretation of the pattern of connectivity
within a brain during active guessing and passive viewing (see Chapter 6). During
passive viewing, information ﬂow could dominate from the pMNS! vmPFC, because
the processes occurring in the pMNS are more automatic than the more inferential
vmPFC activity. If instructed to guess what word the other person is trying to gesture,
however, deliberate mentalizing is encouraged, providing more opportunity for the
vmPFC to process the gestures and hence to send information in the vmPFC ! pMNS188 CONCLUDING REMARKS
information ﬂow. This would even out with the more automatic pMNS ! vmPFC
information ﬂow that dominates during passive viewing and lead to a zero difference
between the directions of information ﬂow.
7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR GRANGER CAUSALITY
Using Granger causality analyses to investigate directed inﬂuences within and be-
tween brains might make the results vulnerable to the alleged confound caused by
variability in hemodynamic delay (David et al., 2008; de Marco et al., 2009; Roebroeck
et al., 2005; Friston, 2009; Chang et al., 2008). This has been investigated on a single
subject level by Deshpande et al. (2009), but the effect on group level has been in
great need of investigation. We took this opportunity and performed simulations in
which we systematically varied (1) the directed inﬂuence between two time series,
(2) the neuronal delay between them, (3) the hemodynamic responses with which
the time series were convolved and (4) the level of noise in the signal. The results,
described in Chapter 5, indicate that when no inﬂuence is present between two brain
areas, there is only a marginal chance (Ç 5%) to report signiﬁcant Granger causality
results (false positives). Furthermore, when an inﬂuence is present and the neuronal
delay between two areas is longer than 1 second, no inversions are observed, even
when the difference in hemodynamic delays goes against the direction of inﬂuence
(thus with a longer hemodynamic delay for the source than for the target). Addi-
tionally, the sensitivity of Granger causality group analyses at this length of neuronal
delay is adequate (È80% for a realistic noise level). Granger causality is therefore
an adequate method to investigate inﬂuences in a between brains context, in which
neuronal delays are in the order of seconds. Our simulations further indicate that the
sensitivity of Granger causality in a within brain situation is rather limited with short
neuronal delays. However, they also show that if a signiﬁcant Granger causal relation
is found between two brain regions, the direction of this reported inﬂuence is correct
in »80% of the cases. Granger causality on a group level is thus less vulnerable for
hemodynamic variability than has often been assumed. Our results therefore argue
that Granger causality is a valid method to investigate connectivity within a brain.
7.4 GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
The research described in this thesis underlines three increasingly important aspects
of social cognitive neuroscience: naturalistic experimental situations, the use of
data-driven analysis methods, and quantifying relations between brains.
The importance of creating as naturalistic situations as possible in the MR-scanner
is increasingly appreciated (Redcay et al., 2010; Hari and Kujala, 2009; Mathiak and7.4 GENERAL IMPLICATIONS 189
Weber, 2006; Hasson et al., 2004). For example, stimuli nowadays often consist of
video recordings of social situations, rather than static images (see e.g. van der Gaag
etal.,2007;Gazzolaetal.,2007a;LaBaretal.,2003). Furthermore,themoreconstraints
are imposed on a social situation, the less naturalistic it might feel for the participants.
In a seminal study, Hasson et al. (2004) did not constrain his participants at all, but
let them freely watch a Hollywood movie, similar to how they would watch a movie
at home. The current research extends this type of free-form experiments by letting
participants engage in the actual social game charades. We did not impose a strict
temporal structure on the timing of the experiment. Gestures could be made freely
with hardly any constraints: no restrictions on the amount of hand movements or eye
gaze, no ﬁxed number of repetitions for one word and no separation in planning and
execution phase.
The use of such an unconstrained social interaction as experimental design, how-
ever, has implications for the data analysis. When a strict temporal structure is im-
posed on the experimental setting, a classical GLM analysis can be used. This method
hinges on the knowledge of the timing of cognitive processes. We used this method,
for example, to investigate the general involvement of pMNS and mentalizing areas
in gestural communication (see Chapter 3). To quantify inﬂuences between brains
during naturalistic interactions, a more exact timing of cognitive processes would be
necessary, other than the on- and offset of the video recordings. This exact timing,
however, is unknown in our experiment in which social interaction was deliberately
left unconstrained. A quantiﬁcation of the stream of gestures would be necessary,
but this is far from trivial: it is unknown what aspects of the highly multidimensional
videorecording are actually relevant for the brain activity of the guesser, making the
generationofpredictorsforaGLMarbitrary. Instead, weusedbetweenbrainsGranger
causality, which has the elegant property of circumventing this problem altogether by
using brain activity of the gesturer to quantify brain activity of the guesser (see Chap-
ter 4). Between brains Granger causality is thereby capable of directly testing those
theories, like the pMNS ‘resonance’ theory (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti
and Arbib, 1998), which are formulated not as a link between a stimulus and a neural
state, but between the neural states of two individuals.
Finally, quantiﬁcation of inﬂuences between brains are of increasing interest in
social cognitive neuroscience. This started with the development of techniques to
measure two brains simultaneously. The research group of Montague developed, for
example, the ‘hyperscanning’ technique with which two scanners could be coupled
during an experiment (Montague et al., 2002). Babiloni et al. (2006) instead measured
EEG simultaneously from different participants and showed that causal relations
exist between prefrontal cortices during a cooperative card-game. Here, we have
introduced between brains Granger causality mapping as a data analysis approach for
fMRI data to quantify inﬂuences and information ﬂow between brains. This thesis is,190 CONCLUDING REMARKS
to our knowledge, one of the very, if not the ﬁrst to describe this type of connectivity
between brains. We hope our work helped paving the way to answer exciting research
questions such as how the connection between brains is modulated in people with a
social deﬁcit, such as autism spectrum disorder.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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People involved in a social interaction can be thought of as being temporarily con-
nected. This connection starts, for example, in the motor system of person A, which
leads to observable behavior that is perceived and interpreted by the primary sensory
and higher cortices of person B. This in turn can lead to activity in the motor system
of person B, which leads to observable behavior that can be perceived and interpreted
by person A, and so on. This connection is dynamic and dependent on events in the
interaction, such as changes in direction of eye gaze, the words being said and the
gestures being made. In this thesis, we investigate such a communicative connection
on a neural level.
This research is inspired both by theories explaining how humans understand
each other and by the methodological advancements in connectivity analyses. Over
the last years, two important ideas have been developed about how people interact
and communicate: the discovery of the mirror system and the idea of mentalizing.
These two concepts form the background of this research and are described in the
following two sections. Furthermore, the development of Granger causality mapping,
an analysis method to investigate directed inﬂuences between brain regions, allowed
us to perform the kind of connectivity analyses we needed.
THE MIRROR SYSTEM
The idea of mirroring is that our brain ’mirrors’ or ’echoes’ the perceived actions of
other people. This idea was inspired by the discovery of mirror neurons in the nineties
(Gallese et al., 1996; Pellegrino et al., 1992). Mirror neurons were discovered in a lab
in Parma while researchers were measuring neurons in area F5 (ventral premotor
cortex) of the Macaque monkey. The researcher noticed that these neurons not only
ﬁre at the moment the monkey grasped a peanut, but also when the monkey was
observing the researcher grasping a peanut. It was known that these neurons are
involved in execution of goal-directed actions performed with the hand or with the
mouth (Kurata and Tanji, 1986; Rizzolatti et al., 1988), but now it became clear that
these neurons also exhibited sensory characteristics. These neurons thus represent
both the execution of an action as well as the observation of an action. This discovery
constitutes an important step in neuroscience, because it conﬁrmed the idea that
perception and action are inextricably linked on a neural level. This idea was already
presentinpsychologicaltheories. JamesGibson, forexample, claimedthatperception
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in essence consists of perceiving ’action affordances’ (Gibson, 1986).
Shortly after the ﬁrst discovery of mirror neurons in the Macaque monkey, the ques-
tion rose whether a similar mirroring mechanism might also be present in the human
brain. Because measuring individual neurons is hardly possible without damaging
a brain, research initially focused on the question whether brain areas exist, which
show activity both during execution and observation of an action (Buccino et al., 2001;
Grafton et al., 1996; Grèzes et al., 1998; Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Grèzes et al., 2003;
Nishitani and Hari, 2000, 2002; Perani et al., 2001; Gazzola et al., 2007b,a; Gazzola
and Keysers, 2008). Brain areas with mirroring properties were indeed identiﬁed and
were collectively dubbed the human mirror neuron system (Keysers and Gazzola,
2009). These areas comprise the ventral and dorsal premotor cortex, the inferior
parietal lobe, and the middle temporal lobe (see Figure 1). Furthermore, several other
brain areas show an overlap between experience and observation of for example emo-
tions (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Wicker et al., 2003), and sensations (Singer et al., 2004;
Keysers and Perrett, 2004). Innovative experiments that make use of, for example,
‘cross-modal repetition suppression’, have shown that there is scientiﬁc evidence for
the existence of individual mirror neurons in the human brain (Kilner et al., 2009;
Lingnau et al., 2009; Chong et al., 2008; Mukamel et al., 2010).
Because mirror neurons form a link between actions we perform ourselves and
actions we see others do, it is assumed that mirror neurons have a function in un-
derstanding other people (see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010, for a recent overview
of literature). When observing someone else performing an action, our own motor
representations of that action become active, ‘as if ’ we are doing this action ourselves.
This is the core idea of simulation theory: we understand other people’s actions, be-
cause we internally simulate these actions in our own brain (Goldman, 1992; Gibson,
1986; Gallese, 2003).
Important for the research in the current thesis is that simulation theory makes a
prediction about mirror neurons. Simulation theory claims that mirror neurons in
the brain of the observer resonate with the mirror neurons in the brain of the actor.
The term ’resonance’ is used loosely here and refers to the ups and downs in the brain
activity of one person that cause similar ups and downs in the brain activity of the
other person. (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001).
This resonance property is investigated in Chapter 4 of the current thesis.
MENTALIZING
Besides simulation as a mechanism to understand others, people have the capacity to
think about and understand others on a more reﬂective level. This can be illustrated
with a typical scene from a soap opera, such as the Bold and the Beautiful: TaylorENGLISH SUMMARY 203
Dorsal premotor cortex
Ventral premotor cortex
Parietal lobule
Middle temporal gyrus left hemisphere right hemisphere
Medial prefrontal cortex Temporal-parietal junction
left hemisphere right hemisphere right hemisphere left hemisphere
putative Mirror Neuron System 
Mentalizing brain areas
Figure 1: Areas constituting the putative Mirror Neuron System and the mentalizing
system in the human brain.
and Ridge are about to get married. Without Taylor knowing this, Brooke is about
to confess that she is pregnant with Ridge’s baby. She hopes that by revealing this
she can prevent this marriage from happening. To understand and appreciate such a
situation, we have to be able to track what all characters involved know, what they
do not know and predict what they will think and feel when they will ﬁnd out. This
ability to attribute mental states, beliefs and desires to others is called having a Theory
of Mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983). The process of
reasoning about other people’s mental states is often referred to as mentalizing (Frith
and Frith, 1999). Mentalizing involves different brain areas than mirroring (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith and Frith, 2006, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000;
Gusnard et al., 2001), the most important being the ventral medial prefrontal cortex
and the temporal-parietal junction (see Figure 1).
CHARADES
There has been a lot of debate about which of the two theories (theory of mind or sim-
ulation theory) can explain most of human interpersonal understanding (Gallagher,
2007; Hickok, 2009; Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Many now believe that mentalizing is a204 ENGLISH SUMMARY
separate mechanism from the more basic, low-level motor simulation (Uddin et al.,
2007; de Lange et al., 2008; Brass et al., 2007; Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The
debate has therefore shifted to the more fruitful question of how these two systems
work together to achieve a full understanding of other people (Keysers and Gazzola,
2007). The charades experiment that is central to this thesis was set up in part to
investigate this issue.
In the charades experiment couples of participants played the game of charades
by taking turns gesturing and guessing concepts in the MR-scanner. Participants
were presented with a word on the screen (either an action or an object, for example
nutcracker, knitting, shaving) and were instructed to convey the meaning of this word
by gestures. Their gestures were recorded on video and presented to their partners,
who went into the MR-scanner to guess what their partner had gestured. The partners
had to push a button when they thought they knew what word was being portrayed.
After a while, the two partners switched roles, with the former gesturer becoming
the guesser and vice-versa. Both partners guessed and gestured 14 words in total.
On a different day, they returned for the control condition in which they observed
exactly the same movies of their gesturing partner, but now with the instruction to
try not to interpret the gestures. In this way, we recorded the brain activity of both
partners in the social interaction, as if they were scanned simultaneously. The set-up
of the experiment allowed us to investigate several questions: (1) Are mirroring and
mentalizing areas involved during the production and interpretation of gestures?
(2) Does brain activity of the guesser resonate with brain activity of the gesturer?
(3) How do areas of the mirror system in the guesser work together to achieve this
interpretation? The following three sections discuss these issues.
INVOLVEMENT OF MIRRORING AND MENTALIZING AREAS
Our ﬁrst research question is whether mirroring and mentalizing areas are involved
during the production and interpretation of communicative gestures. Our hypothesis
was that both the mirror system and the mentalizing system would be active during
the charades game. The reasoning behind this was that on the one hand the mirror
system would be involved in transforming observed gestures into the motor programs
that could produce such a gesture, while on the other hand the mentalizing system
would be involved in interpreting the communicative intentions of the other player.
The results, described in Chapter 3 of this thesis, support in part our hypothesis.
Gesture production and gesture interpretation recruit many of the same brain areas,
showing a large overlap. The areas that are active are in part indeed areas of the mirror
system. When the time course of activity during the production and interpretation
of gestures is considered, it can be seen that all mirror areas elevate their activityENGLISH SUMMARY 205
substantially above baseline for the whole period of the gesture. The mirror system is
thus indeed involved in gestural communication.
The ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which is considered the most impor-
tant of the mentalizing system, is not found to be active during any stage of the game.
This was in disagreement with our hypothesis. Another study did ﬁnd activity in
this region during the interpretation of gestures, but used gestures that refer to inner
mental states (Gallagher and Frith, 2004). The gestures in our experiment, however,
were either actions or objects (e.g. knitting, nutcracker, board game). Speculative, it
could be this difference in gestures that explains the absence of activity in the vmPFC.
A different explanation could be that the vmPFC is part of the so-called ‘default
network’ of the brain. The default network is a conglomerate of areas that show a
distinct activity during the abscence of a clear cognitive task (during ’rest’). This
network was discovered in a meta-study, in which activity during rest was compared
to activity during all kindsof tasks. No matter whichtask was beingperformed, during
therestperiodsimilarareaswereconsistentlyactive. Oneofthemistheventralmedial
prefrontal cortex (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). When attention is not
focused on the external world, these areas seem to process information that has to do
with the self, such as autobiographical memories, future plans and thinking about
the perspective of others (Buckner et al., 2008). An explanation for the absence of
vmPFC activity during gestural communication could be that the vmPFC was active
both during the game as well as during the rest period (looking at a ﬁxation cross).
This could have made it hard to measure a difference in activity.
RESONANCE AND CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN BRAINS
The results described above were calculated by using a classic fMRI analysis. This
means that we have tested which brain regions increase their level of activity when
a task starts and decrease their level of activity when a task is ﬁnished. What we
furthermore were interested in was whether areas of the mirror system would show a
resonance between gesturer and guesser. The charades experiment was set up in such
a way that brain activity of both gesturer and guesser were measured, as if they they
were scanned simultaneously. This enabled us to determine whether brain activity of
the guesser is inﬂuenced by the brain activity of the gesturer. In other words, we used
Granger causality (further described below) to test where in the brain of the guesser,
brain activity could be predicted by brain activity of the mirror system of the gesturer.
The results, described in Chapter 4 show that activity in mirror areas of the guesser do
indeed track the activity of mirror areas of the gesturer accurately. This means that a
consistent relationship exists between mirror areas of the gesturer and the guesser.
Surprisingly, we found that the ventral medial prefrontal cortex of the guesser has206 ENGLISH SUMMARY
a similar relation with mirror areas of the gesturer. We did not expect this, since a
classical analysis of the same data did not show an involvement of this area. These
results indicate that the vmPFC does play a role in the observation and interpretation
of communicative gestures.
Besides the original analysis between the gesturer and the guesser, we have also
calculated several control analyses. Participants had performed a control condition
in which they were shown the gesture movies of their partners again, but were asked
to try not interpret them (‘passive observation’). De temporal relations between the
mirror systems and the vmPFC that we found between gesturer and guesser was
strongly decreased in an analysis in which we paired the gesturer to the passive
observer. This shows that the temporal relation between the two brains is dependent
on the task that is performed, even with exactly the same stimuli. Of course, it is
very difﬁcult to observe, but not interpret. Participants reported, however, to have
interpreted less during the passive observation condition than during the guessing
condition.
When the analysis was performed between a gesturer and a random guesser (thus
using brain activity of someone who had observed gestures of a different gesturer), a
similar effect of decreased temporal relations with regard to the orginal analysis was
found. Even when we paired the gesturer to a random guesser, but paired the words
such that they corresponded between gesturer and random guesser, the temporal
relationsbetweenbrainsdecreasedstronglywhencomparedtothetemporalrelations
between gesturer and guesser.
CONNECTIVITY WITHIN THE MIRROR SYSTEM
Our last research question that we tested with the charades experiment concerned
the inﬂuences from and to mirror areas within the brain of the guesser. We compared
hypotheses generated by different models of the mirror system. A classic account of
the mirror system could be described as strictly ‘feed-forward’ (Kilner et al., 2007a).
This means that a visual representation of an observed action is transformed into the
corresponding motor programs, which leads to an understanding of the action. On a
neuronal level, this would mean that the information ﬂow would predominantly go
from temporal cortex ! parietal cortex ! premotor cortex. An alternative account
sees the mirror system as a dynamic feedback control system. This model is inspired
by both ‘forward’ and ‘inverse’ models from motor control theory (Wolpert et al., 2003;
Voss et al., 2006; Greenwald, 1970). During action execution, a copy of motor com-
mands is sent to sensory areas to predict sensory and proprioceptive consequences
of that action. When, for example, you reach for a tea cup, you expect your own arm
and hand to start stretching out in front of you. This is called the forward model.ENGLISH SUMMARY 207
An inverse model, in contrast to a forward model, does exactly the opposite: when
you see somebody reaching for a tea cup, the inverse model calculates what motor
commands should be executed to achieve this reaching behavior. The dynamic feed-
back control theory assumes that forward models are inhibitory, which means that
they can decrease the amount of activity in brain areas that they are connected with
(Hietanen and Perrett, 1993, 1996). An illustrative example is formed by the fact that
it is difﬁcult to tickle yourself: the accurate expectation of your own tickling hand
decreases the sensitivity of the tickle (Blakemore et al., 1998). In contrast, inverse
models work excitatory and thus can increase the activity of areas with which they are
connected (Gallese et al., 1996; Keysers et al., 2003; Kraskov et al., 2009). The dynamic
feedback control theory thus combines inhibitory forward and excitatory inverse
models. On a neural level, this predicts an information ﬂow from premotor cortex !
parietal cortex ! temporal cortex.
The results, described in Chapter 6 show that the information ﬂow during gesture
interpretation is predominantly posterior: from premotor cortex ! parietal cortex
! temporal cortex. These results ﬁt better with the mirror system functioning as
a dynamic feedback control system than as a strict feed-forward system. The com-
bination of inhibitory forward and excitatory inverse models leads to the following
chain of events in the brain of the guesser: when we see a predictable chain of events,
the beginning is fully represented in the visual cortex and triggers motor programs
through the inverse model. These motor programs are then ‘forwarded’ to predict
future visual (and somatosensory) stimuli. If these stimuli conform to the predictions,
they will be inhibited. The visual ! premotor stream of information is reduced and
the premotor representations triggered will not be substantially updated. If the visual
information violates the predictions, it will not be inhibited, leading to a renewed
visual ! premotor stream of information and an update of the motor representations.
This account of the mirror system is in line with the idea that its main function is a
predictive one (Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Kilner et al., 2007b; Miall, 2003).
GRANGER CAUSALITY
To investigate directed inﬂuences between brain regions within and between brains,
we used Granger causality mapping. Granger causality is a measure of directed
inﬂuence between two time series. Originally conceptualized in the econometric
ﬁeld by Wiener and formalized by Granger (Wiener, 1956; Granger, 1969), it was
introduced as a connectivity analysis for fMRI data in 2003 by Goebel et al. (2003) and
Roebroeck et al. (2005). Clive Granger formalized causality between two time series
using the intuitively appealing concept of temporal precedence: if a signal change in
A is consistently followed by a signal change in B, A Granger-causes B. Mathematically,208 ENGLISH SUMMARY
B A
B A
true underlying influence
Granger causality result?
Figure 2: Could a faster hemodynamic response lead to an inverted Granger causality
result?
this is calculated by comparing two regression equations: one in which the current
value of a time series yi is explained by its own past (yi¡j) with one in which the same
time series yi is explained both by its own past and the past of another time series
(xi¡j). This results in error variances, whose F-ratio quantiﬁes the inﬂuence x exerts
on y. The converse inﬂuence of y on x is also calculated and the difference between
the two reveals the dominant direction of inﬂuence between the two time series.
In this way, Granger causality provides a statistical measure of directed inﬂuences
between brain regions and has the advantage that it does not require an underlying
anatomical model. It maps inﬂuences from a certain seed region to the rest of that
brain and vice versa.
Results of Granger causality analyses of fMRI data are interpreted as indications of
information ﬂow on a neuronal level. This is an indirect inference, however, as fMRI
measures BOLD responses rather than neuronal activity directly. The BOLD response
(Blood Oxygen Level Dependent response) is essentially a measure of changes in de-
oxyhemoglobin level triggered by changes in neural activity. It is assumed to originate
from neural activity, predominantly synaptic (Logothetis et al., 2001; Logothetis and
Wandell, 2004), but unfolds later in time (» 4 - 6s). The temporal characteristics of
the hemodynamic response that links neural activity to changes in the BOLD signal
is not equal across brain regions and participants (Rajapakse et al., 1998; Aguirre
et al., 1998; Kruggel and von Cramon, 1999; Handwerker et al., 2004) and this variabil-
ity is assumed to cause problems for Granger causality analyses (David et al., 2008;
de Marco et al., 2009; Roebroeck et al., 2005; Friston, 2009; Chang et al., 2008). One
fear is that a systematic difference in hemodynamic response between two regions
might introduce temporal precedence where there was none, leading to the report
of spurious Granger causality ﬁndings. Another fear is that a difference in hemody-
namic response might invert the reported direction of Granger causality. The intuitiveENGLISH SUMMARY 209
idea behind this is as follows: If region A causes neural activity changes in region B
and region B has a faster hemodynamic response than region A, a Granger causality
analysis of the BOLD signal might indicate a net inﬂuence going from B to A rather
than the true underlying neural causality that goes from A to B (see Figure 2).
In a between-brains analysis, these hemodynamic differences between brain re-
gions and individuals pose less of a problem because the time lags between neural
activity in the two brains, in the order of seconds, are larger than differences in
hemodynamic delay, in the order of tenth of seconds (Handwerker et al., 2004). In a
within-brain analysis, however, this issue is more pressing. Therefore, we examined
whether Granger causality can indeed deduce the dominant ﬂow of neural informa-
tion even when differences in hemodynamic response are present between different
brain regions and between participants. We used computer simulations to systemati-
cally investigate the effect of the following factors: (1) the directed inﬂuence between
twotimeseries,(2)theneuronaldelaybetweenthem,(3)thehemodynamicresponses
with which the time series were convolved and (4) the level of noise in the signal. The
results, described in Chapter 5, indicate that when no inﬂuence is present between
two brain areas, there is only a marginal chance (Ç 5%) to report signiﬁcant Granger
causality results (false positives). Furthermore, when an inﬂuence is present and
the neuronal delay between two areas is longer than 1 second, no inversions are
observed, even when the difference in hemodynamic delays goes against the direc-
tion of inﬂuence (thus with a longer hemodynamic delay for the source than for the
target). Additionally, the sensitivity of Granger causality group analyses at this length
of neuronal delay is adequate (È80% for a realistic noise level). Granger causality is
therefore an adequate method to investigate inﬂuences in a between brains context,
in which neuronal delays are in the order of seconds.
WithregardtoGrangercausalityinawithinbrainsituation,oursimulationsindicate
that sensitivity is rather limited with short neuronal delays. However, we also found
that if a signiﬁcant Granger causal relation is found between two brain regions, the
direction of this reported inﬂuence is correct in »80% of the cases. Granger causality
on a group level is thus less vulnerable for hemodynamic variability than has often
been assumed. Our results therefore argue that Granger causality is a valid method to
investigate connectivity within a brain.
CONCLUSIONS
Concluding, we can say that both the mirror system and the mentalizing system are
involved in playing the game charades. Even though using a classical GLM analysis
the vmPFC was not found to substantially increase its activity above baseline, Granger
causality between brains revealed that activity in this area of the guesser accurately210 ENGLISH SUMMARY
follows the activity in mirror areas of the gesturer. We have introduced and validated
Granger causality as an analysis method to investigate inﬂuences between brains.
Applying this method on brain activity of mirror areas during social interaction shows
a resonance between these areas between brains. This indicates that it is important to
investigate both brains involved in the interaction, because it can reveal relationships
that would otherwise have stayed hidden.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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In gewijzigde vorm gepubliceerd als: Schippers, M. B. (2010). Hersenen in interactie.
Tijdschrift voor Neuropsychologie, 5(3).
Wanneer twee mensen met elkaar communiceren, dan ontstaat er een soort tijdelijke
verbinding tussen hen. Deze verbinding bestaat uit een keten van gebeurtenissen en
begintbijvoorbeeldbijdehersenactiviteitindemotorischecortexvandeenepersoon.
Deze activiteit leidt tot gedrag, bijvoorbeeld het maken van een gebaar, dat wordt
gezien door de andere persoon. Deze bekijkt en interpreteert dit gebaar wat leidt tot
activiteit in de visuele, sensorische en associatieve cortices. Dit kan dan weer leiden
tot hersenactiviteit in de motorische cortex, tot een ander gebaar en zo verder. Dit
proefschrift beschrijft een hersenonderzoek naar zo’n dergelijke indirecte verbinding
tussen twee mensen.
Voordat ik in ga op het onderzoek wat we hebben uitgevoerd, is het belangrijk om
iets te weten over de achtergrond en inspiratie waarop dit onderzoek is gebaseerd. De
afgelopen jaren zijn er twee belangrijke ideeën ontwikkelt over hoe mensen elkaar
begrijpen en met elkaar kunnen communiceren: het idee van een spiegelsysteem
en een ‘redeneersysteem’. Deze twee ideeën vormen de basis van dit onderzoek en
worden beschreven in de volgende paragraven. Verder heeft de ontwikkeling van
‘Granger causaliteit’, een analysemethode om verbindingen tussen hersengebieden
vast te stellen ook een belangrijke rol gespeeld, deze wordt hierna beschreven.
HET SPIEGELSYSTEEM
Het idee van spiegelen is dat ons brein de handelingen van andere mensen ‘nabootst’.
Aan de basis van dit idee staat de ontdekking van spiegelneuronen (‘mirror neurons’)
in de jaren negentig (Gallese et al., 1996; Pellegrino et al., 1992). Deze spiegelneuro-
nen zijn min of meer per toeval ontdekt in een lab in Parma tijdens het meten van
neuronen in het gebied F5 (ventrale premotorische cortex) van de Makaak aap. Een
onderzoeker merkte op dat deze neuronen niet alleen reageerden op het moment
dat de aap zelf een pinda oppakte, maar ook op het moment dat de aap naar de
onderzoeker keek terwijl deze een pinda oppakte. Het was bekend dat deze neuronen
betrokken zijn bij het uitvoeren van doelgerichte handelingen met de handen en met
de mond. Maar nu werd opeens duidelijk dat deze gebieden ook sensorische eigen-
schappen bezitten (Kurata and Tanji, 1986; Rizzolatti et al., 1988). Deze neuronen
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representeren hiermee zowel het uitvoeren van een handeling als de waarneming
van die handeling. De ontdekking van spiegelneuronen had een grote impact, omdat
hiermee het vermoeden werd bevestigd dat waarnemen en handelen sterk aan elkaar
gekoppeld zijn. Dit idee speelde al langer een rol in psychologische theorieën. James
Gibson beweerde bijvoorbeeld dat perceptie bestaat uit het direct waarnemen van
handelingsmogelijkheden (Gibson, 1986).
Kort na de eerste ontdekking van spiegelneuronen wilde men weten of de mense-
lijke hersenen ook zo’n dergelijk mechanisme bezitten. Omdat het meten van een
individuele neuron vrijwel niet mogelijk is zonder een brein te beschadigen, richtten
onderzoeken zich op de vraag of er wellicht hersengebieden bestaan die activiteit
laten zien tijdens zowel het uitvoeren als het waarnemen van een handeling (Buc-
cino et al., 2001; Grafton et al., 1996; Grèzes et al., 1998; Grèzes and Decety, 2001;
Grèzes et al., 2003; Nishitani and Hari, 2000, 2002; Perani et al., 2001; Gazzola et al.,
2007b,a; Gazzola and Keysers, 2008). Dat blijkt inderdaad zo te zijn en de gebieden
met deze eigenschap vormen samen het menselijke spiegelsysteem (Keysers and
Gazzola, 2009). Deze gebieden zijn de ventrale en dorsale premotorische cortex, de
inferieure parietale cortex en de middelste superieure temporele gyrus (zie Figuur
3). Er bestaan overigens niet alleen spiegelgebieden die een overlap in activiteit laten
zien voor het uitvoeren en waarnemen van handelingen, maar ook voor het erva-
ren en het waarnemen van emoties en sensaties, zoals walging, aanraking en pijn
(Wicker et al., 2003; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Singer et al., 2004; Bastiaansen et al.,
2009). Innovatieve experimenten, die bijvoorbeeld gebruik maken van ‘cross-modal
repetition suppression’, hebben inmiddels wetenschappelijk bewijs geleverd voor het
bestaan van individuele spiegelneuronen in de menselijke hersenen (Kilner et al.,
2009; Lingnau et al., 2009; Chong et al., 2008; Mukamel et al., 2010).
Doordat spiegelneuronen een directe link leggen tussen de handelingen die we
zelf uitvoeren en de handelingen die we anderen zien doen, wordt aangenomen dat
spiegelneuronen een functie hebben in het begrijpen van wat de ander aan het doen
is (zie Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010, voor een recent overzicht van de literatuur). Bij
het zien van een handeling van iemand anders wordt de motorische representatie van
deze handelinginde eigenhersenenactief, alsofdezehandelingzelfwordtuitgevoerd.
Dit idee vormt de kern van de simulatietheorie: we begrijpen wat een ander doet
doordat we deze handeling als het ware simuleren in onze eigen hersenen (Goldman,
1992; Gibson, 1986; Gallese, 2003).
Belangrijk voor het onderzoek in dit proefschrift is dat de simulatietheorie een
voorspelling maakt over spiegelneuronen. Deze theorie beweert namelijk dat spiegel-
neuronen in het brein van degene die een handeling waarneemt resoneren met de
spiegelneuronen van degene die de handeling uitvoert. De term ‘resonantie’ wordt
hier losjes gebruikt en er wordt mee bedoeld dat de pieken en dalen in de hersenacti-
viteit van het motorsysteem van de ene persoon overeenkomstige pieken en dalenNEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 221
veroorzaakt in de hersenactiviteit van het motorsysteem in de andere persoon (Gal-
lese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). In Hoofdstuk 4
van dit proefschrift wordt deze bewering over resonantie onderzocht.
HET REDENEERSYSTEEM
Naast dit spiegelmechanisme waarmee we anderen begrijpen, bezitten we ook een
meer reﬂectief vermogen om na te denken over wat er in anderen omgaat. Denk
bijvoorbeeld aan een typische scene uit een soap, zoals The Bold and the Beautiful:
Taylor and Ridge staan op het punt om met elkaar in het huwelijk te treden. Zonder
dat Taylor dit weet, staat Brooke op het punt om te vertellen dat ze zwanger is van
Ridge, hopende dat ze hiermee de bruiloft kan verhinderen. Om zo’n situatie te
kunnen begrijpen en te kunnen waarderen, moeten we in staat zijn om bij te houden
wat de verschillende personen wel en niet weten en wat ze zullen denken op het
moment dat ze het te horen zullen krijgen. Dit soort bewuste denkprocessen wordt
in de literatuur wel ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) genoemd (Premack and Woodruff, 1978;
Wimmer and Perner, 1983) en vindt plaats in andere gebieden dan de spiegelgebieden
(Frith and Frith, 1999, 2006). Het zijn de ‘redeneergebieden’ (zie Figuur 3), die actief
zijn tijdens bijvoorbeeld het interpreteren van (strip)verhalen en het nadenken over
jezelf en anderen (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith and Frith, 2006,
2003; Gallagher et al., 2000; Gusnard et al., 2001). De belangrijkste twee gebieden
van dit redeneersysteem zijn de ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex en de temporeel-
parietale junctie.
HINTS
In de literatuur is er veel gediscusseerd over de vraag welk van deze twee mecha-
nismes het best kan verklaren van hoe mensen elkaar begrijpen (Gallagher, 2007;
Hickok, 2009; Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Inmiddels wordt er door vele aangenomen
dat twee verschillende systemen die andere functies vervullen (Uddin et al., 2007;
de Lange et al., 2008; Brass et al., 2007; Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). De vraag die nu
centraal staat is hoe deze twee mechanismen van spiegelen en redeneren met elkaar
samenwerken (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). Het ‘Hints experiment’, waarin we gebruik
maken van het communiceren door middel van gebaren, is opgezet om deze vraag te
kunnen onderzoeken.
In het Hints experiment speelden twaalf romantische koppels het spel Hints terwijl
hun hersenactiviteit gemeten werd. De vrouw ging bijvoorbeeld als eerste in de MRI
scanner, terwijl haar man in de wachtkamer zat te wachten. Zij kreeg dan woorden te
zien op het scherm (bv. ‘wenteltrap’) en moest deze communiceren naar haar partner222 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
Dorsale premotorische cortex
Ventrale premotorische cortex
Parietale cortex
Middelste temporale gyrus
linker hersenhelft rechter hersenhelft
Mediale prefrontale cortex Temporeel-parietale junctie
linker hersenhelft rechter hersenhelft rechter hersenhelft linker hersenhelft
Spiegelsysteem 
Redeneersysteem
Figuur 3: Hersengebieden die deel uitmaken van het spiegelsysteem (boven) en het
redeneersysteem (onder).
door middel van gebaren. Deze gebaren werden opgenomen op video. Nadat ze
zeven woorden had uitgebeeld, ging ze uit de scanner en was het de beurt aan haar
man. Deze moest in de scanner raden wat zijn vrouw aan hem probeerde duidelijk
te maken. Hij kreeg de videobeelden te zien en moest op een knop drukken als hij
dacht het geraden te hebben en kon dan antwoord geven via een menu. Nadat hij alle
woorden gezien had, mocht hij op zijn beurt woorden gaan uitbeelden. Zijn vrouw
ging daarna weer in de scanner zodat man en vrouw beide veertien woorden hadden
uitgebeeld en geraden. Op deze manier konden we de hersenactiviteit van de man
en de vrouw tijdens het uitbeelden en het raden van dezelfde gebaren naast elkaar
leggen, alsof ze tegelijkertijd gescand waren. De opzet van dit experiment stelde ons
in staat om meerdere vragen te onderzoeken: (1) Wat is de rol van het spiegel- en het
redeneersysteem tijdens het maken en interpreteren van gebaren? (2) Vertoont de
hersenactiviteit in de spiegelgebieden van degene die uitbeeldt en degene die aan het
raden is een resonantie effect? (3) Hoe werken de spiegelgebieden van degene die aan
het raden is met elkaar samen? In de volgende drie paragrafen wordt nader ingegaan
op deze drie vragen.NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 223
DE ROL VAN HET SPIEGELSYSTEEM EN HET REDENEERSYSTEEM
Onze eerste onderzoeksvraag is wat de rol is van het spiegelsysteem en het redeneer-
systeem tijdens het maken en interpreteren van gebaren. Onze voorspellingen waren
dat zowel het spiegelsysteem als het redeneersysteem actief zouden zijn tijdens het
spelen van het spel hints. De redenatie hierachter was dat aan de ene kant het spie-
gelsysteem ervoor zorgt dat geobserveerde gebaren omgezet worden in motorische
programma’s voor soortgelijke handelingen en dat aan de andere kant de redeneer-
gebieden voor een interpretatie van de intenties van de ander zorgen. De resultaten
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift ondersteunen gedeeltelijk onze voor-
spellingen. Tijdens het maken van de gebaren en het raden van de gebaren zijn er
grote overeenkomsten in hersenactiviteit. De gebieden die actief zijn, komen overeen
met de spiegelgebieden. Als we daarnaast kijken naar hoe de activiteit verloopt tij-
dens het maken en het raden van een gebaar, dan is te zien dat de spiegelgebieden
tijdens deze hele periode een verhoogde activiteit vertonen. Het spiegelsysteem is
dus inderdaad betrokken bij het communiceren door middel van gebaren.
De ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex (vmPFC), het gebied dat als het belangrijk-
ste van de redeneergebieden wordt beschouwd, is daarentegen helemaal niet actief
tijdens het gehele spel. Dit hadden wij niet verwacht. Een ander onderzoek vond
namelijk wel activiteit in de vmPFC tijdens de interpretatie van gebaren, maar maakte
gebruik van gebaren die verwijzen naar innerlijke toestanden (Gallagher and Frith,
2004). De gebaren in ons onderzoek bestonden uit handelingen of objecten (bv. fruit
uitpersen, breien, bordspel en notenkraker). We kunnen speculerend dat het verschil
in gebaren de activiteit in de vmPFC bepaalt. Een andere verklaring voor de afwe-
zigheid van activiteit in de vmPFC kan worden gegeven door het feit dat de vmPFC
ook een onderdeel vormt van het zogenaamde ‘default netwerk’ in het brein. Dit
netwerk is actief als het brein ‘in rust’ is. Het werd ontdekt in een metastudie, waarbij
van een groot aantal onderzoeken de hersenactiviteit tijdens rust werd vergeleken
met die tijdens het uitvoeren van een taak. Ongeacht welke taak werd uitgevoerd
waren tijdens de rustperiodes steeds dezelfde gebieden actief, waaronder de ventrale
mediale prefrontale cortex (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Wanneer de aan-
dacht niet op de externe wereld gericht is, verwerken deze gebieden informatie die te
maken heeft met het zelf, zoals autobiograﬁsche herinneringen, toekomstplannen en
nadenken over perspectief van anderen (Buckner et al., 2008). De verklaring waarom
wij in ons onderzoek geen activiteit vinden in de vmPFC kan zijn dat de vmPFC zowel
actief was tijdens de taak als tijdens de rustperiode (het kijken naar een kruis op het
scherm tussen de gebaren door). Hierdoor is het moeilijk een verschil te meten.224 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
RESONANTIE EN VERBINDINGEN TUSSEN TWEE BREINEN
DehierbovenbeschrevenresultatenzijnverkregendoordefMRIdatateanalyserenop
eenconventionelemanier. Datwilzeggendatwegetoetsthebbenwelkegebiedenhun
activiteit verhogen als een taak begint en deze verlagen als de taak is afgelopen. Waar
we hiernaast in geïnteresseerd waren was de vraag of de spiegelgebieden van degene
die aan het raden was, zou resoneren met de hersenactiviteit van degene die aan
het uitbeelden was. Het Hints experiment is zodanig opgezet dat de hersenactiviteit
van beide personen tijdens het spel gemeten was. Hierdoor konden we een link
leggen tussen de hersenactiviteit van beide personen. We hebben de analysemethode
Granger causaliteit gebruikt (zie paragraaf ‘Granger causaliteit’ voor een uitgebreide
uitlegvandezemethode). Hierdoorkondenwebepalenofactiviteitinhersengebieden
van de persoon die raadt wordt beinvloed door activiteit in hersengebieden van
degene die uitbeeldt. Met andere woorden, we hebben getest in welke gebieden
in het brein van degene die raadt, de hersenactiviteit zich laten voorspellen door
de hersenactiviteit in de spiegelgebieden van degene die uitbeeldt. De resultaten
beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat de spiegelgebieden van degene die aan het
raden is inderdaad nauwgezet de spiegelgebieden van degene die aan het uitbeelden
is volgen. Dat wil zeggen, als een spiegelgebied van de uitbeelder het ene moment
iets actiever wordt en daarna iets minder actief, dan gebeurde dit vervolgens ook in
de spiegelgebieden van degene die aan het raden was.
Verrassend genoeg bleek dat de ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex van degene
die raadt ook een nauwgezette relatie heeft met de spiegelgebieden van degene die
aan het uitbeelden is. Dit was niet geheel verwacht omdat we met een klassieke
analysemethode hadden gevonden dat de activiteit in dit gebied tijdens het raden van
gebaren niet wezenlijk verschilt van diens activiteit tijdens rust. Dit betekent dat dit
gebied wel degelijk een rol speelt in het observeren en interpreteren van de gebaren
van iemand anders.
Naast de oorspronkelijke analyse tussen degene die uitbeeldt en degene die raadt,
hebben we ook een aantal controleanalyses uitgevoerd. Zo hadden de deelnemers
van het experiment de opnames van de gebaren van hun partner later (d.w.z na
het spelen van Hints) nogmaals gezien, maar nu met de instructie om te proberen
geen interpretatie te vormen (‘passieve observatie’). De nauwgezette temporele
relaties tussen de spiegelgebieden en de ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex die
gevonden waren tussen degene die raadt en degene die uitbeeldt, vermindert sterk
als degene die raadt wordt vervangen door iemand die slechts passief observeert.
Dit laat zien dat de relatie tussen hersengebieden afhankelijk is van de taak die de
deelnemers uitvoeren, zelfs bij exact dezelfde stimuli. Uiteraard is het erg moeilijk om
te kijken en tegelijkertijd niet te interpreteren, maar de deelnemers aan het onderzoek
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spel. Hetzelfde effect treedt op als de analyse wordt uitgevoerd tussen degene die
uitbeeldt en een willekeurige andere deelnemer die andere gebaren had gezien. Ook
een controleanalyse waarbij we, woord voor woord, de hersenactiviteit van degene
die uitbeeldt koppelen aan de hersenactiviteit van een willekeurige rader die een
overeenkomstig woord had gezien (maar van een ander persoon), laat zien dat dit
resonantie effect sterk vermindert.
VERBINDINGEN TUSSEN GEBIEDEN VAN HET SPIEGELSYSTEEM
DelaatsteonderzoeksvraagdiewehebbengetestmethetHintsexperimentisdevraag
hoe de spiegelgebieden van degene die aan het raden is met elkaar samenwerken. We
hebben hiervoor twee modellen van het spiegelsysteem met elkaar vergeleken die
hierover tegenstrijdige voorspellingen doen.
Een gangbaar model van het spiegelsysteem beschrijft het spiegelsysteem als puur
‘feed-forward’ (Kilner et al., 2007a). Dit houdt in dat de visuele representatie van een
waargenomen handeling wordt omgezet in het bijbehorende motorische programma,
wat vervolgens leidt tot het begrijpen van die handeling. Op neuraal niveau betekent
dit dat de informatiestroom binnen het spiegelsysteem de volgende weg aﬂegt: tem-
porele cortex ! parietale cortex ! premotorische cortex. Een alternatief voor dit
model is om het spiegelsysteem te beschouwen als een dynamisch feedback controle
systeem. Dit systeem is gebaseerd op het idee van ‘forward’ en ‘inverse’ modellen
uit motor controle theorieën (Wolpert et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2006; Greenwald, 1970).
Tijdens het uitvoeren van een handeling wordt een kopie van het motorische pro-
gramma doorgestuurd naar sensorische cortices, zodat een voorspelling kan worden
gemaakt over wat voor sensorische input verwacht kan worden. Als je bijvoorbeeld
een kopje oppakt, dan verwacht je je eigen arm en hand voor je te zien die naar het
kopje reiken. Dit wordt het forward model genoemd. Het inverse model, daarentegen,
doet precies het omgekeerde: als je iemand een kopje op ziet pakken, dan zorgt het
inverse model dat de visuele representatie omgezet wordt in de bijbehorende mo-
torische representaties die nodig zouden zijn geweest om deze sensorische input te
veroorzaken. De dynamische feedback controle theorie neemt aan dat de forward
modellen een inhiberende werking hebben. Ze kunnen dus de activiteit van het
hersengebied waarmee ze in verbinding staan verminderen (Hietanen and Perrett,
1993, 1996). Een mooi voorbeeld hiervan is bijvoorbeeld dat het moeilijk is om jezelf
te kietelen: de precieze verwachting van je eigen kriebelende hand vermindert de
gevoeligheid van de aanraking (Blakemore et al., 1998). Daarentegen hebben inverse
modellen voornamelijk een stimulerende werking en versterken daarmee de activiteit
van het gebied waarmee ze in verbinding staan (Gallese et al., 1996; Keysers et al.,
2003; Kraskov et al., 2009). De dynamische feedback controle theorie is dus een com-226 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
binatie van inhiberende forward- en stimulerende inverse modellen en op neuraal
niveau betekent dit dat de informatiestroom gedurende het waarnemen van gebaren
de volgende weg af zou moeten leggen: premotorische cortex ! parietale cortex !
temporele cortex.
De resultaten van onze connectiviteitsanalyse beschreven in Hoofdstuk 6 laten
zien dat de informatiestroom tijdens het interpreteren van gebaren voornamelijk
in posterieure richting gaat: premotorische cortex ! parietale cortex ! temporele
cortex. Dit is overeenstemming met de dynamische feedback controle theorie. De
combinatie van inhiberende forward- en stimulerende inverse modellen die deze
theorie voorstelt, leidt tot de volgende keten van gebeurtenissen in het brein: als
we een serie voorspelbare handelingen zien, dan wordt het inverse model aange-
sproken en de visuele representaties worden omgezet in de benodigde motorische
programma’s. Deze motorische programma’s worden vervolgens door het forward
model doorgestuurd naar de sensorische cortex om voorspellingen te maken over
mogelijke toekomstige input. Als deze voorspelling accuraat blijkt te zijn, dan wordt
de input geïnhibeerd. Komen de voorspelling en de werkelijke input echter niet met
elkaar overeen, dan wordt de nieuwe input niet geïnhibeerd en dat leidt tot de ac-
tivatie van andere motorische programma’s. Dit benadrukt dat de functie van het
spiegelsysteem te maken heeft met het voorspellen wat anderen gaan doen (Keysers
and Perrett, 2004; Kilner et al., 2007b; Miall, 2003).
GRANGER CAUSALITEIT
Om de verbindingen tussen twee breinen en tussen de gebieden van het spiegelsys-
teem te kunnen onderzoeken, hebben we gebruik gemaakt van de analysemethode
Granger causaliteit. Een Granger causaliteitsanalyse berekent of twee hersengebieden
elkaar beïnvloeden en in welke richting deze invloed voornamelijk gaat. Deze me-
thode is oorspronkelijk ontwikkeld in het vakgebied van econometrie om de stijging
en daling van aandelen te kunnen voorspellen (Wiener, 1956; Granger, 1969). Goebel
et al. (2003) en Roebroeck et al. (2005) hebben Granger causaliteit vervolgens geïn-
troduceerd als een methode om connectiviteit in fMRI data te analyseren. Granger
causaliteit is gebaseerd op het intuïtieve idee dat een oorzaak altijd eerder plaatsvindt
dan het gevolg. In termen van hersenactiviteit betekent dit dat als een verandering
in activiteit in gebied A consistent gevolgd wordt door een activiteitsverandering in
gebied B, dan zeggen we dat gebied A een Granger-causale invloed heeft op gebied B.
Wiskundig wordt dit uitgerekend door verschillende regressiemodellen met elkaar
te vergelijken: één waarin de huidige waarde van een signaal, yi, verklaard wordt
door zijn eigen verleden, yi¡j, en één waarin de huidige waarde van een signaal,
yi, wordt verklaard door zowel zijn eigen verleden, yi¡j, als het verleden van eenNEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 227
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Figuur 4: Kan een snellere hemodynamische respons leiden tot een schijnbare omge-
keerde invloed bij een Granger causaliteitsanalyse?
ander signaal, xi¡j. De F-verhouding van de variantie van de residuen van deze twee
regressiemodellen kwantiﬁceert de mate van invloed die x uitoefent op y. Ook wordt
de omgekeerde invloed berekend die y uitoefent op x. Door deze twee invloeden
van elkaar af te trekken wordt de dominante richting van invloed berekend. Granger
causaliteit is dus een statistische maat van de gerichte invloed tussen twee hersen-
gebieden. Het heeft als voordeel dat er geen onderliggend anatomisch model hoeft
te worden gespeciﬁceerd, het brengt simpelweg de gebieden in kaart die worden
beïnvloed door een bepaald gebied en andersom.
Het feit dat we Granger causaliteit gebruiken als analysemethode brengt potentiële
gevaren met zich mee. De resultaten van een Granger causaliteitsanalyse worden
namelijk geïnterpreteerd als zijnde informatiestromen op een neuraal niveau. Maar
wat we echter meten met fMRI is de hemodynamische respons, in plaats van neurale
activiteit. De hemodynamische respons is een gevolg van neurale activiteit, maar
ontwikkelt zich met een vertraging van ongeveer 4 tot 6 seconden ten opzichte van
deze neurale activiteit (Logothetis et al., 2001; Logothetis and Wandell, 2004). De
eigenschappen van de hemodynamische respons zijn niet overal in het brein of bij
alle mensen hetzelfde (Rajapakse et al., 1998; Aguirre et al., 1998; Kruggel and von
Cramon, 1999; Handwerker et al., 2004). Zo kan een hemodynamische respons in
het ene hersengebied een vertraging hebben van 3 seconden, terwijl de vertraging
in een ander gebied bijvoorbeeld wel 5 seconden kan zijn. In de literatuur wordt
vaak aangenomen dat deze verschillen problemen kunnen veroorzaken voor Granger
causaliteitsanalyses (David et al., 2008; de Marco et al., 2009; Roebroeck et al., 2005;
Friston, 2009; Chang et al., 2008). Het zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen zijn dat een systema-
tisch verschil in hemodynamische respons leidt tot een schijnbare oorzaak-gevolg
relatie, terwijl er op neuraal niveau geen werkelijk invloed bestaat. Daarnaast zou een
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een Granger causaliteitsanalyse kunnen omdraaien. Stel je bijvoorbeeld voor dat een
hersengebied A veranderingen in neurale activiteit in hersengebied B veroorzaakt.
Gebied B heeft echter een veel snellere hemodynamische respons dan gebied A (zie
Figuur 4). Het lijkt dan net of activiteit in gebied B altijd voorloopt op activiteit in
gebied A, terwijl dit alleen een effect is van de hemodynamische respons. Een Granger
causaliteitsanalyse is gebaseerd op de metingen van deze hemodynamische respon-
sen en kan dan als resultaat een netto invloed van gebied B naar gebied A geven in
plaats van de daadwerkelijk onderliggende neurale invloed die van gebied A naar
gebied B gaat.
Granger causaliteitsanalyses tussen de hersenactiviteit van twee verschillende brei-
nen zijn niet erg vatbaar voor deze fouten, omdat de verschillen in hemodynamische
respons kleiner zijn dan de tijd die het duurt om een gebaar te zien en te verwerken
(Handwerker et al., 2004). Voor onze analyses van het spiegelsysteem binnen één
brein, zou het echter wel rol kunnen spelen. Voordat we deze analyses hebben uit-
gevoerd, hebben we daarom eerst onderzocht of Granger causaliteit wel een goede
methode hiervoor is. Door middel van computersimulaties hebben we onderzocht
wat het effect is van verschillen in hemodynamische respons op Granger causaliteits-
analyses als deze worden uitgevoerd op groepsniveau. De volgende factoren zijn
systematisch onderzocht: (1) de mate van invloed tussen twee signalen, (2) de neuro-
nale afstand tussen de twee signalen (d.w.z. de tijd die het kost om informatie over te
dragen), (3) de hemodynamische responsen van de signalen en (4) de hoeveelheid
ruis in het signaal.
De resultaten beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5 laten zien de kans klein is (Ç5%) dat er
een signiﬁcant resultaat wordt gerapporteerd bij een Granger causaliteitsanalyse
als er geen onderliggende neurale beïnvloeding bestaat tussen twee signalen. De
kans op valse positieven is dus marginaal. Wanneer er wel een beïnvloeding bestaat
tussen de twee signalen en de neuronale afstand tussen de signalen groter is dan
1 seconde (bijvoorbeeld wanneer Granger causaliteit wordt toegepast tussen twee
breinen), dan worden er geen omgekeerde resultaten gevonden. Zelfs niet als het
verschil in hemodynamische responsen tegen de richting van de beïnvloeding gaat
(dus als de bron een langzamere hemodynamische respons heeft dan het doelwit).
Ook is de sensitiviteit bij deze neuronale afstand boven de 80% (als een realistische
hoeveelheid ruis is toegevoegd aan het signaal), wat voldoende is voor een dergelijke
analyse. Hiermee hebben we laten zien dat Granger causaliteit een goede methode is
om de informatiestroom tussen twee breinen in kaart te brengen.
Wat betreft een Granger causaliteitsanalyse binnen één brein laat de sensitiviteit
nog wat te wensen over, vooral bij korte neurale afstanden. Daar staat echter tegen-
over dat als er een signiﬁcant Granger causaliteitsresultaat is gevonden, deze in meer
dan 80% van de gevallen de juiste richting aangeeft. De resultaten van Granger causa-
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respons dan vaak wordt aangenomen. Granger causaliteit is daarmee een valide
methode om informatiestromen binnen één brein te onderzoeken. Hierbij moet wel
worden aangetekend dat veel invloeden niet gevonden zullen worden, maar dat dit
uiteraard geen bewijs is voor het niet bestaan van deze invloeden.
CONCLUSIES
In menselijke interactie zoals bij het spelen van het spel Hints, zijn zowel het spiegel-
systeem als de redeneergebieden in de hersenen betrokken. We hebben dat kunnen
vaststellen door aan te tonen dat tijdens het interpreteren van gebaren, de activiteit
van de ventrale mediale prefrontale cortex van de een sterk de spiegelgebieden volgt
van de ander, terwijl dat met de klassieke dataanalysemethoden niet kan worden
aangetoond. Als methode hebben wij Granger causaliteit geïntroduceerd en gevali-
deerd, waarmee de verbinding tussen twee breinen, de interactie, geanalyseerd kan
worden. Het toepassen van deze analysemethode op spiegelgebieden laat zien dat er
inderdaad sprake is van resonantie tussen twee breinen. Het is dus van belang om
bij het onderzoeken van het sociale brein beide kanten van een sociale interactie te
analyseren. Het analyseren van relaties tussen breinen in plaats van binnen één brein
levert nieuwe inzichten op die anders niet aan het licht komen.BIBLIOGRAFIE
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